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Essays in Corporate Finance 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation contains three chapters. In the first chapter, which is joint work 
with Paul Gompers and Steven Kaplan, we survey 79 private equity (PE) investors with 
combined assets under management of more than $750 billion about their practices in 
firm valuation, capital structure, governance, and value creation. Investors rely 
primarily on internal rates of return and multiples to evaluate investments. Their 
limited partners focus more on absolute performance as opposed to risk-adjusted 
returns. Capital structure choice is based equally on optimal trade-off and market 
timing considerations. PE investors anticipate adding value to portfolio companies, with 
a greater focus on increasing growth than on reducing costs. We also explore how the 
actions that PE managers say they take group into specific firm strategies and how 
those strategies are related to firm founder characteristics. 
The second chapter, co-authored with Efraim Benmelech, Nittai Bergman, and 
Anna Milanez, identifies a new channel through which bankrupt firms impose negative 
externalities on non-bankrupt peers. The bankruptcy and liquidation of a retail chain 
weakens the economies of agglomeration in any given local area, reducing the 
attractiveness of retail centers for remaining stores leading to contagion of financial 
iv 
 
distress. We find that companies with greater geographic exposure to bankrupt retailers 
are more likely to close stores in affected areas. We further show that the effect of these 
externalities on non-bankrupt peers is higher when the affected stores are smaller and 
are operated by firms with poor financial health. 
In the third chapter, using a novel dataset that allows me to capture the 
education and career trajectories of over 250,000 employees of 224 bank holding 
companies, I find that banks with shorter employee tenures and higher fractions of 
MBAs, top school graduates, and job jumpers performed more poorly during the Great 
Recession. This relationship is driven by the predisposition of these banks to take on 
greater risk. These same workforce measures also explain banks’ performance in the 
1998 crisis. Taken together, my results suggest that investigating workforce measures 
could be a step towards quantifying components of risk culture or strategy that 
contribute to financial institutions’ vulnerability to crisis. 
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Chapter 1 
 
What Do Private Equity Firms Say They Do?1 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The private equity (PE, buyout) industry has grown markedly since the mid-
1990s, and academic research has increasingly focused on the effects of private equity.2 
What have been less explored are the specific analyses and actions taken by PE fund 
managers. This paper seeks to fill that gap. In a survey of 79 private equity firms 
managing more than $750 billion in capital, we provide granular information on PE 
managers’ practices in determining capital structure, valuing transactions, sourcing 
deals, governance, and operational engineering. We also explore how the actions that 
private equity managers say they take group into specific firm strategies and how those 
strategies are related to firm founder characteristics. 
Recent academic research has provided accumulating evidence that private equity 
investors have performed well relative to reasonable benchmarks. At the private equity                                                              
1 Co-authored with Paul Gompers and Steven Kaplan. 
2 We classify private equity as buyout or growth equity investments in mature companies. Private equity 
as we define it in this paper is distinct from and does not include venture capital (VC) investments. Many 
papers in the literature study both venture capital and buyout investments, particularly those related to 
performance for limited partners. We decided to pursue PE firms instead of VC firms for several reasons. 
First, PE firms take different actions and invest in different companies than VC firms. Studying the asset 
classes together would have made the paper even longer and more unwieldy. In contrast, performance can 
be compared across asset classes, making it sensible to study VC and PE together. Second, PE firms are 
arguably subject to more controversy about what they do and whether they create value. And, finally, PE 
is a much larger asset class. 
 2 
fund level, Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan (2014), Higson and Stucke (2012), Robinson 
and Sensoy (2013), and Ang, Chen, Goetzmann, and Phalippou (2013) all find that 
private equity funds have outperformed public equity markets net of fees since the mid-
1980s. The outperformance versus the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 in Harris, 
Jenkinson, and Kaplan is on the order of 20% over the life of a fund and roughly 4% per 
year. Consistent with that net of fee performance, Axelson, Sorensen, and Strömberg 
(2013) find outperformance of over 8% per year gross of fees. 
At the private equity portfolio company level, Davis, Haltiwanger, Handley, 
Jarmin, Lerner, and Miranda (2014) find significant increases in productivity in a large 
sample of US buyouts from the 1980s to early 2000s. Cohn and Towery (2013) find 
significant increases in operating performance in a large sample of US buyouts of private 
firms. Kaplan (1989) finds significant increases in public to private deals in the 1980s. 
Cohn, Mills, and Towery (2014) and Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song (2011) find modest 
increases in operating performance for public to private buyouts in the 1990s and early 
2000s, although Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song find large increases in company values. 
From Gompers and Lerner (1999), Metrick and Yasuda (2010), and Chung, 
Sensoy, Stern, and Weisbach (2012), we also know that the compensation of the 
partners at the private equity funds creates strong incentives to generate high returns, 
both directly and through the ability to raise subsequent funds. Strong performance for 
some funds has led to very high compensation for those investors. 
The high-powered incentives combined with the largely positive empirical results 
are consistent with PE investors taking actions that are value increasing or maximizing. 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) classify three types of value-increasing actions: financial 
engineering, governance engineering, and operational engineering. These value-increasing 
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actions are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but certain firms likely emphasize some 
of them more than others. 
In financial engineering, PE investors provide strong equity incentives to the 
management teams of their portfolio companies. At the same time, leverage puts 
pressure on managers not to waste money. In governance engineering, PE investors 
control the boards of their portfolio companies and are more actively involved in 
governance than public company directors and public shareholders. In operational 
engineering, PE firms develop industry and operating expertise that they bring to bear 
to add value to their portfolio companies.  
Despite the growth in private equity, only a few papers have studied the actions 
that private equity investors take. Early papers by Baker and Wruck (1989) and Baker 
(1992) explored value creation in individual cases. More recently, Acharya, Gottschalg, 
Hahn, and Kehoe (2013) study portfolio company performance and relate that 
performance to PE firm and partner characteristics. Much still remains unknown. No 
paper examines detailed levers of value creation across financial, governance, and 
operational engineering.  
In this paper, we further explore what PE investors do by reporting the results of 
a survey of private equity investing practices. First, we identify and tabulate the key 
decisions that private equity investors make. The range of decisions is significantly more 
detailed than has been examined in the prior literature. Our survey is structured around 
examining decisions that support financial, governance, or operational engineering. 
Second, we attempt to categorize distinct strategies that private equity firms employ.  
We survey 79 PE investors (with a total of more than $750 billion of private 
equity assets under management (AUM) as of the end of 2012). We obtain complete 
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answers from 64 of these firms (representing more than $600 billion of private equity 
AUM). The sample represents private equity firms across a spectrum of investment 
strategies, size, industry specialization, and geographic focus. We ask the PE investors 
questions about financial engineering—how they value companies and how they think 
about portfolio company capital structures and management incentives; governance 
engineering—how they think about governance and monitoring; and operational 
engineering—how they think about value creation, both before and after closing the 
transaction. We also ask questions about the organization of the private equity firms 
themselves. 
Despite the prominent role that discounted cash flow valuation methods play in 
academic finance courses, few PE investors use discounted cash flow or net present 
value techniques to evaluate investments. Instead, they rely on internal rates of return 
(IRRs) and multiples of invested capital (MOICs). This contrasts with the results in 
Graham and Harvey (2001), that chief financial officers (CFOs) use net present values 
as often as internal rates of return. Furthermore, few PE investors explicitly use the 
capital asset price model (CAPM) to determine a cost of capital. Instead, PE investors 
target a 22% internal rate of return on their investments on average (with the vast 
majority of target rates of return between 20% and 25%), a return that appears to be 
above a CAPM-based rate. We offer several potential explanations for this seemingly ad 
hoc approach to investment analysis.  
We also asked the PE investors how their limited partners (LPs) evaluate the 
performance of the private equity investors. Surprisingly, the PE investors believe that 
their LPs are most focused on absolute performance than on relative performance or 
alphas. This is also puzzling given that private equity investments are equity 
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investments, some of which had been publicly traded prior to a leveraged buyout. Such 
investments carry significant equity risk, suggesting that equity-based benchmarks such 
as public market equivalents (PMEs) are appropriate. 
Our results on capital structure are more consistent with academic theory and 
teaching. In choosing the capital structures for their portfolio companies, PE investors 
appear to rely equally on factors that are consistent with capital structure trade-off 
theories and those that are consistent with market timing. The market timing result is 
consistent with the results in Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg, and Weisbach (2013; 
henceforth AJSW (2013)), although the capital structure trade-off theory result is not. 
These results are, however, somewhat different from those in Graham and Harvey 
(2001), who find that CFOs focus on financial flexibility. 
Financial and governance engineering also appear to be important. In terms of 
portfolio company management, PE investors expect to provide strong equity incentives 
to their management teams and believe those incentives are very important. They 
regularly replace top management, both before and after they invest. And they structure 
smaller boards of directors with a mix of insiders, PE investors, and outsiders. These 
results are consistent with research on value-enhancing governance structures that have 
been identified in other settings. 
Finally, PE investors say they place a heavy emphasis on adding value to their 
portfolio companies, both before and after they invest. The sources of that added value, 
in order of importance, are increasing revenue, improving incentives and governance, 
facilitating a high-value exit or sale, making additional acquisitions, replacing 
management, and reducing costs. On average, they commit meaningful resources to add 
value, although a great deal of variation exists in how they do so. 
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We take the responses to the various questions about individual decisions and 
analyze how various decisions are related to each other by employing cluster analysis 
and factor analysis. Essentially, we use cluster analysis to explore whether private 
equity firms follow particular strategies. We find that the answers to our survey cluster 
into categories that are related to financial engineering, governance engineering, and 
operational engineering, that is, the levers of value creation highlighted in Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2009). 
We then consider how those strategies are related to firm founder characteristics. 
Firms with founders who have a financial background tend to focus more on financial 
engineering, while those who have a previous background in private equity and, to a 
lesser extent, operations tend to focus more on operational engineering. 
In what follows, we assume the PE investor responses are accurate and interpret 
the survey accordingly. The PE investors filled out the survey with the assurance that 
they would not be identified and that their responses would be aggregated so they could 
not be identified. No individual firm thus has any incentive to report overly positive or 
otherwise inaccurate responses. Doing so will not benefit any one individual firm 
directly. We recognize, however, that some PE investors could report overly positively 
on some questions in the hope that the PE industry will be cast in a better light. We 
discuss how such behavior could affect our results. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 relates the paper to the existing 
literature. Section 1.3 discusses the research design and the sample. Sections 1.4–1.6 
examine PE firms’ financial, governance, and operational engineering practices. Section 
1.7 explores the organizational structure of firms. Section 1.8 discusses potential 
concerns stemming from the survey research design. Section 1.9 explores how the actions 
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that PE managers say they take are reflected into specific firm strategies. Section 1.10 
relates those strategies to firm founder characteristics. Section 1.11 concludes. 
1.2 Related literature 
This paper is related to several strands in the literature. Our survey allows us to 
evaluate whether and how different corporate finance theories are applied in practice by 
investors with extremely high incentives to perform and who also have the highest level 
of education from top business schools. Large academic literatures study firm valuation, 
capital structure, and governance. Do what private equity investors say they do conform 
to what researchers think should be done? Our paper explores how these financial 
decisions are related to firm characteristics. 
Research on capital structure has spawned large numbers of papers that seek to 
explain how firms set their debt and equity structures. Three primary theories receive 
prominence in the literature. First, the trade-off theory of Myers (1977) predicts that 
the amount of debt that a firm raises is a balance between the value creation of interest 
tax shields and the expected cost of financial distress. It is optimal for firms to raise 
additional debt until the marginal tax shield benefit of the additional dollar of debt 
equals the marginal increase in expected cost of financial distress. The trade-off theory 
corresponds to what most introductory finance courses teach about debt policy. Second, 
the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) predicts that firms prefer to raise as much safe 
debt as possible. Once safe debt is exhausted, firms raise risky debt then equity to fund 
projects. Third, Baker and Wurgler (2002) propose a theory of capital structure that 
depends on firm managers timing markets based upon the mispricing of debt or equity. 
When interest rates are perceived to be particularly low relative to fundamentals, firms 
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increase borrowing, and when equity markets are overvalued, firms would tend to raise 
more equity. We seek to assess how much of private equity firm managers’ leverage 
decisions are governed by each of these theories. 
Governance engineering has been another major area of research in corporate 
finance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) were among the first scholars to note that agency 
conflicts exist between managers (who typically own small fractions of equity in the 
firms that they manage) and outside shareholders. Governance engineering involves 
creating a better alignment of incentives between managers and shareholders or 
providing better oversight that can limit empire building and opportunistic behavior. 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) demonstrate that broad measures of corporate 
governance are related to public company performance and valuation. Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) create a framework to measure the incentive effects of equity ownership 
for firm managers. Kaplan (1989) examines management ownership changes in a sample 
of leveraged buyouts from the 1980s and finds that ownership substantially increases on 
average. 
Incentive compensation has been a particularly important area of governance 
research. Jensen (1986) argues that managers of publicly traded firms typically own too 
little equity to make them sensitive to maximizing shareholder value. Private equity 
managers who are aware of these issues seek to align incentives through increases in 
managerial equity ownership. 
Boards of directors are often viewed as an important governance tool to monitor 
managers on behalf of shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) discuss the role of boards 
and how boards should function. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) examine the 
determinants of board structure and argue that board structure tends to be 
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endogenously determined to minimize conflicts with shareholders. Coles, Daniels, and 
Naveen (2008) examine how board size is related to both firm characteristics and firm 
performance. In general, the literature argues that small boards dominated by outsiders 
perform better. We examine board strategy issues for private equity investors. 
We also examine specific strategies around improvement in operating 
performance. Many private equity firms market to their investors and potential portfolio 
companies their ability to increase value by improving operating performance. Kaplan 
(1989) was the first to find improved operating performance after firms undergo a 
leveraged buyout. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) summarize subsequent research largely 
confirming that private equity investments are associated with improvements in 
operating performance or productivity. While little research has identified the key 
operating levers that private equity managers pull to improve performance, several 
papers have examined the effects of private equity on the operational performance of the 
companies they own. More recently, Davis, Haltiwanger, Handley, Jarmin, Lerner, and 
Miranda (2014) use US Census data to study a large sample of US buyouts and find 
that they are associated with increased productivity. Cohn and Towery (2013) use 
income tax data to study a large sample of US buyouts and find improvements in 
operating margins. The exceptions to these positive results are public to private 
transactions. Cohn, Mills, and Towery (2014) and Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song (2011) find 
modest, but insignificant, increases in operating margins in US public to private 
transactions. 
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In doing these analyses, we view this paper as a complement to the survey papers 
of Graham and Harvey, beginning with Graham and Harvey (2001).3 Graham and 
Harvey survey chief financial officers to understand how they make capital budgeting, 
capital structure, and other decisions. They compare their survey findings of practice 
with the recommendations or insights from different academic theories. In this paper, we 
do the same. We view this survey as particularly interesting because private equity 
investors have been so successful (both in terms of generating attractive returns for 
investors and compensation for their managers), have strong incentives to maximize 
shareholder value, and, because of those incentives and compensation, very likely attract 
talented individuals. Furthermore, a large percentage of private equity investors have 
been trained at prominent business schools. In recent years, positions in private equity 
firms have been among the most coveted for graduating master of business 
administration (MBA) students. A PitchBook 2013 survey showed that a small number 
of elite business schools accounted for the majority of new hires in private equity. As 
such, we might expect that private equity investors’ practices would approximate what 
financial economists believe is theoretically (and empirically) value maximizing. 
Finally, our paper is complementary to Da Rin and Phalippou (2014), who 
survey a large sample of PE limited partners. Their survey includes questions on the 
criteria PE limited partners use in choosing PE investments. Da Rin and Phalippou, 
however, have relatively little to say about the internal decision-making and strategies 
of the general partner. 
  
                                                             
3 See also Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) and Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005). 
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1.3 Sample and design 
In this section, we discuss the implementation of the survey and the sample of 
firms used in the study. 
1.3.1 Design 
We created the survey to determine what PE investors say that they do. We also 
attempted to design the survey to compare what those investors do relative to what is 
taught at business schools. We initially tested the survey on three PE investors in the 
summer of 2011. We revised the survey to reflect some ambiguities in our questions and 
to add some questions. The final survey contains 92 questions and is available on Paul 
Gompers’s website.4 
1.3.2 Delivery and response 
We began to distribute the survey to PE investors in the fall of 2011. We 
distributed it to firms in which one of us knew or was introduced to a senior investment 
professional. We continued to identify potential PE investors in 2012. We received our 
last survey response in the winter of 2013. The vast majority of survey responses, 
therefore, were received in 2012. 
We contacted a total of 136 PE firms. We sent survey links to 106 investors at 
these firms who expressed an interest in the survey. Of these, 79 filled out some part of 
the survey and 64 completely filled out the survey. The response rate of roughly 50% is 
much higher than the response rate for other surveys. Graham and Harvey (2001) 
obtain a response rate of 8.9% for CFOs, and Da Rin and Phalippou (2014) obtain a 
response rate of 13.8% for PE limited partners.                                                              
4 See http://people.hbs.edu/pgompers/GKM_PE_survey.pdf 
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1.3.3 Private equity firm characteristics 
Table 1.1 provides some summary statistics for the firms of the PE investors who 
responded to the survey. We obtained cumulative assets under management in private 
equity, performance of the most recent primary fund (if available), and age of each 
private equity firm in the sample as of December 2012 from Preqin. 5 Information on 
firms not covered by Preqin is taken from firm websites and media articles. 
Table 1.1: Private equity firm respondents 
 
 N Mean 25th percentile Median 75th percentile 
Standard 
deviation 
AUM (millions of dollars) 79 9,548.6 750.0 3,400.0 11,000.0 15,021.1 
IRR over benchmark (percent) 58 2.7 −3.9 0.9 6.9 11.8 
Multiple of invested capital 58 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.5 0.3 
Age (years) 79 19.5 12.0 19.0 26.0 10.5 
Firms with       
- office(s) only in the US 44      
- office(s) outside the US 35      
 
Notes: This table describes the sample PE investor respondents. Reported are assets under management 
(AUM), performance of most recent fund (if available), and age of each private equity firm in the sample 
as of December 2012 from Preqin. Information on firms not covered by Preqin is taken from firm websites 
and the media. We also use the results of the current survey to determine office locations of firms in the 
sample. IRR = internal rate of return. 
 
 
The table shows a large variation in the size of the firms as measured by assets 
under management. The mean AUM is just under $10 billion. A quarter of the firms 
have AUM under $750 million and a quarter have AUM above $11 billion. 
Our overall sample of 79 firms represents firms with a total of more than $750 
billion in AUM. Our sample of 64 firms that completed the entire survey represents a 
total of more than $600 billion in AUM. We have solid coverage of the largest PE firms. 
                                                             
5 This measures cumulative AUM for the PE firm, not the size of the most recent fund. 
 13 
Each year, Private Equity International (PEI) ranks the top PE firms globally by AUM. 
Our (fully completed) sample has 11 of the top 25 in PEI’s 2012 list. Given this, our 
results are reflective of a meaningful fraction of the PE industry. 
The table also indicates that Preqin has performance data for the most recent 
fund for 58 of the sample PE firms. The average fund in the sample has an IRR that is 
2.7% above Preqin’s benchmark IRR for the same vintage year. The median fund is 
0.9% above. This suggests that our sample is largely representative of the PE fund 
universe, at least in terms of performance. If anything, we could have a small bias 
towards better performers. We do not believe such a bias would influence our results in 
a meaningful way. If anything, our sample of firms would be expected to employ better 
practices than other PE firms and as such their actions should conform more closely to 
what finance research and courses prescribe. 
Despite the apparent representativeness of the sample and the relatively high 
response rate, we recognize that the sample is potentially selected. This is unavoidable 
given our requirement that we have an introduction to a senior person and given that 
PE firms have limited disclosure requirements. Given the large total AUM our sample 
PE firms control, the survey represents a meaningful fraction of the PE industry. 
Table 1.2 presents the distribution of enterprise values of the portfolio companies 
in which the PE firms invest. The sample has good representation of many different PE 
firm enterprise values and covers the broad spectrum of PE investing. The table 
suggests that almost one-sixth of portfolio company investments by the sample PE firms 
have enterprise values exceeding $1 billion and almost 12% have enterprise values below 
$25 million. 
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Table 1.2: Enterprise value 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
Enterprise value Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
< $25 million 11.8  0.0 19.0  5.5***    4.4  9.4    6.2 16.1**   16.2  6.3** 
$25 million – $100 million 26.3 10.0 44.4 10.4***   16.8 23.5   20.1 31.0   33.4 17.5** 
$100 million – $500 million 28.7 22.0 28.6 28.8   29.3 31.9   31.4 26.6   27.6 30.1 
$500 million – $1 billion 16.8 10.0  5.2 27.0***   22.0 19.8   19.4 14.9   12.7 21.9** 
> $1 billion 16.4  0.0  2.8 28.3***   27.4 15.3   22.9 11.4**   10.2 24.1** 
Number of responses  79  79  37  42    29  29    34  45    44  35 
 
Notes: This table describes the enterprise value of portfolio companies of the sample private equity (PE) 
investors. Question is: “What fraction of the companies you invest in have the total enterprise value 
within the following ranges?” The sample is divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under 
management (AUM), the internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and 
by whether PE investor has a global presence. Statistical significance of the difference between subgroup 
means at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
Table 1.3 confirms that the private equity investors in our sample are primarily 
buyout and growth equity investors, not venture capital investors. Over 90% of the PE 
investors invest in buyouts and almost 75% invest in growth equity. These add up to 
more than one because many PE investors invest in both buyouts and growth equity. A 
minority of the sample firms, particularly the older and larger ones, also invests in 
distressed investments and PIPEs (private investments in public equities). 
Table 1.3: Type of investments 
 
    AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
Type of investment Mean Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
LBOs 90.1 82.9 97.2**   92.3 96.2   93.9 86.8   92.7 86.7 
Growth equity 73.2 74.3 72.2   65.4 73.1   69.7 76.3   73.2 73.3 
Distress 29.6 17.1 41.7**   26.9 34.6   30.3 28.9   19.5 43.3** 
PIPEs 32.4 20.0 44.4**   38.5 38.5   45.5 21.1**   31.7 33.3 
Other  8.5  8.6  8.3    3.8  7.7    9.1  7.9    7.3 10.0 
Number of responses  71  35  36    26  26    33  38    41  30 
 
Notes: This table describes the types of investments considered by the sample private equity (PE) 
investors. The sample is divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under management (AUM), 
the internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor 
has a global presence. Statistical significance of the difference between subgroup means at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. LBOs = leveraged buyouts; PIPEs = private 
investments in public equity. 
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Finally, consistent with our survey delivery method, Table 1.4 indicates that over 
three-quarters of the surveys were completed by a senior PE executive; one with the 
title general partner, managing partner, or managing director. As such, we feel that the 
responses are very likely indicative of firm practices employed within the PE 
organizations broadly. 
Table 1.4: Private equity individual respondents 
 
    AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
Title Mean Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
General partner or director 25.3 21.6 28.6   31.0 31.0   32.4 20.0   25.0 25.7 
Managing partner 22.8 35.1 11.9**   13.8 20.7   20.6 24.4   29.5 14.3 
Managing director 29.1 18.9 38.1   37.9 20.7   26.5 31.1   22.7 37.1 
Chief financial officer  3.8  5.4  2.4    3.4  6.9    2.9  4.4    6.8  0.0 
Other 19.0 18.9 19.0   13.8 20.7   17.6 20.0   15.9 22.9 
Number of responses  79  37  42    29  29    34  45    44  35 
 
Notes: This table describes the title of the individual filling out the survey at the sample PE investor 
firms. The sample is divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under management (AUM), 
the internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor 
has a global presence. Statistical significance of the difference between subgroup means at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
We also used the PE firm websites to collect the names and educations of all of 
the partner-level executives at our sample PE firms. We used the titles partner, 
managing partner, managing director, senior managing director, founder, chief executive 
officer (CEO), chairman, head, and principal. We identified 767 such individuals. Of 
these, almost two-thirds have either an MBA or a doctor of law degree (juris doctor or 
JD)—435 or 57% have an MBA and 54 or 7% have a law degree. Of those with an 
MBA, 167 (38%) are from Harvard Business School, 52 (12%) are from University of 
Chicago Booth School of Business, 39 (9%) are from Stanford Graduate School of 
Business, 32 (7%) are from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, and 
23 (5%) are from Columbia Business School. These figures indicate that the top 
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executives at these firms are highly educated and a very large fraction of them have 
degrees from what would be considered the top graduate schools. Once again, we believe 
that, given the educational background of the sample, our PE firms would likely employ 
industry best practices in their investment process. At the same time, we could have 
oversampled Harvard and Chicago alums while undersampling Wharton alums.6 
1.4 Financial engineering 
This section explores how PE firms state that they employ different components 
of financial engineering.  
1.4.1 Valuation: capital budgeting 
In this subsection, we consider how PE investors value the companies in which 
they invest or, equivalently, evaluate the attractiveness of those investments. A 
substantial corporate finance literature has developed around capital budgeting. Firms 
decide which projects to undertake based upon a variety of investment rules. Much of 
the early finance research established that optimal decision making for firms should be 
based on net present value analyses.7 Finance theory is clear that estimating expected 
future cash flows from an investment, then using a discount rate that is derived from an 
explicit asset pricing model (e.g., CAPM or Fama and French three-factor model) 
should lead to better investment decisions when compared with alternatives such as 
internal rate of return or payback analysis (e.g., multiple on invested capital). The 
theory, therefore, predicts or suggests that private equity investors should be more likely                                                              
6 The PitchBook database finds that Harvard Business School alums make up 26%; Wharton alums, 11%; 
and Chicago alums, 7% of all PE firm professionals. See “Harvard, 4 Other Schools, Make Up Most MBAs 
at PE & VC Firms,” http://blog.pitchbook.com/harvard-4-other-schools-make-up-most-mbas-at-pe-vc-
firms/ 
7 For example, see Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2013). 
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to use discounted cash flow methods. Our results allow us to explore how investment 
decision-making criteria at PE firms compares with the framework implied by finance 
theory. 
1.4.1.1 Valuation: evaluation methods 
The survey asks the PE investors to identify different methods they use to 
evaluate the overall attractiveness of a deal. First, we asked which metrics they use, 
giving them the choice of gross internal rate of return, multiple of invested capital, 
adjusted present value (APV) discounted cash flow (DCF), weighted average costs of 
capital (WACC) DCF, comparable company EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization) multiples, and free cash flow return to equity. Panel A 
of Table 1.5 reports the results. The vast majority of the PE investors rely on gross IRR 
and MOIC. Over 70% also incorporate comparable company multiples. In contrast, 
relatively few PE investors use DCF methods. In sum, less than 20% use APV or 
WACC-based DCF methods to evaluate investments. Second, we asked the PE 
investors to rank their reliance on the different methods. Again, as Panel B of Table 1.5 
indicates, IRR (in particular) and multiple approaches are the overwhelming favorites 
while net and adjusted present value approaches lag far behind. 
We also directly asked private equity managers how they calculate their WACC. 
Only 18 (or 27%) of the PE investors describe performing a calculation that can be 
generously considered to approximate a traditional, CAPM-based approach. At the 
same time, 27 said they did not use WACC and another 10 said “not applicable,” 
indicating, that they, too, do not use WACC. Overall, then, at least 55% of the PE 
investors appear not to use WACC at all. 
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Table 1.5: Deal evaluation metrics and methods 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
Metric/method Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
 
Panel A: Deal evaluation metrics 
Gross IRR 92.7 100.0 88.5 97.0   99.9 96.9   100.0 86.4**   94.2 90.5 
Multiple of invested capital 94.8 100.0 92.1 97.7   99.1 93.3    96.1 93.7   95.5 93.8 
Adjusted present value (APV) 
DCF  9.3   0.0  7.1 11.5    9.3  7.3     3.9 13.9   10.5  7.6 
WACC-based DCF 10.9   0.0  9.3 12.5    5.5 15.2     8.9 12.5    9.4 12.9 
Comparable company EBITDA 
multiples 71.7 100.0 71.4 72.1   63.0 90.7**    75.9 68.1   76.7 64.8 
Free cash flow return to equity 43.8  33.0 29.7 58.3***   45.2 43.7    44.4 43.2   40.7 48.1 
Other 13.8   0.0 10.3 17.4    7.0 21.7    12.1 15.3    8.3 21.4 
Number of responses  67   67  34  33    25  23     31  36    39  28 
 
Panel B: Deal evaluation methods 
Accounting rate of return  0.6   0.0  0.9  0.2    0.7  0.7     0.5  0.7    0.6  0.5 
Adjusted present value  0.9   0.0  0.6  1.2    0.6  0.8     0.5  1.3    0.8  1.0 
Discounted payback period  1.7   0.0  1.7  1.6    1.3  1.3     1.3  1.9    1.9  1.3 
Earnings multiple approach  6.1   8.0  6.0  6.1    5.5  6.2     5.4  6.7    6.1  6.1 
Hurdle rate  3.6   0.0  3.7  3.5    4.4  2.0**     3.4  3.8    3.7  3.5 
Internal rate of return  9.2  10.0  9.0  9.4    9.8  9.1     9.5  9.0    8.9  9.6 
Net present value  2.8   0.0  2.1  3.4    3.7  2.0     2.5  3.0    2.4  3.3 
Payback period  2.4   0.0  2.4  2.4    2.1  2.1     2.5  2.3    2.8  1.7 
Profitability index  0.9   0.0  1.0  0.8    0.8  0.3     0.3  1.5**    0.5  1.4 
Other  2.1   0.0  2.5  1.6    2.2  2.8     2.3  1.9    1.9  2.3 
Number of responses  67   67  34  33    25  23     31  36    39  28 
 
Notes: Panel A presents the percentage of deals for which the sample private equity (PE) investors use 
different methods to evaluate an investment. Panel B provides the average ranking of different methods 
that the sample PE investors use to evaluate an investment, where 10 is the highest and 1 is the lowest. 
The sample is divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under management (AUM), the 
internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor has 
a global presence. Statistical significance of the difference between subgroup means at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. DCF = discounted cash flow; WACC = weighted 
average cost of capital; EBITDA = earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. 
 
 
These results indicate that PE investors do not frequently use net present value 
or DCF techniques. This contrasts markedly with the results in Graham and Harvey 
(2001) for CFOs. They find that CFOs rely on net present value techniques roughly as 
frequently as IRR and that large company CFOs rely heavily on the CAPM to 
determine their cost of capital. 
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Our results for PE investors also contrast with the methods taught in MBA 
finance courses at all top business schools as well as typical valuation analyses seen in 
investment banker fairness opinions for mergers and acquisitions. CAPM-based 
discounted cash flow analyses are the primary method taught and used in those settings.  
Finally, in their IRR calculation, the PE investors clearly evaluate cash flows to 
leveraged equity. Arguably, this, too, contrasts with the usual academic advice in MBA 
finance courses to evaluate and discount cash flows to an all-equity firm. This also raises 
questions as to whether limited partners understand the returns are leveraged.  
1.4.1.2 Years of forecasts 
In evaluating any investment, investors typically forecast the cash flows of that 
investment over some period of time. We asked the PE investors to tell us the time 
horizon of the investment cash flows they evaluate. Figure 1.1 indicates that the great 
majority of PE investors, almost 96% of our sample, use a five-year forecast horizon. At 
the end of the five years, they typically calculate a terminal or exit value. This indicates 
that PE investors do not find it productive or valuable to forecast cash flows for more 
than five years. 
Graham and Harvey (2001) do not appear to have asked this question so we 
cannot compare our results with theirs. While we did not explicitly ask why PE firms 
use five years as the predominant forecasting horizon, most PE firms expect to hold 
their investments for approximately five years. As such, forecasting cash flows over five 
years approximates the PE firm’s time horizon. Several investors have told us that using 
a standard time period, such as five years, allows the PE firms to compare different 
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investments on an equal footing. That explains why each firm would use a standard 
horizon, but not why almost all firms would use the same five-year horizon. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Years of forecasts used by the sample private equity investors. 
 
 
1.4.1.3 Discount of management forecasts 
When PE investors evaluate an investment, they usually begin with a set of 
management forecasts. It seems natural to assume that the PE investors would view 
those forecasts as optimistic. Accordingly, we asked the PE investors whether they 
typically adjusted management’s forecasts. We asked them to measure this as a fraction 
of EBITDA, a measure of pre-tax cash flow. 
Table 1.6 shows that PE investors typically discount management forecasts. For 
the 44 PE investors who answered this question explicitly, the average and median 
discounts are 25% and 20%, respectively. Another 11 of the PE investors who did not 
provide a number indicated that the discount varied with the circumstances of 
individual deals. 
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Table 1.6: Discount to management’s EBITDA forecasts 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
 Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
Discount to management’s 
EBITDA 0.25 0.20 0.27 0.21   0.26 0.25   0.21 0.28   0.25 0.25 
Number of responses  44  44  27  17    15  14    20  24    29  15 
 
Notes: This table reports the discount that the sample private equity (PE) investors normally take to 
management’s EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) in their pro 
forma models. The sample is divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under management 
(AUM), the internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and by whether PE 
investor has a global presence. 
 
 
1.4.1.4 Exit value or terminal value 
To evaluate the economics of an investment, the PE investors need to estimate a 
value for their investment (or, equivalently the portfolio company) at the expected time 
of exit, which is almost always five years into the investment. This valuation can be 
done in (at least) three ways: (1) using the (discounted) value of a growing perpetuity of 
the final year cash flow in a CAPM framework, (2) using the value of comparable or 
similar public companies, and (3) using the value of acquisitions or transactions 
involving comparable or similar companies. 
Panel A of Table 1.7 indicates that PE investors are much more likely to use 
comparable methods—both publicly traded companies and transactions—than 
discounted cash flow methods. Fewer than 30% of the PE investors use a growing 
perpetuity methodology. The percentage increases for larger PE firms but remains below 
35%. The other category is dominated by 11 firms (or 16%) indicating that they use the 
entry multiple (the EBITDA multiple the PE investor paid for the company) to 
calculate the exit multiple. 
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Table 1.7: Terminal value calculation and comparable company selection 
 
     AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
 Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
 
Panel A: Terminal value calculation 
Comparable 
companies 81.4 100.0 75.3 87.7   81.3  88.6    87.3 76.3   78.2  85.8 
Comparable 
transactions 
71.4  99.0 67.8 75.0   73.2  80.3    79.5 64.4   76.1  64.8 
DCF-based growing 
perpetuity 27.3  10.0 20.5 34.3   28.1  16.4    26.6 27.9   21.0  36.0 
Other 25.6   0.0 33.5 17.4   20.7  31.1    22.8 27.9   28.7  21.3 
Number of responses  67   67  34  33    25   23     31  36    39   28 
 
Panel B: Comparable company selection 
Industry 96.9   96.9 97.0   95.8 100.0   100.0 94.1   94.6 100.0 
Riskiness 49.2   34.4 63.6**   54.2  56.5    45.2 52.9   48.6  50.0 
Size 84.6   87.5 81.8   87.5  87.0    90.3 79.4   86.5  82.1 
Growth 73.8   75.0 72.7   79.2  69.6    77.4 70.6   75.7  71.4 
Margins 66.2   59.4 72.7   83.3  65.2    67.7 64.7   62.2  71.4 
Capital intensity 52.3   31.3 72.7***   62.5  52.2    51.6 52.9   51.4  53.6 
Geography 56.9   43.8 69.7**   58.3  69.6    67.7 47.1   48.6  67.9 
Other  4.6    6.3  3.0    4.2   8.7     3.2  5.9    8.1   0.0 
Do not use 
comparables  3.1    3.1  3.0    4.2   0.0     0.0  5.9    5.4   0.0 
Number of responses  65    32  33    24   23     31  34    37   28 
 
Notes: Panel A reports the fraction of deals for which the sample private equity (PE) investors use 
different methods to calculate the exit value or terminal value of the model. Panel B shows the 
determinants of the selection that the sample PE investors use for comparable companies for multiples 
valuation or exit value. The sample is divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under 
management (AUM), the internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and 
by whether PE investor has a global presence. Statistical significance of the difference between subgroup 
means at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. DCF = discounted cash 
flow. 
 
 
Panel B explores how the PE investors choose the comparable companies they 
use. Industry and firm size are the most important criteria they match on, with growth, 
margins, and geography next in importance. Setting the exit multiple equal to the entry 
multiple is also consistent with matching on firm industry and size. Firm riskiness ranks 
seventh among the different criteria. Again, PE investors appear to be skeptical of using 
measures of risk that have strong foundations in academic finance. 
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1.4.1.5 IRR and MOIC targets 
PE investors do not explicitly use DCF or CAPM-based methods. Given their 
emphasis on IRR and MOIC, however, it is important to know what IRR and MOIC 
PE investors target and whether those targets bear any relation to CAPM-based 
returns. 
Panel A of Table 1.8 indicates that PE investors say they target median IRRs of 
25%. Smaller PE firms and those with global investment operations tend to target 
higher IRRs. A rough calculation suggests that this target exceeds a CAPM-based rate. 
In 2012, long-term Treasury bond rates did not exceed 4%. Axelson, Sorensen, and 
Strömberg (2013) estimate an average portfolio company equity beta of 2.3. Assuming 
an equity risk premium of 6%, these suggest a CAPM-based discount rate of less than 
18%. 
The fact that PE investors target returns exceed CAPM-based discount rates is 
not surprising. PE investors pay their fees out of gross IRRs. PE limited partners 
receive their returns net of those fees. In other words, to generate a competitive CAPM-
based return net of fees, PE investors must target a greater return gross of fees. 
Similarly, many PE firms argue that they generate returns in excess of the underlying 
riskiness of the portfolio. To earn positive excess returns, the PE firms would need to 
target returns that are higher than the return implied by the CAPM risk of the 
investment. 
We also asked two questions to determine whether PE investors adjusted their 
target IRR to reflect different risks in different deals. These are presented in Panels B 
and C of Table 1.8. Panel B indicates that over 85% of PE investors adjust their target 
IRRs for firm riskiness. While most PE investors explicitly do not use a CAPM-based 
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approach, this adjustment could be consistent with one. Unfortunately, the survey did 
not explicitly define firm risk. As a result, we cannot distinguish the extent to which 
firm risk refers to systematic or idiosyncratic risk. 
Table 1.8: Internal rate of return target, determinants, and adjustments 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
 Variables Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
 
Panel A: IRR 
Gross IRR target 27.0 25.0 30.0 24.1**   24.5 24.9   24.8 29.3   25.7 28.9 
Number of responses  62  62  31  31    24  22    31  31    36  26 
 
Panel B: IRR determinants 
Firm’s riskiness 86.2   84.4 87.9   91.7 91.3   90.3 82.4   91.9 78.6 
Leverage 47.7   40.6 54.5   58.3 52.2   51.6 44.1   54.1 39.3 
Historical return expectations of 
LPs 30.8   40.6 21.2   20.8 30.4   22.6 38.2   37.8 21.4 
Other  9.2    6.3 12.1    8.3 17.4   16.1  2.9   10.8  7.1 
Not applicable  4.6    6.3  3.0    0.0  0.0    0.0  8.8    2.7  7.1 
Number of responses  65    32  33    24  23    31  34    37  28 
 
Panel C: Adjustments to the cash flows or the IRR 
Risk of unexpected inflation 17.7  0.0  8.2 26.9**   26.0 13.9   21.2 14.5   12.2 25.0 
Interest rate risk 25.5  2.0 22.6 28.3   33.5 26.5   26.3 24.8   26.3 24.5 
Term structure risk 18.5  0.0 16.6 20.3   14.9 26.9   22.9 14.4   13.5 25.0 
GDP or business cycle risk 55.0 50.0 47.8 61.9   63.6 55.7   59.4 51.0   54.2 56.0 
Commodity price risk 28.8 21.0 22.8 34.7   35.5 27.1   30.6 27.2   28.0 29.9 
Foreign exchange risk 20.2 10.0 15.7 24.5   25.6 16.6   23.5 17.1   12.9 29.8*** 
Distress risk 13.0  0.0  8.7 17.2   13.8 11.9   17.2  9.1    9.0 18.2 
Size 28.6 10.0 31.8 25.5   25.1 25.5   22.9 33.8   31.1 25.3 
Market-to-book ratio  7.5  0.0  5.3  9.6    9.3  5.6    7.4  7.6    6.6  8.6 
Momentum 11.8  0.0  9.6 13.9   17.0 10.3   18.9  5.4**   12.9 10.4 
Illiquidity 20.3  0.0 22.2 18.5   19.8  6.8   15.2 25.0   15.8 26.3 
Other  1.4  0.0  2.8  0.0    0.0  0.0    0.0  2.6    2.4  0.0 
Number of responses  65  65  32  33    24  23    31  34    37  28 
 
Notes: Panel A reports the target value of gross IRR used by the sample private equity (PE) investors. 
Panel B describes the variables that the sample PE investors use to adjust their gross IRR target. Panel 
C reports the fraction of deals for which the sample PE investors adjust cash flows or the IRR to reflect 
different risks. The sample is divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under management 
(AUM), the IRR of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor has a global 
presence. Statistical significance of the difference between subgroup means at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. LPs = limited partners; GDP = gross domestic product. 
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Panel B indicates that less than half of the PE investors adjust their target IRRs 
for deal leverage. This suggests that the more than half of the PE investors who do not 
make such an adjustment explicitly do not take a CAPM-based approach. 
Panel C reports the fraction of deals that PE investors adjust cash flows or the 
IRR to reflect different risks. These risks can be divided into macroeconomic or 
systematic risks (unexpected inflation, interest rate, term structure, business cycle, and 
foreign exchange) and firm-specific risks (distress, size, market-to-book, momentum, and 
illiquidity). The results indicate that PE investors are somewhat sensitive to 
macroeconomic risks, particularly gross domestic product (GDP) or business cycle risk 
in which PE investors make some adjustment in roughly half of their deals. This is 
consistent with PE investors taking market or equity risk into account. This is also is 
suggestive of PE investors having time varying hurdle rates. Firm-specific adjustments 
appear less important, although some of the PE firms use a variety of firm-specific 
factors to adjust their target hurdle rates. 
Table 1.9: Multiple of invested capital (MOIC) 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
 Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
Multiple of invested capital 2.85 2.50 3.16 2.54**   2.51 2.56   2.50 3.14**   2.98 2.67 
Number of responses 62 62 31 31   24 21   28 34   36 26 
 
Notes: This table measures the value of gross MOIC targeted by the sample private equity (PE) investors. 
The sample is divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under management (AUM), the 
internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor has 
a global presence. Statistical significance of the difference between subgroup means at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
Table 1.9 indicates that PE investors say they target median MOICs of 2.5 times 
their investment. At a five-year time horizon, this implies a gross IRR of approximately 
20%. The mean MOIC of 2.85 times implies a gross IRR of 23%. The MOIC targets, 
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therefore, imply slightly lower gross IRRs than reported gross IRR targets. Smaller and 
younger private equity firms generally tend to have higher MOIC targets. 
1.4.1.6 Net of fee targets (marketed to LPs) 
We ask private equity investors not only about the targets they use to evaluate 
their investments, but also how their limited partners evaluate the performance of the 
private equity investors. Benchmarking of private equity returns has seen significant 
evolution in recent years both from an academic and from a data vendor perspective. 
Table 1.10: Benchmark for limited partners 
 
   AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
Benchmark Mean Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
Net IRR 25.4 29.0 21.9   27.3 21.7   26.7 24.2   22.2 29.6 
Net IRR versus S&P 500  7.9  6.5  9.4    9.1  4.3   10.0  6.1    8.3  7.4 
Net IRR with respect to 
fund vintage year 27.0 19.4 34.4   27.3 43.5   40.0 15.2**   33.3 18.5 
Net multiple or 
cash-on-cash 38.1 45.2 31.3   31.8 30.4   20.0 54.5***   33.3 44.4 
IRR of other GPs  1.6  0.0  3.1    4.5  0.0    3.3  0.0    2.8  0.0 
Number of responses  63  31  32    22  23    30  33    36  27 
 
Notes: This table reports the most important benchmark for the LPs investing in the sample private 
equity (PE) investors. Net indicates net of all fees. The sample is divided into subgroups based on the 
median of assets under management (AUM), the internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the 
age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor has a global presence. Statistical significance of the 
difference between subgroup means at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. S&P = Standard & Poor’s; GPs = general partners. 
 
 
Table 1.10 reports the benchmark that the PE investors say is most important 
for their LPs. Surprisingly, almost two-thirds of the PE investors report that an 
absolute measure of performance, net IRR and net MOIC, is most important. In less 
than 8% of the cases do the PE investors believe that LPs view performance relative to 
public markets as the most important performance benchmark. This is surprising given 
the large attention paid to alphas and relative performance in public market 
investments such as mutual funds and hedge funds. An additional 27% believe the 
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performance relative to other PE investors is most important. The only difference 
among private equity firm types appears to be that older private equity firms’ investors 
evaluate net IRR relative to fund vintage year more frequently and younger private 
equity firms’ investors look to cash-on-cash multiples. Overall, the focus on absolute 
performance is notable and surprising given the intense focus on relative performance or 
alphas for public market investments. 
In their survey, Da Rin and Phalippou (2014) also find that LPs place a great 
emphasis on IRRs and MOICs in evaluating PE funds and firms. Unfortunately, Da Rin 
and Phalippou do not clearly distinguish between relative and absolute performance. 
Table 1.11 reports the net IRR that the PE investors market to their LPs. The 
median net IRR is between 20% and 25%. Consistent with the PE investors’ gross IRR 
targets, this would correspond to a gross IRR of between 25% and 30%. And as with the 
gross IRR targets, these net IRR targets seem to exceed what one would expect in a 
CAPM-based framework. 
Table 1.11: Net internal rate of return marketed to limited partners 
 
 
  AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
Marketed IRR Mean Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
0–5%  0.0  0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0 
5–10%  0.0  0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0 
10–15%  0.0  0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0 
15–20% 15.6 18.8 12.5   13.0 13.0   23.3  8.8   18.9 11.1 
20–25% 50.0 40.6 59.4   65.2 47.8   53.3 47.1   45.9 55.6 
25–30% 23.4 25.0 21.9   21.7 30.4   20.0 26.5   24.3 22.2 
> 30% 10.9 15.6  6.3    0.0  8.7    3.3 17.6   10.8 11.1 
Number of responses  64  32  32    23  23    30  34    37  27 
 
Notes: This table describes the typical IRR that the sample private equity (PE) investors market to their 
LPs. The sample is divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under management (AUM), the 
IRR of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor has a global presence. 
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1.4.1.7 Discussion 
These somewhat surprising valuation results raise several potential alternative 
explanations. First, because private equity is viewed by many limited partners (and 
marketed as such by some general partners (GPs)) as an absolute return investment, 
nominal hurdle rates could be more meaningful than discounted cash flow valuation 
based upon CAPM discount rates. Because underlying portfolio companies were 
typically only periodically revalued (if at all) in the past, private equity fund returns 
may not be risk-adjusted by limited partners in a traditional sense. Alternatively, 
private equity investors may be skeptical of asset pricing models that seek to measure 
risk. As such, far more of their energy is focused on estimating reasonable cash flows.  
Our analysis of the factors that affect private equity firm hurdle rates also 
indicates a deviation from what is typically recommended in finance research and 
teaching. It suggests that while PE investors do not use a CAPM-based framework, they 
do use what appears to be an ad hoc multi-factor framework. Some of the underlying ad 
hoc factors appear related to systematic risk and others relate to non-systematic risk, 
i.e., it appears that many private equity firms care about the total risk of the 
investment when determining the hurdle rates. This would be consistent with the lack of 
risk-adjusting investment returns on the part of limited partners. If that is the case, 
then private equity managers would care about adjusting the hurdle rates for both types 
of risk. Similarly, the diversity of criteria factored into a PE firm’s gross IRR target 
means that unlike a CAPM-based discount rate, which would be the same across 
different private equity firms, PE firm hurdle rates are likely to vary significantly for 
similar investments and are likely to be PE firm-, time period-, and portfolio company-
specific. 
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Our results concerning exit multiples being based on comparable companies 
suggests that PE investors are somewhat skeptical of CAPM-based methods for valuing 
companies relative to the use of multiples-based approaches. This is at odds with 
methods taught in basic finance courses in which terminal or exit values are calculated 
using growing perpetuity formulas with comparable companies’ methods possibly used 
as a check on the CAPM-based approach. 
The IRR analysis also embeds the action plan of the private equity firm. Typical 
holding periods for investments are centered around five years (the typical projection 
length), and exit values are determined by industry multiples (what they hope to sell 
the company for at exit). As such, the effort put into the typical IRR model helps 
private equity firms manage their portfolio more than DCF does. In essence, the 
framework of investment evaluation can be tied to the investment fund structure that 
imposes limited holding periods and less transparency on underlying valuation 
movements, i.e., systematic risk. 
1.4.2 Capital structure 
As Graham and Harvey (2001), among others, note, a long-standing question in 
corporate finance is whether firms have a target capital structure that is determined by 
a trade-off between the costs and benefits of taking on debt. Among the most taught 
factors that finance educators argue should influence optimal debt levels is the trade-off 
theory in which managers set debt levels to balance the tax of interest deductibility and 
disciplining of management with the expected costs of financial distress. The costs of 
distress include the inability to invest in valuable future projects, retain customers, or 
retain employees because of cash constraints or questions about long-term viability. In 
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their survey, Graham and Harvey find some support for the trade-off theory (as well as 
some support for pecking order theory). They also find that CFOs place their greatest 
focus on retaining financial flexibility and a good credit rating. 
AJSW (2013) contrast the trade-off theory of capital structure with a market 
timing view. From their perspective, the trade-off theory implies that industry factors 
play an important role in optimal capital structure because industries vary in cash flow 
volatility (affecting the probability of distress and agency costs) as well as investment 
opportunities and tangibility (affecting the costs of distress). They argue that buyout 
firm leverage thus should be related to the leverage of public companies in the same 
industry. In the market timing view, in contrast, leverage and capital structure respond 
to economy-wide debt market conditions. When interest rates are low, firms tend to 
raise more debt. When equity prices are high, firms raise capital by issuing more equity. 
For a large sample of buyouts, they do not find any support for the trade-off theories. 
Buyout capital structures are not related to capital structures of similar public 
companies. Instead, consistent with market timing, leverage is highly related to 
economy-wide debt market conditions. 
1.4.2.1 Survey results 
In our survey, we asked the PE investors how they determine the initial capital 
structure of their portfolio companies. We included both trade-off- and market timing-
related factors. Table 1.12 reports the typical capital structure that PE investors target 
at closing. They target a median debt-to-total capital of 60% and a median debt-to-
EBITDA ratio of 4.0 times. Some observers believe these ratios are surprisingly low. 
They are much lower than the ratios that were common in the 1980s. They also are 
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somewhat lower than the median ratios of 70% and 5.2 times, respectively, in AJSW 
(2013). 
Table 1.12: Capital structure at closing 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
Capital structure 
measure Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
Debt-to-capital (percent) 55.7 60.0 54.3 57.2   56.6 56.9   55.0 56.4   55.0 56.8 
Number of responses  62  62  31  31    22  23    30  32    37  25 
                           
Debt-to-EBITDA ratio 3.9 4.0 3.6 4.2**   4.1 4.2   4.2 3.6**   3.8 4.1 
Number of responses 60 60 31 29   22 21   29 31   36 24 
 
Notes: This table reports the typical capital structure at closing for the sample private equity (PE) 
investor portfolio companies measured as debt-to-total capital and debt-to-EBITDA (earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization). The sample is divided into subgroups based on the 
median of assets under management (AUM), the internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the 
age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor has a global presence. Statistical significance of the 
difference between subgroup means at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
 
 
Two likely reasons explain why these survey ratios are lower. First, we conducted 
our survey in 2012, a year in which debt ratios and debt availability were lower than 
the historical average. Second, a number of the investors in our survey invest in growth 
equity as well as buyouts. As their name suggests, growth equity investments are likely 
to use less leverage than buyouts. 
We also find that larger and older private equity investors tend to target more 
levered capital structures. This is perhaps not surprising given that larger private equity 
firms target investments in larger companies that can sustain greater leverage. 
The survey asks what factors the PE investors consider in determining capital 
structure. The trade-off theory suggests a role for firm industry, tax benefits, default 
risk and the ability to generate operating improvements or reduce agency costs. Panels 
A and B of Table 1.13 present the key results. Panel A reports whether the PE 
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investors consider a particular factor, and Panel B reports the rankings of those factors 
(where 6 is the top or highest rank). Both Panels A and B suggest that the trade-off 
theory and market timing are equally important. Almost all of the PE investors consider 
both industry factors and current interest rates in determining capital structure. These 
two rank well above the others in importance. Roughly two-thirds of the PE investors 
explicitly think about the trade-off between tax benefits and default risk, and the same 
percentage also say they raise as much debt as the market will bear. These factors tie 
for third in importance. Just under 40% consider the ability of debt to force operational 
improvements in the manner suggested by Jensen (1989). Finally, only six firms, or less 
than 10%, mention financial flexibility as an important determinant of capital structure. 
This contrasts sharply with the strong emphasis on financial flexibility among CFOs in 
Graham and Harvey (2001).  
Table 1.13: Capital structure factors considered important and ranked 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
 Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
 
Panel A: Capital structure factors – important 
Ability of debt to force 
operational improvements 
39.1   31.3  46.9   39.1 30.4   33.3  44.1   29.7 51.9 
Use as much debt as the 
market will allow 65.6   65.6  65.6   65.2 69.6   73.3  58.8   62.2 70.4 
Current interest rates and 
how much the company can 
pay 
95.3   93.8  96.9   95.7 95.7   96.7  94.1   97.3 92.6 
Industry that the firm 
operates in 96.9   93.8 100.0   95.7 95.7   93.3 100.0   97.3 96.3 
Maximize trade-off between 
tax benefits and risk of 
default 
67.2   59.4  75.0   65.2 78.3   66.7  67.6   64.9 70.4 
Other 35.9   40.6  31.3   17.4 52.2**   36.7  35.3   43.2 25.9 
Number of responses  64    32   32    23  23    30   34    37  27 
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Table 1.13: Capital structure factors considered important and ranked (Continued) 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
 Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
 
Panel B: Capital structure factors – rank 
Ability of debt to force 
operational improvements  1.3 0.0  1.1   1.6    1.0  1.2    1.1   1.5    0.9  1.9** 
Use as much debt as the 
market will allow 
 2.5 3.0  2.5   2.5    2.5  2.7    2.8   2.3    2.5  2.6 
Current interest rates and 
how much the company can 
pay 
 5.0 5.0  4.7   5.3    5.1  4.9    5.0   4.9    4.9  5.0 
Industry that the firm 
operates in  4.5 5.0  4.4   4.5    4.7  4.0    4.3   4.6    4.5  4.4 
Maximize trade-off between 
tax benefits and risk of 
default 
 2.5 3.0  2.4   2.7    2.7  2.7    2.5   2.6    2.5  2.5 
Other  1.8 0.0  2.1   1.4    0.8  2.7**    1.8   1.8    2.1  1.3 
Number of responses  64 64  32   32    23  23    30   34    37  27 
 
Notes: Panel A reports the factors that the sample private equity (PE) investors consider in determining 
how much debt to raise for a transaction. Panel B reports the ranking of factors that the sample PE 
investors consider important in determining how much debt to raise for a transaction. A higher number 
means it is a more important factor with 6 being the highest rank. The sample is divided into subgroups 
based on the median of assets under management (AUM), the internal rate of return (IRR) of most 
recent fund, the age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor has a global presence. Statistical 
significance of the difference between subgroup means at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, 
**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
1.4.2.2 Discussion 
Our market timing result is very consistent with the result in AJSW (2013). 
Although we did not confirm this explicitly, the result to “use as much debt as the 
market will allow” also is consistent with the result in AJSW that the availability of 
leverage affects the pricing of a deal and, possibly, the decision to do one. 
Our finding that PE investors do consider trade-off-related factors is not. The 
question is how can the PE investor and AJSW results be reconciled? One possible 
explanation is that it is very difficult for outside observers to measure optimal capital 
structure. It is unlikely that all public companies in the same industry have the same 
optimal capital structure, and it also is unlikely that all public companies are 
optimizing. In addition, the companies that PE investors select to invest in are likely to 
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be those that were not optimizing and for whom there is room for improvement. Both of 
these factors will introduce noise into the tests conducted by Axelson, Jenkinson, 
Strömberg, and Weisbach.  
Another possibility is that the PE investors answered yes to the trade-off theory 
simply because they consider taxes and financial distress to be important, albeit not 
explicitly for capital structure. We think this is less likely given the fact that they did 
rank the trade-off in a tie for third, suggesting it matters. 
The fact that most private equity firms do not consider financial flexibility when 
setting capital structure is potentially explained by the private equity firm’s ability to 
inject capital in the future. Because most private equity firms own the company and 
have access to inside information, less asymmetric information exists that would create 
an equity financing constraint. The private equity firms typically have existing funds 
with undrawn capital and can always invest additional equity. In fact, we often see such 
follow-on equity investments in situations in which portfolio companies make roll-up 
acquisitions. In these settings, the typical concern about financial flexibility that was 
identified in Graham and Harvey (2001) would be less of a concern. 
Overall, then, the survey indicates that PE investors consider both trade-off and 
market timing theories. This is arguably favorable both to the traditional instruction at 
business schools and to the more recent advances in behavioral finance. 
1.4.3 Incentives 
Management incentives are supposedly an important piece of financial and 
governance engineering. Table 1.14 is consistent with this. It confirms previous work by 
Kaplan (1989), Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), and Acharya, Gottschalg, Hahn, and 
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Kehoe (2013) that PE investors provide strong incentives to portfolio company 
management. On average, PE investors allocate 17% of company equity to management 
and employees. The CEO obtains an average of 8%. The percentages are slightly lower, 
at 15% and 6%, respectively, for the larger PE investors who invest in larger companies. 
This is significantly higher than equity ownership of senior management in public 
companies. For example, Page (2011) finds that the average CEO of a public company 
between 1993 and 2007 held 3.58% of the company’s equity and the median CEO held 
only 1.57%. 
Table 1.14: Typical equity ownership 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
 
Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
PE investors 79.6 85.0 74.9 84.3**   82.7 83.6   82.9 76.6   81.2 77.3 
CEO  8.0  5.0 10.0  6.0    7.1  6.1    7.8  8.2    6.9  9.5 
Top ten management 
(excluding CEO)  7.2  7.0  8.1  6.3**    7.1  6.9    7.0  7.3    7.6  6.6 
Other employees  1.8  0.0  1.1  2.4    3.0  0.9    1.7  1.8    1.3  2.5 
Other  3.5  0.0  6.0  1.1**    0.1  2.6    0.6  6.1**    3.0  4.3 
Number of responses  64  64  32  32    23  23    30  34    37  27 
 
Notes: This table reports the typical equity ownership of the sample private equity (PE) investors, the 
chief executive officer (CEO), and top management. The sample is divided into subgroups based on the 
median of assets under management (AUM), the internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the 
age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor has a global presence. Statistical significance of the 
difference between subgroup means at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
 
 
1.5 Governance engineering 
In this section, we consider PE investors’ attitudes toward corporate governance. 
First, we consider the structure of the boards of directors of their portfolio companies. 
Second, we consider their attitudes toward monitoring, hiring, and firing top 
management.  
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Panel A of Table 1.15 confirms previous work in showing that PE investors 
prefer small boards of directors with more than 90% including between five and seven 
members. Larger private equity firms tend to have portfolio companies with larger 
boards. Panel B indicates that PE investors take roughly three of the board seats while 
allocating one or two to management and one or two to outsiders who are not affiliated 
with the PE firms. Again, the results for board composition are consistent with previous 
work and with conventional wisdom. 
Table 1.15: Board of directors’ size and composition 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
 Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
 
Panel A: Board of directors’ size 
3 or less  3.1    3.1  3.1    8.7  0.0    3.3  2.9    0.0  7.4 
4  1.6    3.1  0.0    0.0  4.3    0.0  2.9    2.7  0.0 
5 32.8   40.6 25.0   21.7 30.4   23.3 41.2   37.8 25.9 
6 10.9   12.5  9.4   21.7  8.7   20.0  2.9**   10.8 11.1 
7 46.9   37.5 56.3   39.1 52.2   46.7 47.1   43.2 51.9 
8  3.1    0.0  6.3    8.7  0.0    3.3  2.9    2.7  3.7 
9  0.0    0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0 
10  1.6    3.1  0.0    0.0  4.3    3.3  0.0    2.7  0.0 
11 or more  0.0    0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0 
Number of responses  64    32  32    23  23    30  34    37  27 
 
Panel B: Board of directors’ composition 
Inside directors  1.6 1.0  1.6  1.5    1.4  1.5    1.5  1.6    1.5  1.7 
PE directors  2.8 3.0  2.7  2.9    2.8  2.9    2.8  2.7    2.7  2.8 
Outside directors  1.7 2.0  1.6  1.9    1.9  1.7    1.9  1.6    1.8  1.6 
Other  0.1 0.0  0.1  0.1    0.0  0.2    0.1  0.1    0.1  0.1 
Number of responses  64 64  32  32    23  23    30  34    37  27 
 
Notes: Panel A presents the desired size of board of directors reported by the sample private equity (PE) 
investors. Panel B presents the desired composition of the board of directors by the sample PE investors. 
The sample is divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under management (AUM), the 
internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor has 
a global presence. Statistical significance of the difference between subgroup means at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 1.16 indicates that PE investors are actively involved in advising their 
companies in the great majority of their deals. In fact, the median PE investor claims to 
be actively involved in all of his or her deals. Again, it would be surprising if we found 
otherwise. 
Table 1.16: Private equity involvement in portfolio companies 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
Active involvement Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
Percent of deals 87.5 100.0 84.8 90.1   81.3 90.2   85.2 89.5   83.0 93.6 
Number of responses  64   64  32  32    23  23    30  34    37  27 
 
Notes: This table reports the fraction of deals in which the sample PE investors become involved in the 
management of portfolio companies, i.e., actively advising the company on strategic choices. The sample 
is divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under management (AUM), the internal rate of 
return (IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor has a global 
presence. 
 
 
Tables 1.17 and 1.18 explore how active the PE investors are in recruiting senior 
management teams in their portfolio companies. Table 1.17 indicates that the majority 
of PE investors, almost 70%, invest in the existing management team. They do not 
recruit their own senior management team before the investment. This is consistent 
with the notion that many private equity firms want to be seen as remaining friendly 
when pursuing transactions. Management is often critical to successfully executing 
transactions. 
At the same time, however, a meaningful fraction of PE investors, 31%, do 
recruit their own senior management teams before investing. This suggests that different 
PE investors have very different investment strategies. It also suggests that the PE 
investors who bring in their own team do not place a great deal of weight on the value 
of incumbency. 
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Table 1.17: Private equity recruitment of management teams 
 
    AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
Senior management 
recruitment Mean Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
Before investing                         
Yes 31.3 31.3 31.3   26.1 39.1   30.0 32.4   29.7 33.3 
No 68.8 68.8 68.8   73.9 60.9   70.0 67.6   70.3 66.7 
After investing                         
Yes 50.0 40.6 59.4   43.5 52.2   50.0 50.0   37.8 66.7** 
No 50.0 59.4 40.6   56.5 47.8   50.0 50.0   62.2 33.3** 
Before or after investing                         
Yes 57.8 53.1 62.5   47.8 63.4   56.7 58.1   48.6 70.4* 
No 42.2 46.9 37.5   52.2 36.6   43.3 41.9   51.4 29.6* 
Number of responses  64  32  32    23  23    30  34    37  27 
 
Notes: This table reports the percentage of the sample PE investors who recruit their own senior 
management teams before investing, after investing, and before or after investing. The sample is divided 
into subgroups based on the median of assets under management (AUM), the internal rate of return 
(IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor has a global presence. 
Statistical significance of the difference between subgroup means at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are 
denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
Table 1.18: Private equity replacement of chief executive officers after investing 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
CEO replaced Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
Percent of deals 33.3 30.0 30.3 36.3   27.9 37.3   27.7 38.2   32.0 35.0 
Number of responses  64  64  32  32    23  23    30  34    37  27 
 
Notes: This table reports the percentage of deals in which the sample PE investors replace the CEO after 
the investment is made. The sample is divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under 
management (AUM), the internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and 
by whether PE investor has a global presence. 
 
 
After the investment, roughly 50% of the PE investors end up recruiting their 
own senior management team. This is consistent with some of the PE investors 
becoming more actively involved in the governance of their companies after the 
investment. When we combine the PE investors who recruit their own teams before, or 
after, or both before and after investing, we find that almost 58% of the PE investors 
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recruit their own senior teams. Again, this suggests that the PE investors are actively 
involved in monitoring and governing their portfolio companies. 
Although ascribing any causality at this point is not possible, the cross-sectional 
results suggest that the PE investors who recruit their own teams have experienced 
better past investment performance. Similarly, larger and global private equity firms are 
more likely to recruit their own management teams at some point. 
1.6 Operational engineering and value creation 
In this section, we explore the ways in which the PE investors attempt to create 
value for their investments and add value to their portfolio companies. 
1.6.1 Deal Sourcing 
PE investors claim that an important determinant of value creation is the ability 
to find or source deals that are proprietary in some sense. Accordingly, we asked several 
questions concerning deal sourcing. Table 1.19 reports the deal funnel experience of our 
PE investors. For every hundred opportunities considered, the average PE investor 
deeply investigates 15, signs an agreement with about eight, and closes on fewer than 
four. This suggests that PE investors devote considerable resources to evaluating 
transactions despite the fact that they ultimately invest in only a very few. When we 
compare the deal funnel at different types of private equity firms, larger and older 
private equity firms pass a greater fraction of their deals through to the next stage. 
There are three explanations for this result. First, larger and older private equity firms 
could just have higher quality initial deal sourcing and, hence, do not need to weed out 
as many deals at all stages. Second, larger firms could have more resources available, so 
they do not have to eliminate possible deals so quickly. Third, the larger fund sizes 
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could reduce the stringency of the deal funnel. It also appears, without attributing 
causality, that better performing PE investors are more selective in the deal 
consideration process. 
Table 1.19: Deal funnel 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
 
Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
All considered 
opportunities 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0   100.0 100.0   100.0 100.0   100.0 100.0 
Deep due diligence  15.1  12.0  12.7  17.4*    17.6  13.7    16.5  13.9    14.5  15.9 
Offer term sheet or 
negotiate detailed terms  12.9  10.0  11.4  14.4    14.6  12.1    13.2  12.6    12.5   3.4 
Sign LOI   8.2   5.0   6.8   9.6     9.0   7.0     8.5   7.9     6.2  10.9** 
Close   3.6   3.0   3.0   4.1*     4.1   2.9     3.7   3.5     3.0   4.3* 
Number of responses   71   71   35   36     26   26     33   38     41   30 
 
Notes: This table reports the percentage of opportunities considered by the sample private equity (PE) 
investors that reach different investment stages. The sample is divided into subgroups based on the 
median of assets under management (AUM), the internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the 
age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor has a global presence. Statistical significance of the 
difference between subgroup means at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. LOI = letter of intent. 
 
 
Table 1.20 considers the source and proprietary nature of the deals that the PE 
investor actually closed. According to the PE investors, almost 36% of their closed deals 
are proactively self-generated, 7.4% are provided by management, and 8.6% come from 
their executive network. These arguably have the potential to be proprietary. In 
contrast, 33% are investment banking generated, 8.6% come from deal brokers, and 
4.3% come from other PE firms. These are unlikely to be proprietary. Smaller and 
younger private equity firms generally tend to source more proprietary deals. This likely 
reflects smaller target deal sizes. Firms that invest in large and mega deals are less likely 
to be able to generate proprietary deals given that their targets are probably more likely 
to be sold in an auction process. Finally, younger private equity firms tend to utilize 
their executive networks more frequently. 
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Table 1.20: Deal sources 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
Deal source Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
Proactively self-generated 35.6 30.0 37.7 33.5   39.3 35.5   35.8 35.4   35.3 35.9 
Investment bank-generated 33.3 25.0 30.5 36.0   33.0 37.0   38.2 29.1   33.0 33.7 
Inbound from management  7.4  5.0  5.8  8.9    6.1  9.0    7.4  7.3    7.2  7.6 
Other PE firm  4.3  0.0  5.4  3.3    4.1  2.2    4.1  4.5    5.0  3.5 
Deal brokers  8.6  0.0  9.5  7.7    6.8  7.1    8.4  8.7    8.7  8.5 
Executive network  8.6  5.0  8.3  9.0    8.8  8.5    4.6 12.1***    9.1  8.0 
LPs or investors  1.7  0.0  2.5  0.9    0.6  0.7    0.4  2.7    1.2  2.3 
Conferences  0.6  0.0  0.3  0.9    1.0  0.3    1.1  0.3    0.5  0.8 
Other  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0    0.1  0.0    0.0  0.1    0.1  0.0 
                           
Percent of closed deals 
considered proprietary 47.9 50.0 54.0 41.9**   48.0 43.9   41.5 53.4   47.6 48.3 
Number of responses  71  71  35  36    26  26    33  38    41  30 
 
Notes: This table reports the percentage of the sample private equity (PE) investors who closed deals 
they identify from different sources and the percentage of closed deals the sample PE investors consider 
proprietary. The sample is divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under management 
(AUM), the internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and by whether PE 
investor has a global presence. Statistical significance of the difference between subgroup means at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. LPs = limited partners. 
 
 
When asked to summarize these sources, the PE investors considered almost 48% 
of their closed deals to be proprietary in some way. Unfortunately, we have no way of 
evaluating exactly what proprietary means and we cannot validate the extent to which 
the deals truly are proprietary or advantaged. 
Nevertheless, we think these results indicate that the PE investors explicitly 
consider the extent to which their potential investments are proprietary and attempt to 
invest in deals that are. 
1.6.2 Deal Selection 
To better understand how PE investors select and differentiate among 
investments, we asked them to rank the factors they considered in choosing their 
investments where 6 is the highest rank. Table 1.21 reports these results. The most 
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important factor in choosing an investment is the business model or competitive 
position of the company. The management team, the PE investor’s ability to add value, 
and the valuation are the three next most important factors and are roughly of equal 
importance. The industry or market of the company and the fit with the PE investor’s 
fund are of least importance. 
Table 1.21: Deal selection 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
Deal selection factor Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
Ability to add value 3.6 3.0 3.6 3.6   3.9 3.5   3.5 3.7   3.5 3.8 
Business model or 
competitive position 4.6 5.0 4.5 4.7   4.5 4.5   4.4 4.7   4.6 4.5 
Fit with fund 2.3 2.0 2.7 1.9   2.0 2.2   2.2 2.4   2.5 2.0 
Industry or market 3.2 3.0 3.4 3.0   3.3 3.0   3.3 3.1   3.5 2.8 
Management team 3.8 4.0 3.7 4.0   3.9 4.0   4.1 3.6   3.8 3.8 
Valuation 3.5 3.0 3.2 3.8   3.4 3.8   3.5 3.5   3.0 4.1*** 
Number of responses 65 65 32 33   24 23   31 34   37 28 
 
Notes: This table reports the ranking of factors considered by the sample private equity (PE) investors in 
choosing investments (where 6 is the highest rank). The sample is divided into subgroups based on the 
median of assets under management (AUM), the internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the 
age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor has a global presence. Statistical significance of the 
difference between subgroup means at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
 
 
Two of these results are notable. First, the PE investors put somewhat more 
weight on the business than on the management team. This result is consistent with the 
work of Kaplan, Sensoy, and Strömberg (2009) showing that, at least within the venture 
capital world, the business strategies of firms remain far more stable (and hence are 
more important) than the stability of management. Second, the importance of the 
ability to add value suggests that PE investors take operational engineering and adding 
value seriously. This also suggests that different private equity firms are likely to target 
and value investments differently. Private equity firms often have particular industry 
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experience and focus. A successful track record in a particular industry is likely to lead 
to greater investment focus on a particular sector. 
The survey asked the selection question in another way by inquiring about the 
drivers of return PE investors anticipate when making investments where 6 is, again, 
the highest rank. Panel A of Table 1.22 reports the percentage of PE investors who view 
a return driver as important, and Panel B of Table 1.22 reports the ranking of those 
return drivers. 
Table 1.22: Return driver importance and ranking 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
 Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
 
Panel A: Return driver – important 
Growth in the value of 
the underlying business 
100.0   100.0 100.0   100.0 100.0   100.0 100.0   100.0 100.0 
Industry-level multiple 
arbitrage  64.8    74.3  55.6    50.0  65.4    66.7  63.2    61.0  70.0 
Leverage  76.1    68.6  83.3    65.4  88.5**    81.8  71.1    73.2  80.0 
Operational 
improvements  97.2    94.3 100.0   100.0  96.2   100.0  94.7    95.1 100.0 
Refinancing  36.6    28.6  44.4    34.6  42.3    45.5  28.9    29.3  46.7 
Other  26.8    28.6  25.0    23.1  19.2    21.2  31.6    31.7  20.0 
Number of responses   71     35   36     26   26     33   38     41   30 
 
Panel B: Return driver – rank 
Growth in the value of 
the underlying business   5.7 6.0   5.8   5.7     5.9   5.5**     5.7   5.7     5.8   5.6 
Industry-level multiple 
arbitrage 
  2.4 3.0   2.8   2.1     1.9   2.4     2.3   2.6     2.1   2.9 
Leverage   2.6 3.0   2.4   2.8     2.3   3.2     3.0   2.2**     2.5   2.7 
Operational 
improvements   4.6 5.0   4.5   4.7     4.9   4.6     4.7   4.5     4.5   4.7 
Refinancing   1.0 0.0   0.8   1.3     0.9   1.3     1.2   0.9     0.9   1.2 
Other   1.1 0.0   1.2   1.0     0.7   0.8     0.8   1.3     1.3   0.8 
Number of responses   71 71   35   36     26   26     33   38     41   30 
 
Notes: Panel A reports the percentage of the sample private equity (PE) investors who mention different 
return drivers that they bet on in making investments. Panel B reports the return drivers that the sample 
PE investors bet on in making investments ranked in order of importance where 6 is the highest rank. 
The sample is divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under management (AUM), the 
internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor has 
a global presence. Statistical significance of the difference between subgroup means at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Growth in the value of the underlying business is mentioned as a return driver by 
100% of the PE investors and is the highest ranked return driver. Operational 
improvements are close behind, ranked second and mentioned by 97% of the PE 
investors. Leverage and industry-level multiple arbitrage—selling at a higher multiple 
than buying—are mentioned by 76% and 65% but rank well behind growth and 
operational improvements. These results suggest that PE investors invest with the 
expectation or hope of growing the value of the business and improving operations. 
Leverage as well as buying low and selling high are viewed as less important. 
Once again, these views can be a reflection of the current private equity 
environment. Historical leverage ratios (in the 1980s and 1990s) were substantially 
higher than they are today for the typical private equity deal. Also, the growth in the 
number of private equity firms and capital under management means that there is likely 
more competition for deals and, hence, less ability to buy companies at a cheap price. 
1.6.3 Value Creation 
Given the emphasis on growing the value of the business, our next questions 
asked the PE investors to identify the sources of that value creation. We asked them to 
distinguish between expected sources of value creation identified before the deal is 
closed, pre-deal, and actual sources of value creation, post-deal or after the investment 
is made. 
1.6.3.1 Pre-investment 
Table 1.23 lists the pre-investment expected sources of value creation. Each deal 
has a large number of sources of value. Hence, the total expected sources of value add 
up to well over 100% indicating that PE investors rely on several sources of value  
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Table 1.23: Pre-investment (expected) sources of value creation 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
Sources of value Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
Reduce costs in general 35.6 27.5 35.8 35.5   37.1 37.3   39.9 32.0   31.0 41.8 
Improve IT or information 
systems 26.1 20.0 30.8 21.6   22.0 23.3   23.9 28.0   26.7 25.3 
Introduce shared services 15.6  2.5 16.4 14.9   11.6 18.3   16.9 14.6   14.9 16.6 
Increase revenue or improve 
demand factors 70.3 80.0 77.5 63.5**   75.0 63.5   67.0 73.2   70.6 70.0 
Redefine the current business 
model or strategy 33.8 29.5 27.8 39.5   43.0 29.8   32.1 35.3   32.8 35.2 
Change CEO or CFO 30.6 27.5 33.4 28.0   29.2 32.9   30.9 30.4   29.3 32.4 
Change senior management team 
other than CEO and CFO 33.4 30.0 37.3 29.7   32.5 33.1   27.9 38.1   35.4 30.8 
Improve corporate governance 47.0 37.0 52.4 41.9   40.1 45.5   39.4 53.5   47.3 46.6 
Improve incentives 61.1 73.5 60.7 61.5   58.3 67.0   65.5 57.4   59.0 63.9 
Follow-on acquisitions 51.1 50.0 53.9 48.4   52.0 46.9   51.0 51.2   53.2 48.3 
Strategic investor 15.6 10.0 16.4 14.8   12.3 14.0   14.4 16.5   15.1 16.2 
Facilitate a high-value exit 50.0 43.5 61.0 39.6**   45.6 42.0   40.4 58.1**   53.5 45.4 
Purchase at an attractive price 
(buy low) 44.3 43.0 49.2 39.6   38.2 43.3   40.9 47.1   44.9 43.5 
Purchase at an attractive price 
relative to the industry 46.6 50.0 54.5 39.2**   38.7 47.3   42.9 49.8   50.1 42.0 
Other  9.8  0.0  9.4 10.2    0.0 14.3**    9.4 10.1   12.4  6.4 
Number of responses  74  74  36  38    27  27    34  40    42  32 
 
Notes: This table describes the percentage of deals that the sample private equity (PE) investors identify 
having specified pre-deal sources of value. The sample is divided into subgroups based on the median of 
assets under management (AUM), the internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE 
investor, and by whether PE investor has a global presence. Statistical significance of the difference 
between subgroup means at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. IT = 
information technology; CEO = chief executive officer; CFO = chief financial officer. 
 
 
Table 1.24: Pre-investment value creators 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
Participants Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
Deal team 97.7 100.0 96.9 98.4   97.7 99.2   98.4 97.0   97.9 97.4 
Operating partners 45.3  40.5 44.9 45.7   46.9 46.3   40.5 49.4   41.6 50.2 
Outside consultants 36.8  26.5 27.9 45.1**   35.0 45.3   42.1 32.2   35.0 39.0 
Other  7.2   0.0  8.9  5.5    5.1  5.2    4.1  9.8    8.8  5.0 
Number of responses  74   74  36  38    27  27    34  40    42  32 
 
Notes: This table reports the percentage of deals that each specified group actively participates in 
identifying pre-deal value for the sample private equity (PE) investors. The sample is divided into 
subgroups based on the median of assets under management (AUM), the internal rate of return (IRR) of 
most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor has a global presence. Statistical 
significance of the difference between subgroup means at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, 
**, and *, respectively. 
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creation. The most frequently mentioned source of value is increasing revenue, identified 
by PE investors as being important in over 70% of their deals. Smaller private equity 
firms identified increasing revenue more often than larger private equity investors. This 
is not surprising given that there may be more room to increase revenues for the smaller 
deals targeted by smaller private equity investors. Follow-on acquisitions are also 
important in more than 50% of their deals. Reducing costs is identified as being 
important in only 36% of their deals. Introducing shared services, in which the PE 
investors help their several portfolio companies aggregate demand for services or 
supplies to improve their bargaining power with suppliers, is also related to reduced 
costs and is important in 16% of the deals. 
Both increasing sales and reducing costs would fit under operational engineering. 
If these answers are accurate (see Section 1.7), growth is more important than reducing 
costs, suggesting a shift in emphasis from the cost cutting and agency cost reduction in 
the 1980s as emphasized in Jensen (1989). The presence of merger and acquisition 
activity may have led many firms to be more efficient on the cost side, i.e., there may 
be less corporate waste today than in the past (Kaplan, 1997). 
Private equity investors also expect to create value in roughly one-third of their 
investments by redefining or changing the company’s strategy or business model. In 
roughly one-third of their investments, they expect to create value by changing the 
CEO or CFO and by changing other members of the senior management team. All of 
these also would fit under the rubric of operational engineering. Presumably these 
actions, if successful, would lead to greater growth, reduced costs, or both. Private 
equity investors also expect to create value by improving incentives (61%) and 
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improving corporate governance (47%). These would fit under the categories of financial 
and governance engineering discussed in Sections 1.4 and 1.5. 
In slightly under half of their investments, private equity investors expect they 
are able to buy at attractive prices, both absolutely (44.3%) and relative to the industry 
(46.6%). In roughly half of their investments, they also expect that they can facilitate a 
high value exit. This suggests that private equity investors believe they create a 
meaningful amount of value by being able to buy low and sell high. For smaller and 
younger private equity firms, the ability to engage in multiple expansion is higher. This 
may reflect the greater frequency of proprietary deals for these types of private equity 
firms and the potential to complete transactions at lower valuations. Among 
practitioners and limited partners, this would usually be considered a type of financial 
engineering, particularly buying low. From an academic perspective, this is difficult to 
characterize. It is potentially consistent with taking advantage of asymmetric 
information, superior bargaining ability, market timing, and an efficient allocation of 
resources (i.e., selling to the right buyer). 
We can say that, overall, the answers indicate that PE investors expect to create 
value pre-investment from a combination of financial, governance, and operational 
engineering. Different private equity firms typically express different value drivers. 
Private equity firms appear to engage in differentiated investment strategies with 
different sources of expected value creation. 
We also asked the PE investors who in their organization is involved in 
identifying the (pre-investment) sources of value creation. Table 1.24 indicates that deal 
team members (i.e., the financial partners) are involved in virtually every deal. Perhaps 
the more interesting result is that operating partners, i.e., those primarily with 
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operating instead of financial experience, are involved in identifying value sources in 
45% of the deals. In addition to relying on operating partners, Table 1.24 indicates that 
the PE investors involve outside consultants in almost 37% of their deals. Smaller and 
younger private equity firms are less likely to engage outside consultants in their 
transactions. Overall, then, Table 1.24 suggests that the PE investors have made a 
meaningful investment in operational engineering although that investment is highly 
variable across firms. 
1.6.3.2 Post-investment 
Table 1.25 lists post-investment realized sources of value creation. The third 
column reports the difference in the mean result for pre- and post-investment for each 
variable. The same sources identified as important pre-investment remain important 
post-investment except that many of them increase in importance. 
Increased revenue remains important in roughly 70% of the deals. Reduced costs 
increase in importance, rising to 47% of deals, but remain below increased growth. The 
use of shared services, redefining the strategy, changing the CEO or CFO, and changing 
other members of the senior management team also increase by 6% to 14% relative to 
the pre-deal expected sources of value. If anything, then, operational engineering sources 
of value appear to be more important post-investment than they are identified as or 
expected to be pre-investment. Improving incentives and improving corporate 
governance also remain important sources of value, increasing by 4% and 5%, 
respectively, relative to pre-investment expectations. 
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Table 1.25: Post-investment sources of value creation 
 
    AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
Sources of value Mean Median ∆ from 
pre-deal 
Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
Reduce costs in general 47.4 48.5 11.7 46.1 48.5   46.5 51.2   52.1 43.3   40.2 56.8** 
Improve IT or information 
systems 
33.5 28.0  7.4 36.4 30.6   29.7 35.3   31.0 35.5   32.8 34.3 
Introduce shares services 21.9 10.0  6.3 18.5 25.2   21.9 24.0   23.9 20.3   18.8 26.1 
Increase revenue or improve 
demand factors 69.5 71.0 −0.8 73.9 65.3   70.7 68.8   67.2 71.4   69.4 69.6 
Redefine the current business 
model or strategy 
40.1 40.0  6.3 34.2 45.7**   52.1 35.0**   39.3 40.8   39.7 40.7 
Change CEO or CFO 42.9 40.0 12.3 40.5 45.3   46.3 43.8   44.1 42.0   40.6 46.0 
Change senior management team 
other than CEO and CFO 47.1 50.0 13.7 46.2 48.0   44.1 52.6   46.7 47.4   48.2 45.7 
Improve corporate governance 52.1 50.0  5.1 56.2 48.2   51.0 52.1   49.9 54.0   53.6 50.1 
Improve incentives 65.1 71.5  3.9 58.3 71.5   70.3 72.3   72.3 59.0   60.5 71.1 
Make follow-on acquisitions 48.1 50.0 −3.0 45.1 50.8   47.8 46.7   50.4 46.1   50.7 44.6 
Bring on a strategic investor 13.5 10.0  2.1 14.5 12.5   14.1 10.1   13.3 13.6   15.4 10.9 
Facilitate a high-value exit 58.8 60.0  8.8 62.7 55.0   55.6 53.6   55.9 61.2   62.8 53.5 
Other  7.1  0.0  7.1  8.3  5.9    0.0  7.1    5.6  8.3    9.1  4.3 
Number of responses  74  74  74  36  38    27  27    34  40    42  32 
 
Notes: This table reports the percentage of deals that the sample private equity investors identify as 
having specified post-deal sources of value and the difference from pre-deal sources of value from Table 
23. The sample is divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under management (AUM), the 
internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor has 
a global presence. Statistical significance of the difference between subgroup means at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. IT = information technology; CEO = chief 
executive officer; CFO = chief financial officer. 
 
 
Table 1.26: Post-investment value creators 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
Participants Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
Deal team 93.3 100.0 90.6 95.9   93.7 95.6   93.5 93.2   92.1 94.9 
Operating partners 51.1  50.0 46.8 55.1   56.2 48.5   45.7 55.6   43.6 60.9 
Outside consultants 27.1  21.0 22.0 31.9   26.2 34.0   29.3 25.2   25.2 29.5 
Other  8.6   0.0 13.0  4.3    3.7  7.9    5.6 11.1    9.2  7.7 
Number of responses  74   74  36  38    27  27    34  40    42  32 
 
Notes: This table reports the percentage of deals that each specified group actively participates in 
identifying post-deal value. The sample is divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under 
management (AUM), the internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the age of private equity (PE) 
investor, and by whether PE investor has a global presence. 
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Facilitating a high-value exit also becomes somewhat more important with 
almost 60% of the PE investors citing this as a post-investment source of value. This 
could reflect the historical perspective of private equity firms that were able to take 
more proprietary deals public or sell at a higher valuation. 
Post-investment, then, the PE investors continue to claim they create value from 
a combination of financial, governance, and operational engineering. Overall, the post-
investment sources of value they realize are somewhat greater than the sources of value 
identified pre-deal. 
We again asked the PE investors who in their organization is involved in 
identifying the (post-investment) sources of value creation. Table 1.26 indicates that the 
participants are similar to those involved pre-investment. Deal team members are 
involved in virtually every deal. Operating partners are involved in identifying value 
sources in 51% of the deals, slightly higher than the 45% pre-deal, and consultants are 
involved in 27%, somewhat less than the 37% pre-deal. 
1.6.4 Exit 
Our final questions relating to value creation concern the exit strategy of PE 
investors. Table 1.27 indicates that PE investors expect to exit roughly one-half of their 
deals through a sale to a strategic buyer, i.e., to an operating company in a similar or 
related industry. In almost 30% of deals, they expect to sell to a financial buyer, i.e., to 
another private equity investor. In less than 20% of deals, PE investors expect to exit 
through an initial public offering (IPO). These percentages are consistent with, in fact 
almost identical to, the exit results in Strömberg (2008) that 53% of deals with known 
exits are to strategic buyers, 30% are to financial buyers, and 17% are through IPOs. 
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Not surprisingly, a significant difference exists between larger and smaller PE investors. 
Larger PE investors expect to exit through an IPO more than 26% of the time, and 
smaller PE investors expect to do so less than 11% of the time. For the largest deals, it 
is less likely that many strategic buyers are large enough to sell to. 
Table 1.27: Types of exit 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
Type of exit Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
IPO 18.8 11.7 10.9 26.4***   23.7 18.9   20.6 17.2   12.1 27.7*** 
Strategic sale 51.0 50.0 57.3 44.8**   46.3 51.4   44.2 56.7**   57.5 42.3*** 
Financial sale 29.5 30.0 31.8 27.3   29.6 28.1   33.6 26.0   30.4 28.3 
Other  0.7  0.0  0.0  1.5    0.5  1.6    1.6  0.0    0.0  1.7 
Number of responses  63  63  31  32    22  23    29  34    36  27 
 
Notes: This table reports the fraction of deals the sample private equity (PE) investors target for different 
types of exit. The sample is divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under management 
(AUM), the internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and by whether PE 
investor has a global presence. Statistical significance of the difference between subgroup means at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. IPO = initial public offering. 
 
 
Panels A and B of Table 1.28, respectively, the presence and the ranking of 
factors that PE investors consider in deciding when to exit (where 7 is the highest 
rank). We are interested in whether private equity firms believe that they can time the 
exit markets (either IPO or mergers and acquisitions markets) or if exits are driven by 
firm-specific performance. Achieving the expected operational plan and capital market 
conditions are the most important and are ranked roughly equally. They are important 
for more than 90% of the PE investors. As with capital structure decisions, this suggests 
that PE investors put roughly equal weight on fundamentals and on market timing. 
Management’s opinion, competitive considerations and hitting a return target are the 
next most important considerations and are ranked roughly equally. They are 
considered by more than 75% of the PE investors. Considering management’s opinion is 
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consistent with a cooperative or advisory relation between PE investors and 
management. The requirement to hit a return target could indicate an agency problem 
between the PE investors and their limited partners in which the private equity firm’s 
limited partners cannot adjust investment performance for risk and, hence, the private 
equity managers maintain nominal return thresholds. 
Table 1.28: Exit timing, importance and rank 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
Factors Mean  Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
 
Panel A: Exit timing – important 
Achieve operational plan set 
out to achieve 92.2   90.6 93.8    95.7 91.3    90.0 94.1   91.9  92.6 
Capital market conditions 96.9   96.9 96.9   100.0 95.7   100.0 94.1   94.6 100.0 
Competitive considerations 76.6   75.0 78.1    69.6 78.3    80.0 73.5   83.8  66.7 
Hit IRR or ROI target 79.7   71.9 87.5    91.3 82.6    76.7 82.4   75.7  85.2 
LPs pressure to return 
capital 56.3   46.9 65.6    56.5 56.5    43.3 67.6   48.6  66.7 
Management’s opinion 85.9   81.3 90.6    87.0 82.6    86.7 85.3   86.5  85.2 
Other 14.1   15.6 12.5    13.0 13.0    13.3 14.7   10.8  18.5 
Number of responses  64    32  32     23  23     30  34    37   27 
 
Panel B: Exit timing – rank 
Achieve operational plan set 
out to achieve  5.5 6.0  5.4  5.5     5.8  5.3     5.3  5.6    5.5   5.4 
Capital market conditions  5.3 5.5  5.4  5.2     5.3  5.3     5.4  5.2    5.0   5.7 
Competitive considerations  3.5 4.0  3.5  3.5     3.2  3.1     3.4  3.5    3.9   2.9 
Hit IRR or ROI target  4.0 4.0  3.9  4.2     4.2  4.6     3.8  4.3    3.9   4.3 
LPs pressure to return 
capital  1.8 1.5  1.5  2.0     1.9  1.8     1.4  2.1    1.6   1.9 
Management’s opinion  3.7 4.0  3.4  4.1     3.8  3.7     4.3  3.2**    3.8   3.7 
Other  0.7 0.0  0.7  0.7     0.7  0.7     0.6  0.7    0.5   0.9 
Number of responses  64 64  32  32     23  23     30  34    37   27 
 
Notes: Panel A describes the factors the sample private equity (PE) investors consider in deciding on the 
timing of exit. Panel B describes the ranking of factors the sample PE investors consider in deciding on 
the timing of exit (where higher rank is more important and 7 is the highest rank). The sample is divided 
into subgroups based on the median of assets under management (AUM), the internal rate of return 
(IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor has a global presence. 
Statistical significance of the difference between subgroup means at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are 
denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. ROI = return on investment; LPs = limited partners. 
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1.7 Private equity firm organization 
Up until this point, the survey questions have asked the PE investors to describe 
what they do with respect to their portfolio company investments. In this section, we 
report the answers to questions about the organization of the PE firms themselves with 
the idea of shedding additional light on how they operate and attempt to create value. 
Historically, private equity firms were small organizations. Since 2000, private equity 
firms have grown substantially in terms of both employees and structure. We seek to 
understand how this growth translates into organizational choices. 
Table 1.29: Private equity (PE) firm organization 
 
   AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
Firm organization Mean Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
Industry 54.4 54.1 54.8   65.5 55.2   64.7 46.7   54.5 54.3 
Criteria 11.4 10.8 11.9   13.8  3.4   11.8 11.1    6.8 17.1 
Product 16.5  5.4 26.2**   17.2 17.2   29.4  6.7***    2.3 34.3*** 
Generalist 36.7 40.5 33.3   27.6 34.5   26.5 44.4   43.2 28.6 
Other  6.3  2.7  9.5   10.3  6.9    8.8  4.4    2.3 11.4 
Number of responses  79  37  42    29  29    34  45    44  35 
 
Notes: This table describes how the sample PE investors say their firm is organized. The sample is 
divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under management (AUM), the internal rate of 
return (IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and by whether PE investor has a global 
presence. Statistical significance of the difference between subgroup means at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
In Table 1.29, we report how the PE firms are organized. The notable result here 
is that only 37% of the PE investors are organized as generalists. This is very different 
from the organization of the PE firms in the 1980s when most firms and most individual 
PE investors were largely generalists. At the same time, more than 50% of the firms are 
organized by industry. Organization by industry likely carries three advantages: PE 
investors who specialize in an industry are more likely to be able to find an opportunity 
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in that industry, to be able to evaluate the opportunity when it appears, and to 
understand whether and how it is possible to add value to that opportunity. 
In Table 1.30, we report the percentage of investment professionals in different 
specializations. A majority of employees in our sample firms are deal professionals. An 
additional 20% can be considered deal-related because they are involved in deal sourcing 
and deal execution, bringing to almost 75% the percentage of employees who are deal 
oriented. At the same time, 8.7% of employees are operating professionals, 1.2% are 
consulting professionals, 5.7% are shared service professionals, and 0.4% are human 
resources professionals, for a total of 16% who can be considered exclusively concerned 
with operational engineering. While this percentage is much lower than the percentage 
of employees who are deal-oriented, it does indicate that meaningful employee resources 
are devoted to value creation. 
Table 1.30: Private equity (PE) firm investment professionals 
 
      AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
Professionals by specialization Mean Median Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
Deal professionals 54.2 50.0 57.7 51.2   55.1 59.2   59.3 50.4   58.7 48.6 
Deal sourcing professionals  8.9  1.3 11.5  6.5    9.8  3.5**    6.0 11.1    9.8  7.7 
Deal execution professionals  9.6  0.0 10.0  9.2   10.4  4.4    5.8 12.4**   11.5  7.2 
Operating professionals  8.7  4.3  8.9  8.4    9.8  6.4    7.2  9.8    7.0 10.7 
Consulting professionals  1.2  0.0  1.1  1.2    0.8  0.7    0.9  1.3    1.2  1.1 
Shared services professionals  5.7  0.0  3.3  7.8    5.3  7.9    6.2  5.4    3.1  8.9** 
Fundraising professionals  3.2  1.2  1.6  4.6***    4.0  2.6    2.9  3.4    1.7  5.1*** 
HR professionals for portfolio 
companies  0.4  0.0  0.4  0.3    0.2  0.3    0.2  0.5    0.2  0.6 
Capital markets professionals  1.8  0.0  0.9  2.5    1.0  2.7    2.9  0.9    0.3  3.6** 
Other  6.5  0.0  4.7  8.1    3.6 12.4    8.6  4.9    6.7  6.3 
Number of responses  79  79  37  42    29  29    34  45    44  35 
 
Notes: This table reports the percentage of investment professionals in different specializations in the 
sample PE investor firms. The sample is divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under 
management (AUM), the internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and 
by whether PE investor has a global presence. Statistical significance of the difference between subgroup 
means at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. HR = human resources. 
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Table 1.31 considers the extent to which PE investors make use of other advisers 
to help with deal sourcing and with value creation. Almost 50% of the PE investors 
utilize senior advisers, a CEO council, or its equivalent. In general, these advisers 
provide nonfinancial advice on businesses. Almost 40% of the PE investors have an 
advisory board of such advisers. When we put these together, almost 66% of the PE 
investors have an advisory board or utilize senior advisers. The PE investors describe 
these advisers or executives as helping with deal flow, assisting with investment due 
diligence, providing industry-specific information, serving on boards post-investment, 
and advising on operating and managerial issues post-investment. Consistent with the 
earlier evidence on operational engineering, this suggests that many of the PE investors 
have made meaningful investments in obtaining operating advice.  
Table 1.31: Operational engineering assistance 
 
    AUM   IRR   Age   Offices 
 Mean Low High   Low High   Old Young   Local Global 
Non-LP advisory board or 
group of advisors 
38.0 32.4 42.9   27.6 48.3   38.2 37.8   47.7 25.7** 
Senior advisors or CEO 
council or equivalent 48.1 35.1 59.5**   51.7 62.1   52.9 44.4   47.7 48.6 
Hire strategy consultants to 
help with operating plans 
31.6 18.9 42.9**   41.4 34.5   41.2 24.4   27.3 37.1 
Number of responses  79  37  42    29  29    34  45    44  35 
 
Notes: This table reports the percentage of the sample private equity (PE) investors who utilize a non–
limited partner advisory board, senior advisors, or a chief executive officer (CEO) council or hire strategy 
consultants. The sample is divided into subgroups based on the median of assets under management 
(AUM), the internal rate of return (IRR) of most recent fund, the age of PE investor, and by whether PE 
investor has a global presence. Statistical significance of the difference between subgroup means at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. LP = limited partner. 
 
 
Almost 32% of the PE investors hire strategy consultants to help with operating 
plans. When we combine these with the senior advisers and CEO councils, we find that 
72% of the PE investors employ an advisory board, CEO council, or strategy 
consultants. Many employ a combination of these. Again, this suggests that many of the 
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PE investors have made meaningful investments in obtaining operating advice. This is 
perhaps not surprising given the growth and increased competitiveness within the 
industry and the expected sources of returns. 
1.8 Concerns 
In our analyses, we assume that PE investors provide accurate responses. Upon 
contacting PE firms, we assured them that their responses would be aggregated so that 
they could not be identified in our analyses. Accordingly, the incentive to report overly 
positive or otherwise inaccurate responses is arguably low because doing so will not 
benefit any one individual firm directly. We acknowledge, however, that some PE 
investors could respond overly positively to some questions in the hope that the PE 
industry will be cast in a more positive light. In this section, we discuss where we think 
those incentives and behaviors could affect our results. 
Any reporting biases should have a minimal effect on how PE investors report 
the methods they use to value companies. Whether a PE investor uses net present value 
or IRR seems uncontroversial. The determinants of target IRR also seem 
uncontroversial. One area in valuation where some incentive to overstate could exist is 
on target IRR. PE investors could want their limited partners to believe they are 
targeting higher IRRs than is the case. The countervailing factor is that if the target 
IRR is overstated, limited partners ultimately will be disappointed and the ability to 
continue to raise new (and potentially larger) funds could be reduced. 
We also think it unlikely that the PE investors gave biased answers to the 
questions on capital structure. If anything, one might expect them to understate the 
extent to which they time the market and use as much leverage as they can. 
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Inconsistent with this, most of the PE investors claim that debt availability and current 
interest rates are important considerations. 
It also seems unlikely that PE investors have an incentive to give biased answers 
to the questions concerning incentives and boards. Alternatively, one could argue that 
they have an incentive to downplay the extent to which they replace incumbent 
management. To the extent that PE investors need to partner with incumbent 
management, it would not be in their interest to report that they frequently replace 
incumbents. Inconsistent with this incentive, the majority of PE investors report that 
they bring in their own top management at some point. 
The section in which PE investors could have an incentive to be overly positive is 
on value creation. To the extent such investors want their LPs to believe that they have 
access to proprietary deals, PE investors could overstate the extent to which their deals 
are proprietary. Consistent with this, our PE investors do say that roughly 50% of their 
investments are proprietary in some way. We do not have any way to evaluate the 
extent to which this is true. At the same time, however, proprietary deal sourcing 
suggests that PE investors are able to buy low. One could expect PE investors to have 
an incentive not to say they can buy low because it does not reflect operating value 
creation on the part of the PE investors. In fact, the PE investors do identify buying 
low and selling high as an important source of value. 
To the extent that PE investors want to be known for growing their investments 
(and creating jobs) instead of reducing costs (and cutting jobs), they would have an 
incentive to overstate the extent to which they rely on growth and understate cost 
cutting. The result that PE investors identify increasing revenue as the most important 
source of value both pre- and post-investment is potentially consistent with this. On the 
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other hand, the fact that PE investors identify reducing costs as more important post-
investment than pre-investment is less consistent with understating cost cutting. Again, 
a countervailing force here is that limited partners expect to see growth and look for 
that value creation. 
Overall, then, while the PE investors may have some incentives to shade their 
survey answers in some areas, particularly regarding deal sourcing and growth, the 
answers they provided do not give us strong reasons to believe that they acted 
consistently on those incentives. 
1.9 Firm types 
The previous sections of this paper examined private equity investor practices in 
financial, governance, and operational engineering. The analyses consider each practice 
separately. In this section, we examine the extent to which certain practices are 
correlated across GPs. In doing so, we attempt to measure whether we can classify 
different groups of GPs as having different strategies. Our approach is to use the 
grouping of answers for a given private equity firm to extract types through cluster and 
factor analyses. We then examine how these types map into our notion of operational, 
financial, and governance engineering. Finally, we look for variation in firm founder 
backgrounds and how the types are influenced by the career histories of the individuals 
who started the various private equity organizations. 
1.9.1 Variables 
In this subsection, we create a variety of variables that help identify GP practices 
using measures that embody financial, governance, and operational engineering. To 
capture difference in investment selection methods, we create a variable that equals one 
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if the GP’s primary deal evaluation measure is IRR. We create a measure of proprietary 
deal sourcing that sums the fraction of deals that GPs say are self-generated, inbound 
from management, and from their executive network. 
We create four capital structure and financial engineering variables that help us 
characterize the various private equity firms. CSTIME, a variable that measures market 
timing behavior, is calculated as the sum of the rankings GPs give to timing factors—
“use as much debt as the market will allow” and “current interest rates and how much 
the company can pay”—as important determinants of capital structure. Similarly, 
CSTRADE measures capital structure trade-off behavior. It equals the sum of a private 
equity firm’s rankings for “maximize trade-off between tax benefits and risk of default” 
and “industry that the firm operates in” as important determinants of capital structure. 
We also create two variables that measure the overall targeted debt levels that the 
private equity firms say they typically employ. DTCAP is simply the typical debt-to-
total capital ratio that the private equity manager states they seek, and DTEB 
measures the typical debt-to-EBITDA ratio. 
Two variables measure management change that private equity managers engage 
in both before and after the investment. RECRUITB equals one if the GP typically 
recruits its own senior management team before investing. RECRUITBA equals one if 
the GP recruits its own senior management team before or after investing. 
The next set of variables is associated with sources of value that private equity 
firms say they identify or look to provide. COSTRED measures the fraction of deals for 
which the GP expects prospective cost reductions prior to the investment to be an 
important source of value. REVGROW measures the fraction of deals for which the GP 
expects prospective revenue growth prior to the investment to be an important source of 
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value. CHCEO is the fraction of deals for which the GP expects that changing the CEO 
to be an important source of value prior to the investment. BUYLOWSELLHI is a 
measure of the general partners’ belief that they can create value prospectively by 
purchasing a company at a low price. The variable is calculated as the sum of the 
fraction of deals a GP expects that buying low, buying low relative to the industry, or 
facilitating a high-value exit are important sources of value. OPPART is simply the 
fraction of deals that involve operating partners. PROPDEAL is the fraction of deals 
the PE investors claim are proprietary. 
We also create variables that measure the factors that GPs find most important 
in an investment decision. INVBUS is the sum of the ranks given to the business model 
and the industry in an investment decision. INVMGMT is the rank given to the 
management team. INVADDV is the rank given to the ability to add value. 
Related to these, we create variables that measure the return drivers on which 
GPs bet. GROWTH equals one if the GP’s top ranking is growth in the value of the 
business. OPIMP equals one if the GP’s top ranking is operating improvements. 
MULTARB equals one if the GP’s top ranking is industry level multiple arbitrage. 
Some univariate correlations are worth noting (although they are not reported in 
a table). High debt to total capital and high debt to EBITDA are positively correlated 
with capital structure timing, cost reductions, and multiple arbitrage and negatively 
correlated with proprietary deals, revenue growth, and investing in management. 
Investing in adding value is positively correlated with operating improvements, cost 
reductions, operating partners, and changing CEOs, but negatively correlated with 
investing in management. Recruiting a CEO beforehand is correlated with proprietary 
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deals, revenue growth, and buying low and selling high. Finally, proprietary deals use 
less debt, less market timing, less cost reduction, and more growth. 
1.9.2 Cluster analysis 
We first use cluster analysis to divide the firms into groups that allow us to 
explore how different firm characteristics co-vary. Cluster analysis groups respondents in 
such a way that the private equity firms within a given cluster are more similar to each 
other than they are to private equity firms in other clusters. We use partition clustering, 
which divides “the observations into a distinct number of non-overlapping groups” 
(kmeans in Stata). We restrict the sample to the 58 firms with complete data responses. 
We report our results with three clusters. The results are qualitatively similar with four 
or five clusters.  
Table 1.32 reports the results. The second cluster is characterized in terms of our 
notions of operational, financial, and governance engineering. The firms in this cluster 
are more likely to say they choose capital structure using trade-off considerations, are 
more likely to recruit an outside CEO or change the CEO, are more likely to focus on 
operating improvements including cost reductions and revenue growth, and are more 
likely to use operating partners. Many of these differences are statistically significant (in 
univariate tests) between Clusters 1 and 2. In sum, Cluster 2 firms seem to say that 
they focus more heavily on implementing operating improvements and bringing in new 
management. 
Cluster 1 includes firms that say they engage in the most financial engineering 
and least operational engineering. They are less likely to use capital structure trade-offs; 
less likely to mention adding value, operating improvements, cost reductions, and  
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Table 1.32: Cluster analysis 
 
  Cluster #1   Cluster #2   Cluster #3   All 
Variable Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
dtcap 0.54 0.60   0.59 0.60   0.54 0.60   0.55 0.60 
dteb 3.64 3.50  3.95 4.00  4.11 4.00  3.88 4.00 
cstime 7.87 9.00   7.69 8.00   7.32 8.00   7.64 8.00 
cstrade 3.48 3.00  5.00 5.00  3.58 4.00  3.93 4.00 
invbus 7.83 8.00   7.38 7.50   8.47 8.00   7.91 8.00 
invmgmt 4.04 4.00  3.75 3.50  3.79 4.00  3.88 4.00 
invaddv 3.04 3.00   4.00 4.00   3.79 4.00   3.55 3.00 
recruitb 0.30 0.00  0.44 0.00  0.26 0.00  0.33 0.00 
propdeal 0.50 0.50   0.46 0.50   0.53 0.50   0.50 0.50 
growth 0.91 1.00  0.63 1.00  0.84 1.00  0.81 1.00 
opimp 0.04 0.00   0.25 0.00   0.16 0.00   0.14 0.00 
costred 25.17 20.00  55.38 55.50  31.42 20.00  35.55 25.00 
revgrow 73.04 80.00   82.19 87.50   66.16 70.00   73.31 80.00 
chceo 31.39 29.00  40.06 40.50  30.00 26.00  33.33 30.00 
buylowsellhi 181.48 175.00   190.38 190.00   68.74 70.00   147.00 150.00 
multarb 3.20 3.00  2.70 3.00  2.60 2.50  2.90 2.50 
oppart 13.35 6.00   91.56 100.00   55.05 60.00   48.59 39.50 
aum 7.15 2.11  9.11 1.80  12.25 8.00  9.36 2.65 
Number of firms 23 23   16 16   19 19   58 58 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of a cluster analysis using partition clustering that divides “the 
observations into a distinct number of non-overlapping groups” (kmeans in Stata). The analysis generates 
three clusters. dtcap is debt to total capital; dteb is debt to EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization); cstime is the sum of the rankings the private equity (PE) investors give 
to timing factors as important determinants of capital structure; cstrade is the sum of the rankings given 
to trade-off factors as important determinants of capital structure; invbus is the sum of the ranks given to 
the business model and the industry in an investment decision; invmgmt is the rank given to the 
management team; invaddv is the rank given to the ability to add value; recruitb is one if the PE investor 
typically recruits its own senior management team before investing; propdeal is the fraction of deals the 
PE investors claim are proprietary; growth equals one if the PE investor’s top ranking is growth in the 
value of the business; opimp equals one if the top ranking is operating improvements; costred is the 
fraction of deals the PE investor expects for cost reductions pre-investment; revgrow is the fraction of 
deals the PE investor expects for prospective revenue growth pre-investment; chceo is the fraction of deals 
the PE investor expects that changing the CEO is important pre-investment; buylowsellhi measures the 
importance of creating value buying low or selling high; multarb equals one if the general partner’s top 
ranking is industry-level multiple arbitrage; oppart is the fraction of deals that involve operating partners; 
and aum is assets under management. 
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operating partners; and are more likely to buy low and sell high. The firms in this 
cluster also tend to be smaller than those in the other two clusters. Firms in the first 
cluster also tend to give their management teams a larger equity stake in the business. 
The third cluster is intermediate between the first two on financial and operational 
engineering. 
1.9.3 Factor analysis 
As an alternative to cluster analysis, we use factor analysis to extract the main 
dimensions of variation in the characteristics of our sample firms. In factor analysis, one 
seeks to identify correlations among observed variables in terms of underlying 
unobserved factors of a smaller dimension. Essentially, factor analysis models the 
observed variables as a function of the unobserved factors. 
Table 1.33 reports the factor loadings for the first six factors. The first three 
factors explain almost two-thirds of the variance in the data and have natural 
interpretations. The first factor has positive loadings on debt levels, operating 
improvements, cost reductions, operating partners, and adding value and negative 
loadings on growth, revenue growth, proprietary deal, and investing in the business. As 
with the cluster analysis, this suggests that some firms focus on operating improvements 
while others focus on buying good businesses in which they have some proprietary 
sourcing advantage. The second factor has its highest positive loadings on changing the 
CEO and recruiting a CEO before the deal closes and negative loadings on investing in 
management and operating improvements. This suggests a strong tendency for firms to 
differ in the extent to which they invest in new management versus incumbent. The  
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Table 1.33: Factor analysis 
 
Panel A: Principal factors, unrotated (58 observations, 11 retained factors, 143 parameters) 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor #1 2.5695 0.6027 0.2659 0.2659 
Factor #2 1.9668 0.2159 0.2035 0.4695 
Factor #3 1.7509 0.4964 0.1812 0.6507 
Factor #4 1.2545 0.1910 0.1298 0.7805 
Factor #5 1.0635 0.3087 0.1101 0.8905 
Factor #6 0.7548 0.2473 0.0781 0.9687 
 
Panel B: Factor loadings 
Variable Factor #1 Factor #2 Factor #3 Factor #4 Factor #5 Factor #6 
dtcap  0.5621 −0.0327  0.4938  0.0708 −0.2085 −0.2560 
dteb  0.5035 −0.0410  0.6676 −0.0047 −0.1817  0.0605 
cstime  0.1665 −0.2789  0.3737  0.2625  0.2806 −0.1203 
cstrade  0.1097  0.0423 −0.1426  0.1490 −0.0639  0.1176 
invbus −0.2527  0.1049  0.0168  0.3620 −0.5344 −0.1266 
invmgmt −0.2061 −0.2732  0.1520 −0.1401  0.5712  0.1638 
invaddv  0.5915  0.0930 −0.2394 −0.3619 −0.1367  0.1696 
recruitb  0.1495  0.5952  0.1109  0.2706  0.1373  0.0994 
propdeal −0.3721  0.4450 −0.1385  0.2428 −0.0297  0.3292 
growth −0.6203  0.3045  0.4265 −0.4185 −0.1212 −0.0479 
opimp  0.5183 −0.3698 −0.5246  0.3405 −0.0026  0.0244 
costred  0.5507  0.1235  0.0199 −0.3660  0.1529 −0.1378 
revgrow −0.0509  0.5792 −0.1024 −0.1207  0.1880 −0.2658 
chceo  0.3892  0.6732 −0.2110 −0.0282 −0.0566 −0.0677 
buylowsellhi  0.0983  0.3450  0.0160  0.2469  0.3541 −0.2450 
multarb  0.2566  0.2428  0.1569  0.3298  0.2231  0.1216 
oppart  0.3305  0.0754 −0.2566 −0.3633 −0.0318  0.1694 
aum  0.2185  0.1442  0.4313  0.0482 −0.0320  0.5167 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of a factor analysis of sample private equity (PE) firm characteristics 
and answers. dtcap is debt to total capital; dteb is debt to EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization); cstime is the sum of the rankings the PE investors give to timing factors 
as important determinants of capital structure; cstrade is the sum of the rankings given to trade-off 
factors as important determinants of capital structure; invbus is the sum of the ranks given to the 
business model and the industry in an investment decision; invmgmt is the rank given to the management 
team; invaddv is the rank given to the ability to add value; recruitb is one if the PE investor typically 
recruits its own senior management team before investing; propdeal is the fraction of deals the PE 
investors claim are proprietary; growth equals one if the PE investor’s top ranking is growth in the value 
of the business; opimp equals one if the top ranking is operating improvements; costred is the fraction of 
deals the PE investor expects for cost reductions pre-investment; revgrow is the fraction of deals the PE 
investor expects for prospective revenue growth pre-investment; chceo is the fraction of deals the PE 
investor expects that changing the CEO is important pre-investment; buylowsellhi measures the 
importance of creating value buying low or selling high; multarb equals one if the general partner’s top 
ranking is industry-level multiple arbitrage; oppart is the fraction of deals that involve operating partners; 
and aum is assets under management. Likelihood-ratio test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(153) = 
376.57; p-value = 0.0000. 
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third factor has high positive loadings on debt levels, capital structure timing, and 
assets under management and negative loadings on adding value and operating 
improvements. This suggests a factor that is operating improvements versus financial 
engineering. 
Both the cluster analysis and the factor analysis appear to divide firms into those 
that have a focus on operating improvements versus financial engineering and those that 
have a focus on investing in new management versus the incumbent. These results 
provide one expected and one unexpected result. We do not find it surprising that 
private equity firms pursue strategies that are largely based on financial engineering and 
others pursue strategies based on operational engineering. The different firm strategies 
toward incumbent management, however, are surprising. The importance of people and 
incentive alignment has been well established within the private equity industry. What 
has not been explored are the distinctive approaches to solving these people issues. 
Future research should explore the effectiveness of these various approaches. 
1.10 Founder types and firm types 
In this section, we consider whether PE firm strategies are related to the 
characteristics of the founding general partners. We classify the founding general 
partners of each of the PE firms in our sample. In our sample of firms, we gather 
information on the identity of firm founders from the private firms’ Web pages or news 
articles. Education and career histories are then gathered from the same sources or via 
LinkedIn. 
A founding general partner is classified as “financial” if the GP worked in 
investment banking, commercial banking, or investment management or had previously 
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been a chief financial officer. “Operational” GPs are those founders that had prior work 
history in consulting, operations, or general management. Finally, we classify a founding 
general partner as having a “private equity” background if the GP came from another 
PE or venture capital firm prior to founding the current one. For each firm, we 
calculate the average background of the firm by simply classifying the fraction of 
founders with each type of career history. We then perform a cluster analysis on those 
three variables (fraction of each career history) and classify 27 firms as having a finance 
background, 25 firms as having an operational background, and nine firms as having a 
private equity background.  
In Table 1.34, we explore how these types relate to specific strategies. Private 
equity firms founded by financial general partners appear more likely to favor financial 
engineering and investing with current management. Private equity firms that have 
founders with private equity experience appear to be the most strongly engaged in 
operational engineering. They are more likely to invest with the intention of adding 
value, to invest in the business, to look for operating improvements, to change the CEO 
after the deal, and to reduce costs. Firms founded by general partners with operational 
backgrounds have investment strategies that fall in between the other two groups. 
These results, while preliminary, do seem to indicate that career histories of firm 
founders have persistent effects on private equity firm strategy. This result is similar to 
the work of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) that demonstrates persistent effects of senior 
management in organizations they lead in terms of firm strategy. The strategies 
identified for private equity firms clearly align with the firm founders’ careers. While 
these results are preliminary, future research should explore whether investments that 
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align with the strength of the firm founders do better or worse in the long run than do 
investments that deviate from these strengths. 
Table 1.34: Relation of founder and firm characteristics 
 
Variable Mean (all) Finance Operations Other PE 
dtcap 0.56 0.52 0.58 0.57 
cstime 7.47 7.33 7.76 7.00 
cstrade 3.86 3.26 4.64 3.22 
invbus 7.77 7.44 8.20 8.56 
invmgmt 3.82 4.26 3.56 2.89 
invaddv 3.63 3.37 3.52 4.22 
recruitb 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.22 
propdeal 0.51 0.54 0.46 0.47 
growth 0.80 0.78 0.80 0.78 
opimp 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.22 
costred 35.6 25.0 38.1 42.3 
revgrow 70.3 66.6 70.5 80.6 
chceo 30.6 26.3 30.4 48.8 
buylowsellhi 140.9 155.4 150.2 125.0 
aum 9.55 10.30 11.06 4.72 
year_founded 1993.5 1992.7 1994.5 1994.2 
Number of responses 79 27 25 9 
 
Notes: This table reports the relation of founder characteristics to firm characteristics of the sample 
private equity (PE) investors. PE investors are classified as finance, operational, or other PE based on a 
cluster analysis on the fraction of their founders with financial, operational, or previous PE backgrounds. 
dtcap is debt to total capital; cstime is the sum of the rankings the PE investors give to timing factors as 
important determinants of capital structure; cstrade is the sum of the rankings given to trade-off factors 
as important determinants of capital structure; invbus is the sum of the ranks given to the business model 
and the industry in an investment decision; invmgmt is the rank given to the management team; invaddv 
is the rank given to the ability to add value; recruitb is one if the PE investor typically recruits its own 
senior management team before investing; propdeal is the fraction of deals the PE investors claim are 
proprietary; growth equals one if the PE investor’s top ranking is growth in the value of the business; 
opimp equals one if the top ranking is operating improvements; costred is the fraction of deals the PE 
investor expects for cost reductions pre-investment; revgrow is the fraction of deals the PE investor 
expects for prospective revenue growth pre-investment; chceo is the fraction of deals the PE investor 
expects that changing the chief executive officer is important pre-investment; buylowsellhi measures the 
importance of creating value buying low or selling high; and aum is assets under management. 
 
 
1.11 Conclusion 
Over the past decade, academic finance has explored the impact of PE firms in a 
number of areas by examining sometimes limited data. In this paper, we attempt to 
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highlight the impact of PE investors utilizing different data. We report what PE 
investors say they do by tabulating the results of a survey of PE investing practices. 
Because PE investors are highly educated, have strong incentives to maximize value, 
and have been very successful, their practices likely also have been successful. We are 
interested in how many of their responses correlate with what academic finance endorses 
and what it teaches. Do private equity investors do what the academy says are best 
practices? 
We find that very few investors use DCF or net present value techniques to 
evaluate investments, contrary to what one might expect. Instead, they rely on internal 
rates of return and multiples of invested capital. This contrasts with the results in 
Graham and Harvey (2001), who find that CFOs use net present values as often as 
internal rates of return. The result also conflicts with the focus on net present value in 
most business school finance courses. Furthermore, few PE investors use the capital 
asset price model to determine a cost of capital. Instead, PE investors typically target a 
return on their investments well above a CAPM-based rate. Target IRRs also seem to 
be adjusted by different PE firms utilizing different factors. Hence, different PE firms 
likely have different target IRRs for the same deals. 
The fact that they do not use DCF techniques is interesting. It could indicate 
that IRR and MOIC techniques are sufficiently robust or effective that DCF techniques 
are not necessary. Alternatively, it could indicate some practical deficiency with DCF 
techniques, especially in the private equity setting in which fund structures limit 
investment horizons and considerable asymmetric information exists between general 
and limited partners. These settings may make managing via IRR-based investment 
decisions better. 
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The fact that PE investors target returns that exceed CAPM-based returns is 
consistent with their believing that they add meaningful value to their investments and 
that they need to do so to generate their compensation. As the industry becomes more 
competitive, it will be interesting to see if target hurdle rates come down. 
We also find that PE investors believe that absolute, not relative, performance is 
most important to their LP investors. The focus on absolute performance is notable 
given the intense focus on relative performance or alphas for public market investments. 
There are two possible explanations for this. First, LPs, particularly pension funds, may 
focus on absolute returns because their liabilities are absolute. Alternatively, the chief 
investment officers of the LPs choose a private equity allocation based on relative 
performance, but the professionals who make the investment decisions care about 
absolute performance or performance relative to other PE firms. We believe that the 
advent of greater dissemination of risk-based performance benchmarks such as PMEs is 
likely to affect the view of limited partners and potentially trickle back down to the 
private equity general partners. 
In choosing the capital structures for their portfolio companies, PE investors 
appear to rely equally on factors that are consistent with capital structure trade-off and 
market timing theories. Again, these results are somewhat different from those for CFOs 
in Graham and Harvey (2001). The market timing result is consistent with the findings 
in AJSW (2013). This result is arguably favorable both to the traditional instruction at 
business schools and to the more recent advances in behavioral finance. 
PE investors expect to provide strong equity incentives to their management 
teams and believe those incentives are very important. They also structure smaller 
board of investors with a mix of insiders, PE investors, and outsiders. 
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 Finally, PE investors say they place a heavy emphasis on adding value to their 
portfolio companies, both before and after they invest. The sources of that added value, 
in order of importance, are increasing revenue, improving incentives and governance, 
facilitating a high-value exit or sale, making additional acquisitions, replacing 
management, and reducing costs. Consistent with adding operational value, the PE 
investors make meaningful investments in employees and advisers who provide advice 
and help in implementing operating improvements. 
While we recognize that it is possible that some PE investors report overly 
positively on some questions in the hope that the PE industry will be cast in a more 
positive light, particularly in aspects of deal sourcing and value creation, the answers 
they provided do not give us strong reasons to believe that they have a meaningful 
impact on our findings and conclusions. 
We finish with exploratory analyses to consider how financial, governance, and 
operational engineering practices co-vary within PE firms. The analyses suggest that 
different firms take very different strategies. For example, some focus much more 
heavily on operational engineering, while others rely heavily on replacing incumbent 
management. These investment strategies are strongly influenced by the career histories 
of the private equity firm founders. It will be interesting (and, with these data, possible) 
to see which of these strategies, if any, exhibit superior performance in the future. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Agglomeration of Bankruptcy1 
 
2.1 Introduction 
How does bankruptcy spread? While research on bankruptcy and financial 
distress has documented how bankruptcy reorganizations affect firms that file for 
Chapter-11 themselves, there is limited evidence on the effect of bankruptcies and 
financial distress on competitors and industry peers. In this paper, we identify a new 
channel by which bankrupt firms impose negative externalities on their non-bankrupt 
competitors, namely, through their impact on peer firm sales and on the propensity to 
close stores. 
Research in industrial organization has argued that the geographic concentration 
of stores and the existence of clusters of stores can be explained by consumers’ imperfect 
information and their need to search the market (Wolinsky 1983). Indeed, both 
practitioners and academics argue that economies of agglomeration exist in retail since 
some stores—those of national name-brands or anchor department stores, in 
particular—draw customer traffic not only to their own stores but also to nearby stores. 
As a result, store level sales may depend on the sales of neighboring stores for reasons 
that are unrelated to local economic conditions (Gould and Pashigian 1998; Gould, 
Pashigian, and Prendergast 2005). 
                                                     
1 Co-authored with Efraim Benmelech, Nittai Bergman, and Anna Milanez. 
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We conjecture that the externalities that exist between neighboring stores, and 
the economies of agglomeration they create, can be detrimental during downturns, 
propagating and amplifying the negative effects of financial distress and bankruptcies 
among firms in the same locality. Our main prediction is that, due to agglomeration 
economies, retail stores in distress impose negative externalities on their neighboring 
peers: store sales tend to decrease with the reduction in sales, and ultimately the 
closure, of neighboring stores. If such negative externalities are sufficiently strong, 
bankruptcies, and the store closure they involve, will lead to additional store closures 
and bankruptcies, propagating within a given area. 
Identifying a causal link, however, from the bankruptcy and financial distress of 
one retailer to the sales and closure decisions of its neighboring retailers is made difficult 
by the fact that bankruptcy filings and financial distress are correlated with local 
economic conditions. Correlation in sales among stores in the same vicinity may 
therefore simply reflect weak demand in an area. Similarly, the fact that store closures 
tend to cluster locally may often be the outcome of underlying difficulties in the local 
economy, rather than the effect of negative externalities among stores. Local economic 
conditions will naturally drive a correlation in outcomes among stores located in the 
same area. 
Using a novel and detailed dataset of all national chain store locations and 
closures across the United States from 2005 to 2010, we provide empirical evidence that 
supports the view that bankruptcies of retail companies impose negative externalities on 
neighboring stores owned by solvent companies. Our identification strategy consists of 
analyzing the effect of Chapter 11 bankruptcies of large national retailers, such as 
Circuit City and Linens ‘n Things, who liquidated their entire store chain during the 
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sample period. Using Chapter 11 bankruptcies of national retailers alleviates the concern 
that local economic conditions led to the demise of the company: it is unlikely that a 
large retail chain will suffer major financial difficulties because of a localized economic 
downturn in one of its many locations. Supporting this identification assumption, we 
show that stores of retail chains that eventually end up in Chapter 11 bankruptcy are 
not located in areas that are worse than the location of stores operated by chains that 
do not end up in bankruptcy, along a host of economic characteristics. 
We then show that stores located in proximity to stores of national chains that 
are liquidated are more likely to close themselves. Importantly, we find that this effect is 
stronger for stores in the same industry of the liquidating national chain as compared to 
stores in industries different from that of the liquidating chain. For example, focusing on 
stores located in the same address (usually mall locations), the probability that a store 
will close in the year following the closure of a store belonging to a liquidating national 
chain is approximately two times larger when operating in the same industry as 
compared to when the stores operate in different industries. 
Finally, we study the interaction between the geographical effect of store closures 
and the financial health of solvent owners of neighboring stores. We hypothesize that 
the impact of national chain store liquidations will be stronger on firms in weaker 
financial health, as these stores are expected to suffer more from the reduction in 
customer traffic. Focusing on stores owned by a parent company, and measuring 
financial health using the profitability of the parent, we find that, consistent with our 
hypothesis, the geographical effect of store closures on neighboring stores is indeed more 
pronounced in financially weaker firms. For example, when located within a 50 meter 
radius of a closing national chain store, stores belonging to parent firms in the 25th 
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percentile of profitability are between 16.9 and 22.2 percent more likely to close. In 
contrast, if the parent firm is in the 75th percentile of profitability there is no statistical 
significant effect on the likelihood of store closure. 
Along the same lines, we also find that larger stores are more resilient to the 
closure of neighboring stores, exhibiting a lower likelihood of closure following the 
closure of neighboring stores. 
Our paper is closely related to a large body of work on agglomeration economies 
that studies how the proximity of firms and individuals in urban areas increases 
productivity. Prior work has shown that increases in productivity can arise for a variety 
of reasons, including reduced transport costs of goods, increased ability of labor 
specialization , better matching quality of workers to firms, and knowledge spillovers.2 
Within the retail sector, agglomeration economies may arise because of the increased 
productivity stemming from reduced consumer search costs. By utilizing micro-level 
data on store locations and closures our paper contributes in two ways to this important 
literature.  
The first contribution is our focus on the way in which downturns and 
bankruptcies damage economies of agglomeration and the productivity enhancements 
they create. In contrast, prior work has focused on the creation of agglomeration 
economies through firm entry and employment decisions (See, for example, Ellison and 
Glaeser (1997), Glaeser et al (1992), Henderson et al. (1995), and Rosenthal and Strange 
(2003)). By focusing on downturns, our work shows how agglomeration economies can 
be understood to propagate bankruptcies and financial distress. Indeed, firm closures 
                                                     
2 Important contributions include Krugman (1991a) and (1991b), Becker and Murphy (1992), Helsley and 
Strange (1990), and Marshall (1920)). 
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will naturally reduce proximity between agents in an urban environment, which will 
tend to reduce the productivity of remaining firms due to dis-economies of 
agglomeration. To the extent that replacing closed stores with new ones takes time—for 
example due to credit constraints during downturns—the reduction in productivity may 
have long term consequences.3 
The second contribution of the paper is the empirical identification of 
agglomeration economies. The standard difficulty in identifying agglomeration effects is 
the endogeneity of firms’ location decisions. Namely, is firm proximity causing high 
productivity or, alternatively, is the proximity simply a by-product of firms choosing to 
locate in areas naturally pre-disposed to high productivity? Employing micro-level data 
on store locations, we address the endogeneity concern by instrumenting for variation in 
store location with our large retail-chain bankruptcy instrument.4 As described above, to 
the extent that national chain store closures are not driven by highly localized demand-
side effects, we can measure the impact of store closures on nearby stores. 
Agglomeration effects, and the degree to which they attenuate with distance to other 
stores, are therefore estimated at a micro level.  
Our paper also adds to the growing literature in finance on the importance of 
peer effects and networks for capital structure (Leary and Roberts 2014), acquisitions 
and managerial compensation (Shue 2013), entrepreneurship (Lerner and Malmendier 
                                                     
3 There have been few studies analyzing how firms in bankruptcy or financial distress affect their industry 
peers. One exception is Benmelech and Bergman (2011) who use data from the airline industry to 
examine how firms in financial distress impose negative externalities on their industry peers by increasing 
their cost of debt capital. 
4 Rosenthal and Strange (2008) instrument for the location of firms with the presence of bedrock. Other 
efforts to deal with the endogeneity concern involve analyzing co-agglomeration effects (see, for example, 
Ellison et al. (2010)). 
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2013) and portfolio selection and investment (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008). In 
particular, our paper is closely related to Almazan, De Motta, Titman, and Uysal (2010) 
who link financial structure to economies of agglomeration. In particular, Almazan, De 
Motta, Titman, and Uysal (2010) show that firms that are located in industry clusters 
are more likely to maintain financial slack in order to facilitate acquisitions within these 
clusters. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains our 
identification strategy. Section 2.3 describes our data sources and provides summary 
statistics and Section 2.4 describes the initial location of stores in our sample. Section 
2.5 presents the empirical analysis of the relation between bankrupt store and 
neighboring store closures. Section 2.6 analyzes the effects of store size and firm 
profitability on store closures. Section 2.7 concludes. 
2.2 Identification strategy 
Our main prediction is that, due to economics of agglomeration, the closure of 
retail stores imposes negative externalities on their neighbors—that is, store sales tend 
to decrease with a decline in customer traffic in their area. If this effect is sufficiently 
large, store closures will tend to propagate geographically. However, identifying a causal 
link from the financial distress or bankruptcy of retailers to the decision of a 
neighboring solvent retailer to close its stores is difficult because financial distress is 
potentially correlated with underlying local economic conditions. For example, the fact 
that local retailers are in financial distress can convey information about weak local 
demand. Similarly, the fact that store closures tend to cluster locally does not imply in 
and of itself a causal link but rather may simply reflect difficulties in the local economy.  
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Our identification strategy consists of analyzing the effect of Chapter 11 
bankruptcies of large national retailers, such as Circuit City and Linens ‘n Things, who 
liquidate their entire store chain during the sample period. Using Chapter 11 
bankruptcies of national retailers alleviates the concern that local economic conditions 
led to the demise of the company: it is unlikely that a large retail chain will suffer major 
financial difficulties because of a localized economic downturn in one of its many 
locations. Still, it is likely that national chains experiencing financial distress will 
restructure their operations and cherry-pick those stores they would like to remain open. 
According to this, financially distressed retailers will shut down their worst performing 
stores while keeping their best stores open, implying that a correlation between closures 
of stores of bankrupt chains may merely reflect poor local demand rather than negative 
externalities driven by financial distress. We address this concern directly by only 
utilizing variation driven by bankruptcy cases that result in the liquidation of the entire 
chain. In these cases, there is clearly no concern of cherry-picking of the more successful 
stores; all stores are closed regardless of local demand conditions. 
In examining national chain liquidations, one concern that remains is that the 
stores of the liquidating chain were located in areas that experienced negative economic 
shocks—for example, because of poor store placement decisions made on the part of 
headquarters—and that it was these shocks that eventually drove the chain into 
bankruptcy. We address this concern in two ways. First, based on observables, we show 
empirically that stores of chains that eventually file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and end 
up in full liquidations are not located in areas that are worse than the location of stores 
operated by chains that do not end up in bankruptcy. Second, due to our precise data 
on the location of each store and our use of area fixed effects (either county, zip code, or 
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zip-by-year), our identification strategy enables us to net out local economic shocks and 
relies on variation within the relevant geographic area. As such, the relevant 
endogeneity concern is not that the stores of liquidating national chains were located in 
areas that suffered more negative economic shocks, but rather that these stores were 
somehow positioned in the worse locations within each county or zip code. Given their 
firms’ success in forming a national chain of stores, this seems highly unlikely.  
To further alleviate concerns about store locations we also perform a placebo 
test. We define a “placebo” variable that counts for each store in our sample the 
number of neighboring stores that are part of a national chain that will liquidate in the 
following year but that are currently not in bankruptcy. We find that the effect of store 
liquidation on subsequent store closures is not driven by the location of the retail chain-
stores that will later become bankrupt but rather by the timing in which they were 
actually closed which is consistent with the existence of a causal effect of store closures. 
2.3 Data and summary statistics 
2.3.1 Sample construction and data sources 
Our dataset is composed of several sources which we describe in turn in this 
section. The main source is Chain Store Guide (CSG), a database that contains detailed 
information on retail store locations in the US and Canada. CSG data is organized in 
the form of annual snapshots of almost the entire retail industry at the establishment 
level.5 The information on each location contains the store name, its address (street 
number, street name, city, state, and zip code) and phone number, the parent company, 
                                                     
5 CSG does not track locations operated by companies that have annual revenues below a certain 
industry-specific threshold. For example, to be included into the database, apparel retailers and 
department stores are required to have annual sales of at least $500,000 and $250,000, respectively. 
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and a CSG-defined industry.6 Our sample covers the 2005-2010 period and includes 
828,792 store-year observations in the U.S. in the following CSG-defined industries: 
Apparel Stores, Department Store, Discount Stores, General Merchandise Store, Home 
Centers & Hardware Chains, and Value-Priced Apparel Store. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 
demonstrate the coverage of our data by plotting the locations of all stores in our 
dataset for the first year (2005 in Figure 2.1) and the last year of our sample (2010 in 
Figure 2.2). 
We clean the data and streamline store names and parent names for consistency. 
Large chain stores account for the bulk of the data. For example, in 2010, the 50 largest 
retail chains accounted for 111,655 of the 166,045 stores in the dataset, representing 
67.2% of the stores in the data for that year. 
Our empirical strategy requires us to compute distances between retail locations. 
To do so we convert all street addresses into geographic coordinates using ArcGIS 
software. If an address is not contained in the address locator used by ArcGIS, we pass 
it through Google Maps API in an additional attempt to geocode it. As a result, we 
successfully map street addresses to geographic coordinates for 97% of the data. The 
information on longitudes and latitudes of full addresses—up to a street number—makes 
it possible for us to compute distances between retail locations to a very high precision. 
Since our analysis focuses on stores that are in close proximity to each other, we use the 
standard formula for the shortest distance between two points on a sphere (see Coval 
and Moskowitz (1999)) without adjusting for the fact that the Earth’s surface is geoid-
shaped. 
                                                     
6 The parent company is essentially the name of the retail chain. Some companies operate stores under 
different brands which we then match to the parent company. 
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Figure 2.1: Store locations as of 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Store locations as of 2010 
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We supplement the CSG store-level data with information on the number of 
employees accessible through Esri’s Business Analyst. Esri’s data structure is very 
similar to that of CSG. We carefully merge these two databases by store/parent name 
and address; questionable cases are checked manually. The majority of information on 
the number of employees available is collected by Esri by reaching out individually to 
every store on a yearly basis; about 10% of the data though is populated according to 
the data provider’s proprietary models based on observable characteristics of a retail 
location. In our analysis, we use only the actual data points and discard modeled 
figures. 
We also use Esri’s Major Shopping Centers, which is a panel of major U.S. 
shopping centers, to group stores in our sample into malls where applicable. The 
included mall-level pieces of information are mall name and its address (usually up to a 
street intersection), gross leasable area (GLA), total number of stores, and names of 
anchor tenants (up to four). We merge Esri’s Major Shopping Centers to CSG data 
using the following multi-step procedure. First, we find anchor stores in the data using 
the information on store/parent name and zip code. If several anchor stores pertaining 
to the same mall are identified, we confirm the match if the average distance from 
anchors to the implied center of the mall is less than 200 meters. By doing so, we 
increase our confidence that we do not erroneously label stores as anchor tenants in zip 
codes containing a large number of stores. Stores located within 25 meters of anchors 
are assigned to the same mall. Second, we geocode addresses of malls that were not 
found in the data using anchor tenants—e.g., information on their anchors is missing—
to be able to compute distances between malls and stores. All stores within 100 meters 
of the mall are assigned to that mall. At all stages of the algorithm, we manually check 
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questionable cases by looking up store addresses and verifying whether they are part of 
a shopping mall. 
Next, we use SDC Platinum to identify retail Chapter 11 bankruptcies since 
January 2000 within the following SIC retail trade categories: general merchandise (SIC 
4-digit codes 5311, 5331 and 5399), apparel (5600, 5621 and 5651), home furnishings 
(5700, 5712, 5731, 5734 and 5735) and miscellaneous (5900, 5912, 5940, 5944, 5945, 
5960, 5961 and 5990). There were 93 cases of retail Chapter 11 liquidations between 
2000 and 2011. The largest bankruptcies in recent years include Circuit City, Goody’s, 
G+G Retail, KB Toys, Linens ‘n Things, Mervyn’s, and The Sharper Image. 
Bankruptcy stores are identified in our data by their respective parent name. 
We then merge our data with Compustat Fundamental and Industry Data. We 
use the Compustat North America Fundamentals Annual database to construct 
variables that are based on operational and financial data. These include the number of 
employees in the firm, size (defined as the natural log of total assets), market-to-book 
ratio (defined as the market value of equity and book value of assets less the book value 
of equity, divided by the book value of assets), profitability (defined as earnings over 
total assets), and leverage (defined as total current liabilities plus long-term debt, 
divided by the book value of assets). 
We supplement our database with information pertaining to the local economies 
from the Census, IRS, Zillow, and the BLS. We rely on the 2000 Census survey for a 
host of demographic variables available by zip code. We also use the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) data which provides the number of filed tax returns (a proxy for the 
number of households), the number of exemptions (a proxy for the population), adjusted 
gross income (which includes taxable income from all sources less adjustments such as 
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IRA deductions, self-employment taxes, health insurance, alimony paid, etc.), wage and 
salary income, dividend income and interest income at the zip code level. We use data 
on house prices from Zillow, an online real estate database that tracks valuations 
throughout the United States. We construct annual county-level and zip-code median 
house values as well as annual changes in housing prices. 
2.3.2 Individual store closures 
In order to construct our main dependent variable of store closings we compare 
the data from one year to the next. We define a store closure if a store entry appears in 
a given year but not in the subsequent one. Given that our data span the years 2005-
2010 we can identify store closings for each year from 2005 up to 2009. Panel A of Table 
2.1 provides summary statistics on store closings during our entire sample-period as well 
as, individually, for each of the years in the sample. The number of stores in the data 
ranges from 84,388 individual stores in 2005 to 155,114 stores in 2009. The rate of 
annual store closure ranges between 1.4% in 2007 to 11.0% in 2008. During the entire 
sample period of 2005-2009, 6.1% of store-years represent store closures, with a standard 
deviation of 23.9%. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 display the geographical distribution of store 
closures (red dots) relative to stores that stay open (blue dots) for the years 2007 and 
2008, respectively. 
There are 30 retail companies that filed for bankruptcy and were matched to our 
2005–2010 data set. Table 2.2 provides a chronological list of the bankrupt companies, 
the date in which they filed for bankruptcy, whether they emerged from bankruptcy, 
and the number of stores operated by the firm. Table 2.2 clearly demonstrates the wave 
of retail bankruptcies during the economic contraction of 2007–2009 as consumer 
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consumption and expenditure declined sharply. In forming the sample of liquidating 
national chains used in our identification we include only those chains where upon 
bankruptcy of the chains all stores were closed, and in which the retail chains operated 
in several states. 
Table 2.1: Individual store closures 
 
Year Mean 
Standard 
deviation Min Max N 
 
Panel A: Closed stores over time 
2005–2009 0.061 0.239 0 1 661,382 
2005 0.048 0.213 0 1 84,388 
2006 0.085 0.279 0 1 125,897 
2007 0.014 0.116 0 1 147,551 
2008 0.110 0.313 0 1 148,432 
2009 0.047 0.211 0 1 155,114 
 
Panel B: Bankrupt stores over time 
2005–2010 0.021 0.142 0 1 827,156 
2005 0.010 0.100 0 1 84,388 
2006 0.008 0.091 0 1 125,897 
2007 0.029 0.167 0 1 147,551 
2008 0.042 0.201 0 1 148,432 
2009 0.026 0.158 0 1 155,114 
2010 0.004 0.063 0 1 165,774 
 
Panel C: Stores closed in full liquidation bankruptcies over time 
2005–2009 0.010 0.100 0 1 661,382 
2005 0.002 0.049 0 1 84,388 
2006 0.003 0.058 0 1 125,897 
2007 0.001 0.033 0 1 147,551 
2008 0.019 0.135 0 1 148,432 
2009 0.019 0.137 0 1 155,114 
 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics on store closings and bankrupt stores. Panel A displays all 
store closings. Panel B presents bankrupt stores, Panel C presents store closings that result from full 
liquidation bankruptcies. 
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Figure 2.3: Store closures during 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Store closures during 2008 
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Table 2.2: Bankrupt retail companies 
 
Company Filing date Emerged 
Used in 
identifi-
cation 
Bankruptcy 
outcome 
Date 
disposed 
# of 
stores 
Gadzooks 02/03/04 No No Acq. 02/17/06 243 
Ultimate Electronics 01/11/05 No No Acq. 12/09/05 65 
D K Stores 04/08/05 No Yes Liq. 02/09/06 54 
Norstan Apparel Shops 04/08/05 No Yes Acq. 05/26/05 229 
G+G Retail 01/25/06 No Yes Liq. 12/06/06 515 
Tower Record 08/20/06 No Yes Liq. 08/06/07 89 
KS Merchandise Mart 10/03/06 No Yes Liq. N/A 17 
Hancock Fabrics 03/21/07 Yes No Reorg. 08/01/08 373 
The Dunlap 07/10/07 No Yes Liq. N/A 38 
The Sharper Image 
Corporation 
02/19/08 No Yes 363 sale 08/13/12 184 
Linens ‘n Things 05/02/08 No Yes 363 sale 06/12/09 589 
Mervyn’s 07/29/08 No Yes Liq. 10/27/08 177 
Boscov’s 08/04/08 No No Liq. 12/04/07 49 
Value City Department 
Stores 
10/26/08 No Yes Liq. 02/26/09 66 
Tweeter Home 
Entertainment Group 
11/05/08 No Yes 363 sale 07/13/07 104 
National Wholesale 
Liquidators 
11/10/08 No Yes Liq. N/A 55 
Circuit City Stores 11/10/08 No Yes 363 sale 09/20/10 721 
KB Toys 12/11/08 No Yes Liq. 02/16/10 461 
Goody’s 01/13/09 No Yes Liq. 07/03/09 287 
Gottschalks 01/14/09 No Yes Liq. 02/28/11 58 
Rex Stores 02/01/09 No Yes Liq. N/A 111 
S & K Famous Brands 02/09/09 No Yes Liq. 03/16/10 136 
Ritz Camera Centers 02/22/09 Yes No Reorg. N/A N/A  
Joe’s Sports Outdoors 
More 
03/24/09 No Yes Liq. 04/14/09 31 
Filene’s Basement 05/24/09 No No Liq. 02/10/10 25 
Eddie Bauer Holdings 06/17/09 No No 363 sale 03/18/10 371 
Movie Gallery 02/02/10 No Yes Liq. 11/18/10 2,415 
Loehmann’s Holdings 11/15/10 Yes No Reorg. 02/09/11 48 
 
Notes: This table provides information on the main retail bankruptcy cases used in our analysis. The 
table lists the name of the bankrupt company, its bankruptcy filing date, whether it emerged or not from 
bankruptcy, the bankruptcy outcome, the date in which the case was disposed, the time spent in 
bankruptcy and the number of stores operated by the company in the time of the bankruptcy filing. Acq. 
= acquired; Liq. = liquidated; reorg. = reorganized. 
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Panel B of Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for stores that operated while 
their company was in a Chapter 11 restructuring. As Panel B shows, 2.1% of the 
827,156 observations were stores that their companies were operating under Chapter 11 
protection. The number of bankrupt stores increased sharply from 4,231 stores in 2007 
(representing 2.9% of total stores) to 6,167 bankrupt stores in 2008 (4.2% of total 
stores). By 2009 many of the bankrupt retailers were liquidated and their stores 
disappeared resulting in fewer bankrupt stores (3,963 stores representing 2.6% of the 
stores in our sample). By 2010 most of the remaining bankrupt companies that were not 
liquidated emerged from Chapter 11 and the number of bankrupt stores fell to 652 or 
0.4% of the stores in our sample. 
Finally, we calculate the number of stores that were closed in bankruptcies of 
chains that were fully liquidated. As we argue previously, these bankruptcy cases are 
not driven by the specific location of their stores but rather because of a failure of their 
business plan. Hence, as described in the Identification Strategy section, we use store 
closures resulting from the chain-wide liquidation of the parent firm to capture the 
negative externalities of bankruptcy. Panel C of Table 2.1 displays summary statistics 
for these chain-wide liquidating stores. The number of stores closed by chains that were 
fully liquidated in bankruptcy increases from 160 stores in 2007 (0.10% of total stores) 
to 2,650 (1.86% of total stores) and 2,987 (1.93% of total stores), in 2008 and 2009, 
respectively.7 
  
                                                     
7 As in Panel A of Table 2.1 we cannot calculate stores closing for 2010 given that it is the last year in 
our panel dataset. 
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2.3.4 Neighboring store closures 
We construct three main measures of neighboring store closures that are driven 
by liquidation of national retail chains. To do this, for each store in our sample and for 
every year we measure the distance to any other store in our sample. Specifically, for 
each store we define its neighboring stores in a series of concentric circles. We consider 
neighboring stores that are: (1) located in the same address; (2) located in a different 
address but are within a 50 meters radius of the store under consideration; and (3) 
stores that are located in a different address and are located in a radius of more than 50 
meters but less or equal than 100 meters from the store under consideration.8 In each of 
these three geographical units, for each store and each year, we then count the number 
of stores that were closed as a result of a full liquidation of a large retail chain. 
Table 2.3 provides summary statistics for the three measures associated with 
each of the three geographical units, as well as for counts of neighboring stores that are 
outside of the 100 meters radius. Panel A of Table 2.3 displays summary statistics for 
same address stores that were closed in chain liquidations. During the 2005-2010 same-
address liquidated stores ranged from 0 to 3 with an unconditional mean of 0.028 and a 
standard deviation of 0.181. For any given store, therefore, the maximum number of 
stores operating in the same address that were closed as a result of a retail-chain 
liquidation is three. Panel A also displays the evolution of the same-address measure 
over time. For example, on average same-address equals 0 and 0.002 in 2005 and 2006, 
respectively.9 As the number of bankruptcies rose in 2007 same-address increased to  
                                                     
8 Different stores that are operating in the same address are usually indicative of a shopping mall. 
9 The first statistic here simply reflects the fact that there were no store closures as a result of retail-chain 
liquidations in 2005. 
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Table 2.3: Neighboring store closures 
 
Year Mean 
Standard 
deviation Min Max N 
 
Panel A: Same address 
2005–2010 0.028 0.181 0 3 827,156 
2005 0.000 0.000 0 0 84,388 
2006 0.002 0.045 0 1 125,897 
2007 0.038 0.192 0 2 147,551 
2008 0.016 0.127 0 2 148,432 
2009 0.085 0.327 0 3 155,114 
2010 0.009 0.100 0 2 165,774 
 
Panel B: Not same address and distance ≤ 50 meters 
2005–2010 0.012 0.115 0 3 827,156 
2005 0.000 0.000 0 0 84,388 
2006 0.002 0.044 0 1 125,897 
2007 0.009 0.099 0 2 147,551 
2008 0.003 0.055 0 2 148,432 
2009 0.038 0.207 0 3 155,114 
2010 0.010 0.111 0 2 165,774 
 
Panel C: 50 meters < distance ≤ 100 meters 
2005–2010 0.008 0.094 0 3 827,156 
2005 0.000 0.000 0 0 84,388 
2006 0.001 0.030 0 1 125,897 
2007 0.005 0.075 0 2 147,551 
2008 0.002 0.044 0 1 148,432 
2009 0.025 0.166 0 3 155,114 
2010 0.008 0.103 0 2 165,774 
 
Panel D: Further away store closures 2005–2010 
100–150 meters 0.007 0.087 0 3 827,156 
150–200 meters 0.006 0.085 0 3 827,156 
200–250 meters 0.020 0.151 0 4 827,156 
250–300 meters 0.006 0.082 0 3 827,156 
300–350 meters 0.006 0.083 0 4 827,156 
350–400 meters 0.006 0.079 0 3 827,156 
400–450 meters 0.006 0.081 0 3 827,156 
450–500 meters 0.006 0.079 0 4 827,156 
 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics on full liquidation closings of neighboring stores. Panel A 
displays store closings in the same address. Panels B and C present store closings for 0-50 meter and 50-
100 meter distances. Panel D lists summary statistics for distances that are between 150 and 500 meter. 
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0.038 in 2007 (range between 0 and 2) and peaked at 0.085 (range between 0 and 3) in 
2009. 
Panels B and C present similar statistics for the 0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 50 and the 50 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 100 measures, respectively. As can be seen, both measures display 
similar patterns over time ranging from 0 to 3 and averaging approximately 0.01. 
Finally, Panel D expands the concentric rings beyond 100 meters, and displays summary 
statistics for distances up to 500 meters, at 50 meter interval. 
2.4 Stores locations 
2.4.1 The geographical dispersion of liquidated chain stores 
One of the main pillars of our identification strategy is the conjecture that large 
bankruptcy cases of national retail chains are less likely to be driven by localized 
economic conditions given their diversity and geographical dispersion. We present the 
case for the geographical dispersion of these chains in Table 2.4 by listing information 
on the geography of operation of the retail chain bankruptcies utilized in our empirical 
strategy.10 In choosing these cases we focus on those bankruptcy cases of retail chains 
that operated in several states and that end up in full liquidation of all the stores. 
Table 2.4: Retail chains fully liquidated 
 
Company # of 
stores 
# of 
states 
# of census 
divisions 
Largest census 
division  
Circuit City Stores 570 44 9 S. Atlantic 
D K Stores 54 5 3 Mid Atlantic 
Discovery Channel Retail Stores 107 32 9 Pacific 
G+G Retail 314 40 9 S. Atlantic 
  
                                                     
10 Note that the Discovery Channel Retail Stores liquidation did not result from a Chapter 11 filing but 
rather from a voluntary closure of the entire chain. 
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Table 2.4: Retail chains fully liquidated (Continued) 
 
Company 
# of 
stores 
# of 
states 
# of census 
divisions 
Largest census 
division  
Goody’s 377 21 5 S. Atlantic 
Gottschalks 60 6 2 Pacific 
Joe’s Sports Outdoors More 26 2 1 Pacific 
KB Toys 483 44 9 Mid Atlantic 
KS Merchandise Mart 18 5 3 E. N. Central 
Linens ’n Things 496 48 9 S. Atlantic 
Mervyn’s 169 8 3 Pacific 
Movie Gallery 2,831 50 9 Pacific 
National Wholesale Liquidators 44 12 4 Mid Atlantic 
Norstan Apparel Shops 147 21 6 S. Atlantic 
Rex Stores 113 34 9 S. Atlantic 
S & K Famous Brands 43 11 5 S. Atlantic 
The Dunlap 38 8 4 W. S. Central 
The Sharper Image Corporation 178 38 9 Pacific 
Tower Record 88 20 8 Pacific 
Tweeter Home Entertainment Group 104 22 8 S. Atlantic 
Value City Department Stores 105 15 5 E. N. Central 
 
Notes: This table provides information on the geographical dispersion of the liquidated retail chains used 
in the analysis. 
 
 
There are 21 such cases in the data affecting a total of 6,418 individual stores in 
our sample. The mean (median) number of stores of these retail chains is 305.6 (113) 
and ranges from 18 stores (KS Merchandise Mart) to 2,831 (Movie Gallery). All retail 
chains operate in more than one state, with the least diversified chain operating in only 
two states (Joe’s Sports Outdoors More) and the most geographically dispersed chain 
operating in all fifty states (Movie Gallery). Finally, as the last two columns of Table 
2.4 demonstrate, all chain except Joe’s Sports Outdoors More operate in more than one 
region of the U.S. For example, eight chains have operations in all nine census divisions, 
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and 19 out of the 21 retail chain operate stores in at least four different census divisions. 
While two retailers seem to be less geographically dispersed (Joe’s Sports Outdoors 
More and Gottschalks) they do not drive our results and excluding them from the 
calculation of liquidated stores does not affect our findings. Furthermore, Figures 2.5, 
2.6, and 2.7 illustrate the geographical dispersion of the initial stores locations of three 
firms that ended up in full liquidation used in the empirical identification: Circuit City, 
Linens ‘N Things, and The Sharper Image. As the figures demonstrate, and consistent 
with the statistics in Table 2.4, these retail companies had dispersed geographical 
operation. 
Given their geographic dispersion, it is unlikely that the collapse of these chains 
is driven by localized economic shocks related to a particular store or sub-area. Of 
course, this does not rule out the concern that nation-wide, liquidating stores were 
positioned in worse locations. We address this concern in the next section. 
2.4.2 The initial location of liquidated chain stores 
The previous section presents evidence that most liquidated chains are 
geographically dispersed across states and U.S. regions. In this section we show that 
stores of liquidated chains were not located in zip codes with worse economic 
characteristics than the location of stores operated by non-bankrupt chains. We start by 
comparing the means of several local economic indicators between chains that end-up in 
full liquidations and chains with similar business that do not end-up in bankruptcy 
during the sample period. The local economic indicators that we use are the natural log 
of adjusted gross income income at the zip code in 2006; the natural log of median house 
value at the zip code in the 2000 Census; and the percentage change in median house 
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price during the period 2002-2006 in the zip code which is based on data from Zillow. 
We focus on the year 2006 since economic slowdown began already in 2007.  
It is important to note that we compare the locations of chains to otherwise 
similar chains two years before the liquidated chains file for bankruptcy. We present 
summary statistics for the three chains presented in Figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7: Circuit 
City, Linen `n Things, and The Sharper Image. Each of the chains is matched to a 
similar chain that does not end-up in bankruptcy and liquidation during the sample 
period. We compare Circuit City and Best Buy; Linen `n Things and Bed Bath & 
Beyond; and The Sharper Image to Brookstone. As Table 2.5 illustrates, there are no 
statistically significant differences in the three local economic indicators that pertain to 
store locations between the chains that will end-up in liquidations and their comparable 
chains. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Store locations of Circuit City 
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Figure 2.6: Store locations of Linens ‘n Things 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Store locations of The Sharper Image 
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Table 2.5: Comparison of store locations 
 
Company 
log(adjusted 
gross income) 
log(median 
house value) 
∆(house value 
2002–2006) 
# of 
stores 
Circuit City Stores 4.08 11.81 0.63 607 
Best Buy 4.09 11.82 0.60 729 
p-value 0.799 0.625 0.164 
 
     Linens ’n Things 4.12 11.91 0.61 511 
Bed Bath & Beyond 4.11 11.87 0.60 700 
p-value 0.308 0.119 0.598 
 
     The Sharper Image 4.17 12.19 0.68 181 
Brookstone 4.16 12.02 0.69 269 
p-value 0.983 0.000 0.635 
  
Notes: This table compares the means of log(adjusted gross income), log(median house value), and 
∆(house value 2002–2006) across all the stores of fully liquidated chains and similar chains that were not 
liquidated for a three selected chains. Means are calculated based on store locations in 2006. P-values are 
calculated using a two-sample t-test assuming equal variances for the hypothesis that the difference in the 
means is different from zero. 
 
 
While Table 2.5 presents univariate analysis for three chains we now move to 
estimate the relation between local economic conditions and store location for all the 
liquidated chains in our data. We run a linear probability model of future store 
liquidation -- testing the relation between belonging to a chain that eventually ends up 
in liquidation and local economic indicators. We estimate the following regression: 
𝐿𝑑𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖,𝑧,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 log(𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑑)𝑧,𝑡 + 𝛽2 log(ℎ𝑖𝐿𝑑𝑑 𝑣𝑑𝑣𝐿𝑑)𝑧,2000+ 𝛽3%Δℎ𝑖𝐿𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑2002−2006,𝑧 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑑𝑣𝑣𝑖 + b𝑖𝛿 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
where the dependent variable is an indicator variable that is set equal to one if a store is 
operated by a national retail chain that will end up in liquidation at some point in the 
future, and zero otherwise; log(𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑑)𝑧,𝑡 is the natural log of median adjusted 
gross income at the zip code in either 2005 or 2006; log(ℎ𝑖𝐿𝑑𝑑 𝑣𝑑𝑣𝐿𝑑)𝑧,2000 is the natural 
log of median house value at the zip code in the 2000 Census; %Δ ℎ𝑖𝐿𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑2002−2006,𝑧 
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is the percentage change in median house price during the period 2002-2006 in the zip 
code and is based on data from Zillow; Mall is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the store is located in a large shopping mall, and zero otherwise; and b is a vector 
of county fixed effects. The coefficients of interest are 𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3 which measure the 
effect of local economic conditions on store location. Table 2.6 presents the results from 
estimating different variants of the model and displays standard errors (in parentheses) 
that are clustered at the zip code level as we do throughout the paper. Given that the 
location of a specific store does not change over time we estimate separate cross-
sectional rather than panel regressions for the years 2005 and 2006. 
Table 2.6: Determinants of store locations 
 
(Sub)sample: All stores 
Non-mall 
stores Mall stores All stores 
Non-mall 
stores Mall stores 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
log(median household income) 0.007 0.010 -0.017 -0.007 0.001 -0.035 
 
[0.009] [0.010] [0.035] [0.007] [0.001] [0.030] 
log(median house value) 0.002 0.004 -0.010 0.008*** 0.010*** -0.007 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.011] [0.002] [0.002] [0.008] 
Median house price growth, 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
2002–2006 [0.004] [0.004] [0.016] [0.003] [0.003] [0.009] 
Mall 0.037*** 
  
0.028*** 
  
 
[0.003] 
  
[0.002] 
  Year 2005 2005 2005 2006 2006 2006 
Fixed effects County County County County County County  
Observations 52,597 44,488 8,109 76,057 62,808 13,249 
Adjusted-R-squared 0.013 0.010 0.043 0.002 0.007 0.030 
 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates and standard errors in parentheses for linear probability 
models of stores locations. The tables uses zip-code level economic controls and all regressions include an 
intercept, and county fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors are calculated by clustering at the zip 
code level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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As the first column of Table 2.6 demonstrates, stores of national retail chains 
that end-up in liquidation after the year 2005 are located in zip codes with economic 
characteristics that are not statistically different from zip codes of stores belonging to 
chains that do not end up in liquidation. The only difference between stores of chains 
that end in liquidations and other stores is that the former are more likely to be located 
in shopping malls. In Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.6 we split the sample between non-
mall stores (Column 2) and stores located in a mall (Column 3). As Table 2.6 
illustrates, store locations of chains that end up in full liquidation are again not different 
from the location of other stores when we stratify the data by a mall indicator.  
Columns 4, 5 and 6 repeat the store location analysis in Columns 1, 2 and 3 but 
for the year 2006 rather than 2005. Again, the results show that stores of retail chains 
that end up in liquidation are located in zip codes that are similar to the location of 
other stores in terms of median household income and house price appreciation. As the 
table demonstrates, the difference between the location of liquidated chain stores and 
the location of non-liquidated chain stores is that stores of liquidated chains are located 
in zip-codes with slightly higher median house values in 2000.  
In summary, Table 2.6 demonstrates that along the observables there are no 
significant differences between the location of liquidated chain stores and the location of 
stores belonging to retail chains that do not undergo liquidation in 2005. Moreover, the 
only slight difference in terms of location is that liquidated chain stores are more likely 
to be located in zip codes with slightly higher median house values in 2006. These 
results confirm that the initial location of stores of national chains that end up in 
liquidation is not a likely cause of their failure. Thus, given the geographical dispersion 
of these chains and the zip codes in which they are located, closures of these stores are 
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unlikely to be driven by worse local economic conditions. However, one remaining 
concern is that the locations of liquidating national chains suffered more during the 
economic downturn even though their initial location was no worse. As discussed below 
we address this point directly through the inclusion zip-by-year fixed effects. 
2.5 The effect of bankruptcy on store closures 
2.5.1 Baseline regressions 
We begin with a simple test of the negative externalities hypothesis by 
estimating a linear probability model of store closures conditional on the liquidation of 
neighboring stores that result from a national retailer chain-wide liquidation. We 
estimate different variants of the following baseline specification. 
𝐶𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑑(𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑑(0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 50)𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽3𝑑(50 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 100)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 log(𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑝 ℎ𝑖𝐿𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑣𝑑)𝑧,𝑡+ 𝛽5𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑑 𝑔𝑝𝑖𝑔𝑑ℎ𝑧,𝑡 + b𝑖𝛿 + d𝑡𝜃 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
(2) 
where the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a store is closed in 
a given year, and zero otherwise; n(same address), n(0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 50), and n(50 <
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 100) are the number of stores that were closed in bankruptcies of chains 
that were fully liquidated and that are (1) located in the same address; (2) located in a 
different address but are within a 50 meters radius of the store under consideration; and 
(3) stores that are located in a radius of more than 50 meters but less than 100 meters 
from the store under consideration, respectively. log(income per household) is a zip-code 
level median adjusted gross income per capita; income growth is the annual growth rate 
in adjusted gross income per household within a zip code, both income measures are 
constructed from the IRS data. b is a vector of either state, county or zip code fixed 
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effects; d is a vector of year fixed effects and 𝜖 is a regression residual. We focus our 
analysis on stores of chains that are not currently undergoing a national liquidation to 
avoid mechanical correlation between the dependent and explanatory variables.11 That 
is, we eliminate from the sample stores that are operated by the retail chains reported in 
Table 2.4 during their bankruptcy years. Table 2.7 presents the results from estimating 
different variants of the model and displays standard errors (in parentheses) that are 
clustered at the zip code level. 
Table 2.7: Neighboring bankrupt stores and store closures 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Full liquidation bankrupt store closurest−1 
   same address 0.0036** 0.0037** 0.0042*** 0.0065*** 0.0030** 0.005***  
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
   distance ≤ 50 meters 0.0003 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0024 -0.0010 -0.0020 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
   50 < distance ≤ 100 meters 0.0019 0.0024 0.0022 0.0007 0.0020 0.0030 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Ln(income per household) 0.0066*** 0.0052*** -0.0049 -0.0650***    
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.009]   
Income growth -0.0328*** -0.0381*** -0.0304*** 0.0071   
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011]   
Fixed effects Year 
Year & 
State 
Year & 
County 
Year & 
Zip 
Year-by-
County 
Year-by-
Zip  
Observations 654,581 654,581 654,581 654,581 654,581 654,581 
Adjusted R-squared 0.021 0.021 0.027 0.062 0.050 0.160 
 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates and standard errors in parentheses for linear probability 
models of store closures. All regressions include an intercept and year fixed effects. Models 2, 3, and 4 
include state, county, and zip-code fixed effects, respectively. Model 5 includes county*year and Model 6 
includes zip*year fixed effects. Standard errors are calculated by clustering at the zip code level. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
                                                     
11 See Angrist and Pischke (2009) page 196. 
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Column 1 of Table 2.7 presents the results of regression (2) using only year fixed 
effects. As can be seen, there is a positive relation between the number of stores closed 
as part of a national chain-wide liquidation and the probability that stores of non-
bankrupt firms in the same address will close. Thus, consistent with the externalities 
conjecture, increases in bankruptcies and store closures are associated with further 
closings of neighboring stores. The effect is economically sizable: being located in the 
same address as a liquidating retail-chain store increases the probability of closure by 
0.36 percentage points, or 5.9 percent of the sample mean. We also find that the 
negative effect of store closures is confined to stores located in the same address given 
that the coefficients on both n(0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 50) and n(50 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 100) are not 
statistically different from zero. As shown below, once heterogeneity is added to the 
analysis we capture effects at longer distances. 
Column 2 of the table repeats the analysis in Column 1 while adding state fixed 
effects to the specification. As can be seen, the results remain qualitatively and 
quantitatively unchanged: bankruptcy induced stores closures lead to additional closings 
of stores in the same area. Columns 3 and 4 repeat the analysis but add either county or 
zip-code fixed effects to the specification and hence control for unobserved heterogeneity 
at a finer geographical level. As can be seen in the table, we continue to find a positive 
relation between stores that are closed in full liquidation bankruptcies and subsequent 
store closures in the same address. 
Further, the inclusion of either county or zip-code fixed effects increases the 
marginal effect of same address store closures considerably from 0.0036 and 0.0037 to 
0.0042 and 0.0065 in the county and zip fixed effects specifications, respectively. Thus, 
Table 2.7 demonstrates that having one neighboring store close down as part of a 
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national retail liquidation increases the likelihood that stores in the same address will 
close by between 5.9 and 10.7 percent relative to the unconditional mean.12 The results 
point to agglomeration economies in retail, as the reduction of store density in a given 
locality exhibits a negative effect on other stores in the area, increasing their likelihood 
of closure. This is consistent with evidence in Gould and Pashigian (1998) and Gould, 
Pashigian, and Prendergast (2005) which show that store level sales may depend on the 
sales of neighboring stores. 
Finally, Columns 5 and 6 include county-by-year or zip-code-by-year fixed effects 
and hence control for unobserved time-varying heterogeneity at a fine geographical level. 
The inclusion of these fixed effects soaks-up any time-varying local economic conditions 
that may be correlated with the likelihood of store closures. As can be seen in Columns 
5 and 6 we continue to find a positive relation between stores that are closed in full 
liquidation bankruptcies and subsequent store closures in the same address. These 
results alleviate concerns that the locations of liquidating national chains suffered more 
during the economic downturn even though their initial location was no worse. 
Turning to the control variables in Table 2.7, in the first three columns the 
coefficient of log(income per household) is either positive or not statistically significant 
in explaining individual store closures. Moreover, as would be expected, the first three 
columns of Table 2.7 also suggest that stores are less likely to be closed in zip codes in 
which income grows over time. Furthermore, in our specifications that include zip-code 
fixed effects in which we control for unobserved geographical heterogeneity at a finer 
                                                     
12 The fact that the relevant coefficients rise after including county or zip level fixed effects may be 
suggestive of the fact that stores of liquidating retail chains are located, if anything, in better areas on 
average, as seen above. 
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level (Column 4) we find that income per household has a negative and significant effect 
on the likelihood that a store closes down, again, as one would expect. 
2.5.1.1 Neighboring bankrupt stores and closing of stores by distance 
We next turn to estimate the externalities effects of further away store closures. 
We supplement the analysis in Table 2.7 by adding additional distance ranges to the 
specification in regression (2). Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
𝐶𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑑(𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑑(0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 50)𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽3𝑑(50 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 100)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑑(100 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 150)𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽5𝑑(150 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 200)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑑(200 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 250)𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽7𝑑(250 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 300)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑑(300 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 350)𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽9𝑑(350 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 400)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑑(400 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 450)𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽11𝑑(500 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 500)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12 log(𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑝 ℎ𝑖𝐿𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑣𝑑)𝑧,𝑡+ 𝛽13𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑑 𝑔𝑝𝑖𝑔𝑑ℎ𝑧,𝑡 + b𝑖𝛿 + d𝑡𝜃 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
(3) 
Table 2.8 reports the results of regression (3) using the four different fixed effects 
specifications used in Table 2.7. As the table demonstrates, out of the eleven distance 
measures, 𝛽1—the coefficient on n(same address)—is the only estimate that is both 
statistically and economically significant. While 𝛽1 ranges from 0.004 (in the year fixed 
effects specification) to 0.007 (in the zip-code fixed effects specification), almost all the 
other estimates are much smaller and are not statistically different from zero. Only the 
coefficient on n(300 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 350) is negative and marginally significant. The 
results in Table 2.8 confirm our baseline results and demonstrate that when analyzing 
average effects the negative externality of store closures is mostly driven by very near 
stores. However, we return to this result below when analyzing the externality effect of 
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store closures on neighboring stores belonging to chains of differing financial health and 
differing industries. 
Table 2.8: Neighboring bankrupt stores and store closures by distance 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Full liquidation bankrupt store closurest−1 
   same address 0.004** 0.004** 0.004*** 0.007***  
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
   distance ≤ 50 meters 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
   50 < distance ≤ 100 meters 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
   100 < distance ≤ 150 meters 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] 
   150 < distance ≤ 200 meters 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 
 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
   200 < distance ≤ 250 meters -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.003 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
   250 < distance ≤ 300 meters 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.001 
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
   300 < distance ≤ 350 meters -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005*  
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
   350 < distance ≤ 400 meters 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.000 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
   400 < distance ≤ 450 meters 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.001 
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] 
   450 < distance ≤ 500 meters 0.005 0.005 0.002 -0.001 
 
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] 
Ln(income per household) 0.007*** 0.005*** -0.005 -0.065***  
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.009] 
Income growth -0.033*** -0.038*** -0.030*** 0.007 
 
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011] 
Fixed effects Year Year & State Year & County Year & Zip  
Observations 654,581 654,581 654,581 654,581 
Adjusted R-squared 0.021 0.022 0.027 0.062 
 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates and standard errors in parentheses for linear probability 
models of store closures. All regressions include an intercept and year fixed effects. Models 2, 3, and 4 
include state, county, and zip-code fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are calculated by clustering 
at the zip code level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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2.5.2 Falsification exercise: placebo regressions 
We supplement our analysis by performing a placebo exercise, the results of 
which are reported in Table 2.9. For each of the distance measures in Regression (2) and 
Table 2.7 we define a “placebo” variable which counts for each store in our sample the 
number of neighboring stores that are part of a national chain that will liquidate in the 
following year but that are currently not in liquidation. Following our baseline 
regression, we define these placebo variables for each of the three distance groups—same 
address, up to 50 meters and above 50 meters but below 100 meters. Thus, the 
falsification variables are simply the distance based liquidating store closure counter 
variables forwarded one period ahead. We then run the following variant of our baseline 
specification: 
𝐶𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑑(𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑑(0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 50)𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽3𝑑(50 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 100)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑑(𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑)𝑖,𝑡+1+ 𝛽5𝑑(0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 50)𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽6𝑑(50 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 100)𝑖,𝑡+1+ 𝛽7 log(𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑝 ℎ𝑖𝐿𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑣𝑑)𝑧,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑑 𝑔𝑝𝑖𝑔𝑑ℎ𝑧,𝑡+ b𝑖𝛿 + d𝑡𝜃 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
(4) 
where the first three variables are the lagged store closure counter variables and the 
following three variables are the forwarded store closure counter variables. By including 
both lagged and forwarded variables, we attempt to uncover the time-stamp of the 
store-closure externality separately from the endogenous (soon to be bankrupt) retail-
chain store location. Since the externality of store closure is likely to arise only after the 
store closes—as only then does costumer traffic drop—the externality effect predicts 
that the forwarded variables will not be significant while the lagged variables will be 
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significant. In contrast, if the locations of liquidating chain stores were endogenous and 
correlated with omitted variables that predict local store closure, we would expect to 
find the forwarded variables positively related to store closure. 
Table 2.9: Neighboring bankrupt stores and placebo store closures 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Full liquidation bankrupt store closurest−1 
   same address 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.007***  
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
   distance ≤ 50 meters 0.001 0.000 -0.002 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
   50 < distance ≤ 100 meters 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Placebo full liquidation bankrupt store closurest+1 
   same address -0.0060*** -0.0054*** -0.002 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
   distance ≤ 50 meters -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
   50 < distance ≤ 100 meters 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
    
Ln(income per household) 0.0053*** -0.005 -0.0647***  
 
[0.002] [0.003] [0.009] 
Income growth -0.0381*** -0.0305*** 0.007 
 
[0.009] [0.009] [0.011] 
Fixed effects Year & State Year & County Year & Zip  
Observations 654,581 654,581 654,581 
Adjusted R-squared 0.022 0.027 0.062 
 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates and standard errors in parentheses for linear probability 
placebo models of store closures. All regressions include an intercept and year fixed effects. Models 1, 2, 
and 3 include state, county, and zip-code fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are calculated by 
clustering at the zip code level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 2.9, the results are consistent with an externality effect. 
The coefficients on the lagged variables—𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3—are identical to our baseline 
results in Table 2.7. The coefficient on the fourth variable—i.e. the forwarded 
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n(same address)𝑖,𝑡+1—is negative and significant in the first two models. However, once 
we move to the preferred specification which includes both year and zip-code fixed 
effects this coefficient becomes much smaller (-0.0022 in Column 3 as compared to -
0.0060 in Column 1) and is no longer statistically significant. Further, the forwarded 
variables using the greater distance store closure counters are not statistically 
significant. Taken together the results show that the effect of store liquidation on 
subsequent store closures is not driven by the location of the retail chain-stores that will 
later become bankrupt but rather by the timing in which they were actually closed. 
2.5.3 Stores closures inside shopping malls 
Prior work has shown that anchor stores in shopping malls create positive 
externalities on other non-anchor stores by attracting customer traffic. Mall owners 
internalize this externality by providing rent subsidies to anchor stores. Indeed, the rent 
subsidy provided to anchor stores as compared to non-anchor stores—estimated at no 
less than 72 percent—suggests that these positive externalities are economically large. 
Given the importance of anchor stores within malls, we next focus our analysis on the 
potential externalities that arise when an anchor store in a shopping mall closes. To 
maintain our identification strategy, we focus only on the effects of anchor store closures 
that are a result of the liquidation of a national retail chain. 
We match our data on retail chain stores to Esri’s Major Shopping Centers, a 
panel dataset of major U.S. shopping centers that lists the name and address of each of 
the malls and includes data on gross leasable area in the mall, the number of stores, and 
the names of up to four anchor tenants in the mall. %Can we say something about how 
they define anchor stores? 
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There are 4,421 unique malls that are matched to 104,217 store-year 
observations. The average mall has a gross leasable area (GLA) of 474,019 square feet 
(median=349,437) and ranges from a 25th percentile of 259,086 sqf to a 75th percentile 
of 567,000 sqf. The matched malls span all of the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia. Figure 2.8 presents the geographical distribution of the malls that are 
matched to our data as well as the shopping mall gross leasable area. 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Shopping malls’ locations and size 
 
 
Next, to estimate the externality generated by store closures within malls, we 
rerun our baseline regressions only on stores that have been matched to the Esri Mall 
database. Similar to the baseline regressions, our main dependent variable in this 
regression, same mall, is simply the number of retail-chain stores in the mall that close 
due to the liquidation of the entire chain. Our data enable us to control for mall fixed 
effects (as opposed to just zip-code fixed effects) in addition to the year dummies which 
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further alleviates concerns about the initial location of stores of chains that end-up in 
liquidation. 
Table 2.10: Mall bankrupt stores and mall store closures 
 
  (1) (2) 
 
Full liquidation bankrupt store closurest−1  
   same mall 0.003* 0.002 
 [0.002] [0.002] 
   same mall anchor store  0.009**  
  [0.004] 
Ln(income per household) -0.046* -0.048*  
 [0.027] [0.027] 
Income growth 0.094** 0.095**  
 [0.038] [0.038] 
Fixed effects Year & Mall Year & Mall  
Observations 104,217 104,217 
Adjusted R-squared 0.094 0.094 
 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates and standard errors in parentheses for linear probability 
models of mall-based store closures. All regressions include an intercept and year and mall fixed effects. 
Standard errors are calculated by clustering at the zip code level. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
As Column 1 of Table 2.10 shows, we find that store closings within a mall lead 
to further store closures within a mall. When a store closes in a mall, the subsequent 
annual closure rate of other stores in the mall increases by 0.3 percentage points, or 
4.9% of the sample mean. In Column 2 we add a second variable that counts the 
number of anchor stores within a mall that are closed as a result of the liquidation of a 
national retail chain. As the table shows, we find that most of the effect within malls is 
coming from anchor stores: The coefficient on same mall becomes insignificant while 
that on the number of national liquidating anchor stores rises to 0.009. The effect of 
anchor store closure is thus triple that of the average effect of non-anchor stores, 
consistent with prior research pointing to the impact of anchor stores in drawing in 
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costumers. The economic effect is sizable with an anchor store closure causing a 14.7% 
increase in the probability of store closures within the mall relative to the unconditional 
mean. 
One caveat that should be noted in regards to this effect is that some firms insert 
co-tenancy clauses into their lease contracts, which provide them the option to 
terminate their leases when certain stores close. Thus, the increase in the externality 
effect could be explained both by the greater importance of anchor stores in drawing 
traffic to malls, as well as the higher flexibility that fellow stores enjoy in terminating 
their leases when an anchor store closes. 
In a separate set of regressions, we also analyze the effect of store closures on 
stores located outside malls. Table 2.11 repeats our baseline analysis in Table 2.7 for 
stores that were not matched to the Esri’s Mall database. There are 550,364 stores in 
our data that are not part of matched malls. Such stores are either not located in 
shopping malls, or are located in smaller malls that are not matched to the Esri Mall 
database. As the table demonstrates, the coefficient on n(same address)𝑖,𝑡+1 is positive 
and significant statistically indicating once again a negative externality of store closure 
on stores located in the same address.13 Comparing the coefficients on the same-address 
variable in Table 2.11 to those in Table 2.10 indicates that the effect of store closure 
outside shopping malls on other stores located in the same address is similar to that of 
the effect of an anchor store closure.14 
                                                     
13 Note that retail stores collocating in the same address could either be stores not in a mall but in the 
same building, or stores located in a mall which was not matched to the Esri database. 
14 Taking into account the standard errors of these coefficients shows that the coefficients are not 
statistically different for one another. 
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Table 2.11: Non-mall bankrupt stores and non-mall store closures 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Full liquidation bankrupt store closurest−1 
   same address 0.0115*** 0.0118*** 0.0115*** 0.0087**  
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
   distance ≤ 50 meters -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0034 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
   50 < distance ≤ 100 meters 0.0053 0.0056 0.0060* 0.0039 
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] 
Ln(income per household) 0.0089*** 0.0071*** -0.0023 -0.0682*** 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.009] 
Income growth -0.0442*** -0.0491*** -0.0413*** 0.0002 
 
[0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] 
Fixed effects Year Year & State Year & County Year & Zip  
Observations 550,364 550,364 550,364 550,364 
Adjusted R-squared 0.021 0.022 0.028 0.067 
 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates and standard errors in parentheses for linear probability 
models of non-mall store closures. All regressions include an intercept and year fixed effects. Models 2, 3, 
and 4 include state, county, and zip-code fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are calculated by 
clustering at the zip code level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
One potential reason for this is that due to the small number of stores in small 
shopping malls or in buildings where stores collocate, any store closure will have a 
relatively large impact on other stores nearby.15 
2.6 Heterogeneity in the response to store closures 
In order to understand better the mechanisms through which store closures 
spread to further closing of stores, we add heterogeneity to our empirical analysis. In 
this section we investigate the transmission of negative externalities that are imposed by 
bankruptcies of neighboring stores further by studying the differential effect of store 
                                                     
15 This also explains why the coefficient on same address is larger when focusing on stores not matched to 
malls than the sample-wide effect of same address. The latter effect includes the impact of non-anchor 
store closure within malls, which as Table 2.10 shows, is small. 
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closures along the following three peer characteristics: (i) across industries; (ii) 
conditional on a firm’s financial strength; and (iii) store size. 
2.6.1 The effect of bankrupt stores by industry 
We begin by analyzing whether the effect of store closures on neighboring store 
closures depends on the industrial composition of stores in the same vicinity. Some 
spatial models of imperfect competition predict that firms will choose to locate as far 
from their newest competitors as possible (Chamberlin (1933), Nelson (1970), Salop 
(1979), Stuart (1979)). The key result of these models is that the further away other 
stores are from a particular store, the greater market power that specific store will have 
with respect to the consumers located near it. If so-called centrifugal competition is the 
main factor driving stores locations in the U.S., we should expect that store closures will 
benefit nearby stores that are in the same retail segment. This is simply because the 
remaining stores will end up facing less competition. 
Alternative spatial models suggest that it may be optimal for stores in the same 
industry to locate next to one another. According to this view, the geographical 
concentration of similar stores is driven by consumers’ imperfect information. For 
example, Wolinsky (1983, p. 274) writes: 
“[I]mperfectly informed consumers are attracted to a cluster of stores 
because that is the best setting for search. A store may thus get more 
business and higher profits when it is located next to similar stores. This 
effect may outweigh centrifugal competitive forces...” 
Indeed, research in urban economics has provided a good deal of evidence for the 
existence of economies of agglomeration and industrial clusters.16 
                                                     
16 See for example, Ellison and Glaeser (1999), Henderson et al. (1995), and Rosenthal and Strange 
(2003)). 
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To test how product substitutability and similarity influences the effect of retail 
store closures on neighboring retail stores, we use the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) definition of an industry. To assign firms into industries, 
we employ two definitions that are based on 5-digit and 6-digit NAICS codes. 
Specifically, for each store in our sample we define same industry analogs of 
n(same address), n(0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 50), and n(50 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 100) which count only 
the number of liquidating retail-chain stores that are in the same industry of the given 
store, where industry identity is defined using either 5- or 6-digit NAICS. For each 
store, we also define different industry exposures to stores of liquidating national retail 
chains in an analogous manner. We then estimate, separately, the effect of same 
industry and different industry store closures on subsequent store closings in their area. 
Results that are based on 5-digit NAICS are presented in Table 2.12. 
As the table shows, we find that the effect of same industry store closures is 
bigger than different industry store closures. In the specification that controls for year 
and zip-code fixed effects we find that the coefficient on n(same address) is 0.009 for 
same industry compared to 0.006 in the different industry regression. Moreover, we also 
find a positive and significant effect of our second distance measure, n(0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤50), in the same industry regressions. This effect is quite sizable: the coefficient of 0.018 
(significant at the 5 percent level) in Column 3 implies that the effect of having one 
store close increases the likelihood of further store closure by 29.5 percent relative to the 
unconditional mean for stores in the same industry and that are located within a 50m 
radius of the closing store. In contrast, as Columns 4-6 show, there is no effect of 
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different industry n(0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 50) on further store closures. We repeat the 
analysis using a 6-digit NAICS definitions and obtain very similar results.17 
Table 2.12: Bankrupt stores industry and store closures (5-digit NAICS) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Full liquidation bankrupt store closures same industryt−1 
   same address 0.008* 0.008* 0.009**    
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]    
   distance ≤ 50 meters 0.022** 0.022** 0.018**    
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]    
   50 < distance ≤ 100 meters 0.002 0.002 -0.004    
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.010]    
 
Full liquidation bankrupt store closures different industryt−1 
   same address    0.003** 0.004** 0.006***  
    [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
   distance ≤ 50 meters    -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 
    [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] 
   50 < distance ≤ 100 meters    0.003 0.002 0.001 
    [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
        
Ln(income per household) 0.005*** -0.005 -0.066*** 0.005*** -0.005 -0.065***  
 [0.002] [0.003] [0.009] [0.002] [0.003] [0.009] 
Income growth -0.038*** -0.030*** 0.007 -0.038*** -0.030*** 0.007 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011] 
Fixed effects 
Year & 
State 
Year & 
County 
Year & 
Zip 
Year & 
State 
Year & 
County 
Year & 
Zip  
Observations 654,581 654,581 654,581 654,581 654,581 654,581 
Adjusted R-squared 0.022 0.027 0.062 0.022 0.027 0.062 
 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates and standard errors in parentheses for linear probability 
models of store closures. The table presents results for store closures in the same industry as well as store 
closures in different industries. All regressions include an intercept and year fixed effects. Models 1, 2, and 
3 include state, county, and zip-code fixed effects, respectively. Models 4, 5, and 6 also include state, 
county, and zip-code fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are calculated by clustering at the zip 
code level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
                                                     
17 These results are omitted for brevity and are available upon request. 
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2.6.2 Store closures and firm profitability 
We further investigate the transmission of negative externalities that are imposed 
by bankruptcies of neighboring stores by studying the joint impact of a firm’s financial 
health and neighboring store closures on the likelihood that a firm will close its own 
store. We hypothesize that the effect of neighboring store closures on the likelihood that 
a store will close should be larger for stores owned by parent firms that have low 
profitability. Less profitable firms are financially weaker, making them more vulnerable 
to a decline in demand that is driven by the reduction in traffic associated with 
neighboring stores closing down. We therefore introduce an interaction variable between 
profitability and each of the local store closures into the specification estimated in the 
regressions reported in Table 2.13.18 
In Table 2.13 we run the analysis separately with different fixed effects to control 
for geographic heterogeneity. All regressions control for lagged values of firm size 
(natural log of book value of assets), leverage (defined as total debt divided by lagged 
assets), and profitability (EBITDA divided by assets). Column 1 of the table includes 
year fixed effects, Column 2 includes year and state fixed effects, while Columns 3 and 4 
each control for year and either county or zip-code fixed effects. As in the rest of the 
analysis in the paper, standard errors are clustered at the zip code level. 
As can be seen in Table 2.13, the coefficients on all three measures of bankrupt 
stores—n(same address), n(0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 50), and n(50 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 100)—are 
positive and statistically significant, indicating that stores closed in large retail-chain 
liquidations lead to additional store closures in their vicinity. Consistent with the  
                                                     
18 See Benmelech and Bergman (2011) for a similar approach. 
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Table 2.13: Bankrupt stores firm profitability and store closures 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Full liquidation bankrupt store closurest−1 
   same address 0.0329*** 0.0332*** 0.0345*** 0.0364***  
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
   × Profitabilityt−1 -0.1679*** -0.1683*** -0.1709*** -0.1698***  
 
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
   distance ≤ 50 meters 0.0110* 0.0116** 0.0109* 0.0066 
 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
   × Profitabilityt−1 -0.0478* -0.0485* -0.0471 -0.0475 
 
[0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.030] 
   50 < distance ≤ 100 meters 0.0227*** 0.0233*** 0.0241*** 0.0205***  
 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
   × Profitabilityt−1 -0.1085*** -0.1082*** -0.1123*** -0.1114***  
 
[0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.038] 
Sizet−1 -0.0067*** -0.0068*** -0.0067*** -0.0066***  
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Leveraget−1 0.1024*** 0.1027*** 0.1029*** 0.1043***  
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Profitabilityt−1 0.0846*** 0.0853*** 0.0858*** 0.0859***  
 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Ln(income per household) 0.0076*** 0.0056** -0.0027 -0.0899***  
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.011] 
Income growth -0.0116 -0.0095 -0.0089 0.0415***  
 
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.016] 
Fixed effects Year Year & State Year & County Year & Zip  
Observations 359,675 359,675 359,675 359,675 
Adjusted R-squared 0.030 0.030 0.040 0.090 
 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates and standard errors in parentheses for linear probability 
models of store closures conditional on firm profitability. All regressions include an intercept and year 
fixed effects. Models 2, 3, and 4 include state, county, and zip-code fixed effects, respectively. Standard 
errors are calculated by clustering at the zip code level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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prediction of the joint effect of financial distress and store closures, we find that the 
effect of local store closure is amplified when the retailer operating the neighboring store 
is experiencing low profitability. The coefficients on the interaction terms between each 
of the three distance measures and profitability is negative and significant suggesting 
that financially stronger firms can weather the decline in revenue that is caused by store 
closings in the area. 
More specifically, the estimates imply that a local store closure increases the 
likelihood that a store in the same address with a parent firm in the 25th percentile of 
profitability will also close by 1.03 to 1.36 percentage points, which represent an 
increase of 16.9 to 22.2 percent relative to the unconditional mean. In contrast, when 
the parent of the store is in the 75th percentile of the sample profitability, the effect of 
of store closure on the likelihood of same-address store closure is not statistically 
different from zero. 
Similar to the effect of store closures on same-address stores, the coefficient on 
the interaction term between n(0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 50) and profitability is negative and 
statistically significant at the ten percent level (the effect ranges from -0.0471 to -0.0485 
) with standard errors of approximately 0.03) but only in the specification without 
county or zip code fixed effects.19 
Finally, the coefficient on the interaction term between n(50 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 100) 
and profitability is negative and statistically significant in all specifications, including 
those with zip-code fixed effects. The magnitude of the coefficients indicate that a store 
closure 50 to 100 meters away increases the likelihood that a store with a parent in the 
                                                     
19 Note, though, that the coefficient on the interaction term barely changes across all specifications. 
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25th percentile of the profitability distribution will close by 9.0 to 14.8 percent relative 
to the unconditional mean. 
Moving to the firm-level variables, the results show that on average larger 
retailers are less likely to close their stores while more leveraged retailers are more likely 
to close their stores. Interestingly, we find that more profitable retailers are on average 
more likely to close their stores. One explanation for this finding could be that more 
profitable firms are more likely to experiment when choosing store locations, and hence 
are more likely to close stores which they find not to be profitable. 
Taken together, our results show that stores of weaker firms are strongly affected 
by the closure of neighboring stores. The negative externality of store closure is greater 
on weaker firms than on stronger ones and, as Table 2.13 shows, the effect carries over 
larger distances. Stores of weaker firms thus seem to be more reliant on the existence of 
agglomeration economies. When these agglomerations are destroyed through the 
liquidation of neighboring stores, weaker stores are pushed towards economic inviability 
and shut down. Given an initial financial weakness in a geographic area, store closures 
can thus propagates across the area. 
2.6.3 Store size and the effect of bankrupt stores 
We continue by analyzing how store size affects the impact of store closures on 
the decision of neighboring stores to close. We hypothesize that a larger store will be 
more resilient to the closure of neighboring stores as compared to a smaller store since 
larger stores may be less reliant on neighboring stores to bring in costumer traffic. 
Further, to the extent that retailers act more quickly to shut down unsuccessful large 
stores as compared to unsuccessful small stores, for example, due to the greater impact 
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larger stores have on retailers’ bottom line, larger stores will on average be more 
profitable than smaller ones. Similar to the results in the prior section, we would then 
expect larger stores to be more resilient to local store closures. 
Table 2.14: Store size and store closures 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Full liquidation bankrupt store closurest−1 
   same address 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.050***  
 
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] 
   × Store size -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.012***  
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
   distance ≤ 50 meters -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.010 
 
[0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
   × Store size 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
   50 < distance ≤ 100 meters -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
   × Store size 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Store size -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005***  
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ln(income per household) 0.000 -0.001 -0.007* -0.023 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.014] 
Income growth 0.032** 0.029* 0.027* 0.037**  
 
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] 
Fixed effects Year Year & State Year & County Year & Zip  
Observations 181,066 181,066 181,066 181,066 
Adjusted $R^2$ 0.016 0.017 0.030 0.121 
 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates and standard errors in parentheses for linear probability 
models of store closures conditional on store size. All regressions include an intercept and year fixed 
effects. Models 2, 3, and 4 include state, county, and zip-code fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors 
are calculated by clustering at the zip code level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
We rerun our baseline regressions analyzing the likelihood of store closure while 
interacting store size, as measured by the number of employees in each store, with each 
of the three local store closure variables, n(same address), n(0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 50), and 
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n(50 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 100). We add the usual set of control variables which include the 
host of year and geographic fixed effects. The results are reported in Table 2.14. 
As can be seen in the table, we find a negative coefficient on the interaction term 
between store size and the n(same address) variable which measures the number of store 
closures of liquidating national retail chains in a given address. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, the negative coefficient on the interaction term implies that larger stores are 
indeed less affected than smaller ones by the closure of stores located in the same 
address. The economic effect is sizable: Focusing on the specification with zip-code fixed 
effects, following the shutdown of a neighboring store, a store in the 25th percentile of 
the size distribution experiences a 47 percent rise in the probability of closure relative to 
the mean. In contrast, a store in the 75th percentile of the size distribution experiences 
only a 8.2 percent rise in the probability of closure. The data thus support the 
hypothesis that larger stores are more resilient to neighboring store closures and less 
reliant on agglomeration economies to generate traffic. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Most empirical work on agglomeration economies focuses on the creation of 
economies of agglomeration through the endogenous choice of firm entry. In this paper, 
rather than focusing on the endogenous creation of agglomeration economies we study 
how downturns damage economies of agglomeration. 
Our analysis shows that bankrupt firms impose negative externalities on non-
bankrupt neighboring firms through the weakening of retail agglomeration economies. 
Store closures naturally lead to reduced attractiveness of retail areas as customers prefer 
to shop in areas with full occupancy. This, in turn, leads to declines in demand for retail 
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services in the vicinity of bankrupt stores, causing contagion from financially distressed 
companies to stores of non-bankrupt firms. We argue that in downturns agglomeration 
economies may propagate bankruptcies and financial distress. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Beyond the Corner Office: 
Employee Characteristics and Bank Performance 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this paper, I investigate whether characteristics of bank employees shed light 
on bank conduct and performance before and during the financial crisis. While previous 
studies have considered top executives’ characteristics and their impact on firm 
performance,1 virtually no attention has been paid to the characteristics of non-
executives.2 My paper is the first to do a close study of the individual characteristics of 
a firm’s workforce as a whole in efforts to understand performance. 
To this end, I use a novel data set created by merging 1) individual-level resume 
data from a major professional networking website and 2) bank-level performance and 
balance sheet data from Call Reports and CRSP.3 The advantage of my dataset of 
individual resumes is that it allows me to reconstruct snapshots of workforces and their 
                                                     
1 See, for example, Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Malmendier and Tate (2005), Güner, Malmendier, and 
Tate (2008), Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2012), Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013), Minton, 
Taillard, and Williamson (2014), and Benmelech and Frydman (2015). 
2 Some exceptions are Agarwal and Wang (2009), Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisni (2010), Berg, Puri, 
and Rocholl (2013), Tzioumis and Gee (2013), Agarwal and Ben-David (2014), and Cole, Kanz, and 
Klapper (2015). These studies are either experimental over a subset of banks’ employees or use 
proprietary data from a single lender. 
3 I supplement the main dataset used in the baseline analysis with the information on geographic 
distribution of banks’ deposits from FDIC’s Summary of Deposits, house prices from Zillow, and the Risk 
Management Index from Ellul and Yerramilli (2013). 
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characteristics in the 224 bank holding companies (BHCs) in my sample.4 I am able to 
observe how the workforces of banks evolved in the pre-crisis years and document the 
relationship between a variety of workforce measures (particularly employee education, 
experience, and stability of employment) and crisis performance. 
In my analysis, I use several measures of bank performance, including stock 
returns, bank failure, and percentage of loans charged-off (overall and by loan category). 
I focus on four workforce measures: 1) percentage of employees with an MBA; 2) 
percentage of employees who received a degree from a highly-ranked university; 3) 
percentage of employees with a high propensity to switch jobs in the past; and 4) 
average turnover of the workforce.5,6 I hone in on these four characteristics because 
extant literature has documented a relationship between such traits at the executive 
level and firm performance. For instance, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) note that 
employees with MBAs appear to follow more aggressive strategies and Minton, Taillard, 
and Williamson (2014) find that financial expertise amongst directors is strongly related 
to lower performance during crisis. Perez-Gonzalez (2006) finds that family-appointed 
CEOs with degrees from selective academic institutions tend to outperform those 
without them. Berger, Kick, and Schaeck (2014) find that younger executive teams tend 
to be riskier; and Chernenko, Hanson, and Sunderam (2015) find that experience was a 
significant predictor of crisis performance, as inexperienced managers had almost twice 
as much subprime exposure as their seasoned counterparts. 
                                                     
4 FDICs Summary of Deposits contains matching between BHCs and their commercial bank subsidiaries. I 
use it to aggregate commercial banks to the BHC level. 
5 Turnover is defined as the negative of the average job tenure of a bank’s employees. 
6 These variables are labeled in the regression tables as MBA, Top school, Job jumper, and Turnover, 
respectively. 
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Job mobility measures have received less attention in the finance literature 
because of their reliance on employer-employee matched data. The broader economics 
literature has explored the effects of job mobility on individual outcomes such as wage 
growth (Keith and McWilliams 1999, Altonji and Williams 2005) and has found positive 
wage effects for seniority, suggesting that workers acquire firm-specific human capital 
for which they are compensated.7 Individuals with a tendency to move jobs despite this 
added compensation plausibly 1) have a preference for finding novel job opportunities or 
2) tend to get laid off by employers. It is natural to postulate, then, that a workforce 
with a documented predisposition to move jobs for either reason will be less stable and 
require excessive future investment in worker training. As such, I anticipate that job 
jumping will be negatively related to performance. 
I find that banks with a higher proportion of workers having the aforementioned 
traits (MBAs, top school degree holders, job jumpers, and high turnover) tended to 
perform worse in the crisis than their counterparts. A one-standard deviation increase in 
the proportion of MBAs lowers the bank’s stock return during the recent crisis by 4.5 
percentage points. Similar statistics for the fraction of top school degree-holders, job 
jumpers, and worker turnover are 9.4, 12.2, and 13.5 percentage points respectively.8 I 
also show that these same workforce measures are positively related to bank failure as 
well as the fraction of loans charged-off in the crisis years. 
                                                     
7 In fact, early-career wage growth is strongly associated with higher job mobility of young employees 
(Topel and Ward 1992), but frequent job switching over the entire course of one’s career is associated 
with lower earnings (Fuller 2008). 
8 These workforce measures are aggregated to the bank level and adjusted by bank size. 
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I use a host of observable bank characteristics (for example, pre-crisis growth, 
securitization activity, compensation, and composition of the loan portfolio)9 known to 
be related to performance and risk-taking to show that my workforce measures are not 
proxies for other commonly used indicators of banks’ vulnerability to crisis. The baseline 
relationship between crisis performance and workforce measures is virtually unchanged 
in the presence of additional controls. I also show that the relationships between the 
workforce measures and different bank characteristics are, by and large, flat. 
Accordingly, my workforce measures are unlikely to be picking up the effect of some 
known measures of banks’ vulnerability to crisis. Rather they provide meaningful 
information orthogonal to that which can be derived from other observable traits. 
These baseline results lead me to develop three hypotheses about the nature of 
the relationship between my workforce measures and bank performance during crisis 
that I can then take to my data. 
My first hypothesis is that firms with higher proportions of MBAs, top school 
employees, job jumpers, and workers with relatively short tenures10 had such workforce 
compositions because they looked to grow aggressively in the pre-crisis period, and these 
were the types of workers that were available to hire. If this is the case, then the 
                                                     
9 The full list of variables includes: pre-crisis stock returns volatility, tier-1 capital ratio, ratio of core 
deposits to assets, housing bubble exposure, securitization activity, ratio of private MBS to assets, assets 
growth, assets per employee growth, number of employees growth, ratio of loans to assets, fraction of non-
interest income in total income, assets per employee, residual compensation, fraction of real estate loans in 
total loans, fraction of C&I loans, fraction of consumer loans, fraction of agricultural loans, fraction of 
other loans, and Herfindahl index for loan categories. 
10 I define my turnover variable as the negative of average job tenure. I choose to work with turnover for 
expositional convenience so that all of my workforce measures move in the same direction. That is, high 
values of MBA, top school, job jumper, and turnover are all associated with poor performance in crisis. 
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relationship I document between these measures and performance can be explained by 
pre-crisis hiring. 
I reject this hypothesis by showing that the characteristics of pre-existing 
employees—those recruited before the pre-crisis expansion kicked off—are driving the 
relationship I document between crisis performance and workforce measures. In other 
words, the hiring implemented by banks to accommodate the growth that preceded the 
financial crisis does not explain the baseline relationship between how well or poorly 
banks performed in crisis and the composition of their workforces.  
My second hypothesis is that the relationship between workforce characteristics 
and bank performance is attributable to underlying bank quality. If this is the case, I 
expect some banks to always perform poorly—in booms and busts alike—and some 
banks to consistently perform well. I reject this hypothesis by showing that the 
workforce measures related to poor crisis performance are, if anything, indicative of 
superior performance in the pre-crisis period.11,12 
My third hypothesis is that my workforce measures are related to risk-taking by 
banks. If this is the case, then I would expect that risk-taking will be highest in banks 
with the highest proportion of MBAs, top school graduates, high turnover employees, 
and job jumpers. I find support for this hypothesis in the data. 
                                                     
11 This finding is consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012) who show that banks that perform worst in 
crisis had above-average returns before the crisis. 
12 I also show that banks that had the largest proportion of MBAs, top school degrees, job jumpers, and 
workers with the shortest tenures had higher compensation per employee than their counterparts. 
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I measure risk by calculating holdings of highly rated securitization tranches that 
are not government or agency affiliated,13 computing the ratio of private mortgage-
backed securities to assets, and calculating the average interest rate on loans. I find that 
banks with the highest proportion of MBAs, top school graduates, high turnover 
employees, and job jumpers took on more risk before the crisis. They also had higher 
volatility of stock returns and higher realized tail risk14 which is consistent with their 
taking more ex-ante risk that resulted in greater ex-post fluctuations of stock prices. 
Finally, these banks perform more poorly on Ellul and Yeramilli’s (2013) risk 
management index,15 which assesses the strength of risk management functions at bank 
holding companies. Taken together, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis 
that my workforce measures are related to banks’ crisis performance because of 
differences in banks’ risk-taking before the crisis. 
Given the role that the real estate boom played in the financial crisis,16 it is also 
important to consider its role in my study of human capital and bank performance 
during the Great Recession. I measure a bank’s exposure to the housing bubble as the 
                                                     
13 I follow Erel, Nadauld, and Stulz (2014) who study holdings of highly rated tranches, which are highly 
rated securities issued in securitizations and held on BHC balance sheets, like subprime residential 
mortgages and collateralized debt obligations. They identify the amount of securities assigned an AA or 
AAA risk weight that are not government or agency-affiliated, and call this the “highly rated residual.” 
14 I compute tail risk following Acharya et al. (2010) based on the stock’s average return over its 5% 
worst trading days. 
15 To construct a risk management index (RMI), Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) hand-collect information on 
the organizational structure of the risk management function for each bank holding company from its 10-
K statements, proxy statements, and annual reports. Their measure is only available for a subset of the 
banks in my sample. 
16 Mian and Sufi have written extensively on the role of housing in the recent crisis and in downturns 
generally. See, for example, Mian and Sufi (2009), Mian and Sufi (2010), and Mian and Sufi (2011). 
127 
 
deposit-weighted average of the growth in median home prices for each state in which 
the bank has branches.17,18 
As expected, I find that banks with more exposure to the housing bubble fare 
worse in the crisis. Consistent with the notion that my workforce measures are not 
proxies for other known observable characteristics, the predictive powers of my 
workforce measures are not affected by adding controls for exposure to the real estate 
bubble. Interestingly, I find that the relationship between my workforce measures and 
the form of risk-taking undertaken by banks depends on the growth of home prices in 
banks’ locations. In particular, banks located in states with booming pre-crisis real 
estate prices—like Nevada—take more risk pre-crisis through risky loan origination and 
securitization; whereas banks in states with sluggish pre-crisis home prices growth—like 
Iowa—take more risk by holding real estate-backed securities on their books.19 
Beyond housing bubble exposure, it is possible that some aspects of local labor 
markets, such as the availability of MBAs in the pool of potential hires,20 is driving the 
results I observe between bank performance and workforce characteristics. I reject this 
theory by demonstrating that the relationship is not driven by state averages of these 
workforce measures but rather is strongly related to the workforce composition of the 
                                                     
17 An important caveat is that the locations of bank branches are endogenous. It is feasible that banks 
willing to have high exposure to the housing boom proactively set up locations and attracted deposits in 
areas with rising real estate prices. 
18 Garmaise (2013) mentions that medium-sized banks are typically local mortgage lenders. 
19 Examples include highly rated securitization tranches and private mortgage-backed securities. 
20 Oyer and Schaefer (2012), for example, study firm-employee matching in the context of law firms and 
find that geography/proximity to a specific law school is an important factor. 
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individual bank under consideration. This suggests that the matching of employees to 
banks on bank’s strategy—and not on bank’s location—underpins my empirical findings. 
Additionally, I explore the relationship between banks’ performance and the 
characteristics of employees with different job functions. If it is risk-taking that is 
driving the relationship I document between performance and my workforce measures, 
then I expect that those individuals with job descriptions related to risk-taking 
activities—referred to in my analysis as “employees with impact”—are the drivers of the 
results I document.21 I find evidence to support this notion. 
Finally, to generalize my results, I extend my analysis to the 1998 crisis and find 
that bank performance during the crisis could be predicted by the same workforce 
characteristics I study in the context of the Great Recession.22 Additionally, I replicate 
the results of Fahlenbrach et. al (2012)23 in my sample and show that performance in 
the 1998 crisis is a powerful predictor of performance in the most recent crisis. However, 
the workforce measures I study, calculated as of year-end 1997, are stronger predictors 
of recent financial crisis performance. This is consistent with the proposition that the 
persistence of banks’ vulnerability to crisis stems from the persistence of their workforce 
characteristics. 
                                                     
21 This is similar in spirit to Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) who show that companies run by CEOs 
with impact (with influence over crucial decisions) have more volatile stock returns. 
22 This is a noteworthy result. The 1998 crisis and the Great Recession happened for very different reasons 
and occurred almost a decade apart. Yet, I find that the same workforce measures that predict poor 
performance in the recent financial crisis were related to subpar performance in the 1998 crisis. As I argue 
later in the paper, this result advocates for an interpretation of my workforce measures as indicative of 
latent firm culture or business strategy. 
23 Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) demonstrate that a bank’s stock return during the 1998 crisis predicted both 
its stock return and its probability of failure in the recent financial crisis. The authors conclude that their 
“findings are consistent with persistence in a bank’s risk culture and/or aspects of its business model that 
make its performance sensitive to crises.” 
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Taken together, my results suggest that workforce measures could help quantify 
components of banks’ risk cultures or business strategies that contribute to financial 
institutions’ vulnerability to crisis. 
Banks’ risk-taking is a multi-dimensional object that is hard to capture with a 
single measure. Banks differ in their holdings of safe and risky assets, in the liquidity of 
assets on their balance sheets, in the growth rates of their loan portfolios, in the 
maturity mismatch between assets and liability, and the like.24 It is challenging to 
parsimoniously account for the full spectrum of banks’ risk-taking activities. My study 
offers a way to reduce the dimensionality of the problem by focusing on the 
characteristics of banks’ workforces. 
There are two distinct channels that could result in a relationship between 
individual characteristics and firm performance: 1) individuals with certain 
characteristics could be hired to act in accordance with an overarching business strategy 
or corporate culture; or 2) firms’ hiring of particular employees could result in 
employees making decisions that impact banks’ paths to success. This paper takes no 
stand on which of these mechanisms is at play, though it is likely that some 
combination of the two drives the relationship I document between workforce 
characteristics and bank performance.  
Consider an example from my dataset to help illustrate these empirical findings. 
As of 2006, Corus Bank had the highest fraction of employees with MBA degrees from 
top schools of all the bank holding companies in my sample. Headquartered in Illinois, it 
                                                     
24 See Falato and Scharfstein (2015) for a comprehensive discussion of banks’ risk-taking behavior. 
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did incredibly well before the crisis.25 Investment in its stock at the beginning of 2003 
earned more than 100% by the end of 2006. The bank failed in September of 2009, and 
its failure received a fair amount of attention, both in the crisis and its aftermath. 
Chicago Real Estate Daily labeled it a “national poster child for reckless risk-taking” 
and a Treasury Audit Report in 2012 concluded that Corus Bank made a series of poor 
investments, including Florida developments “surrounded by car dealerships instead of 
water.”26,27 
This example is not unique—it is a pattern I observe time and time again in my 
analysis. Having controlled for commonly used determinants of performance, the 
workforce characteristics of banks are highly related to bank outcomes in crisis, and the 
same characteristics that seem to be related to poor performance during the crisis are 
related to above par performance in the pre-crisis period. 
This paper builds on and contributes to three distinct strands of extant finance 
literature. Past work on the personal characteristics of C-suite executives and board 
members has linked individual characteristics to corporate performance and has found 
that variation in their levels of financial expertise (Güner, Malmendier, and Tate 2008; 
Minton, Taillard, and Williamson 2014); education (Bertrand and Schoar 2003); and 
other individual characteristics like military service (Benmelech and Frydman 2015); 
                                                     
25 In fact, the Corus Bank’s stock was doing so well that it was split 2-for-1 twice: in December 2003 and 
May 2006. 
26 The full excerpt from the report reads: “OCC officials told us that the quality of management’s 
decisions declined in 2007 and 2008 as evidenced by some projects Corus chose to finance. For example, 
Corus originated a loan for a development that was 5 to 10 miles off the Las Vegas strip. Similarly, an 
OCC official stated that the bank’s projects in later years were not as high quality, citing Florida 
developments surrounded by car dealerships instead of water. Another OCC official also said the locations 
of the bank’s projects in Florida did not make sense, such as a project in the Everglades.” 
27 The lengthy investigation into specific actions that led to the bank’s demise is suggestive of some 
elements of risk-taking being hard to observe—let alone quantify—especially ex-ante. 
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overconfidence and optimism (Malmendier and Tate 2005; Graham, Harvey, and Puri 
2013) and general ability, communication, and execution skills (Kaplan, Klebanov, and 
Sorensen 2012) impacts firm performance.  
My paper pushes the literature in this field forward by moving beyond the study 
of top-level executives to consider the characteristics of all the employees of a firm and 
how these relate to firm success. Earlier work on the role of non-executives at financial 
institutions has been mostly experimental and limited in scope. Some studies have 
conducted experiments with commercial bank loan officers to test how compensation 
affects risk taking (Cole, Kanz, and Klapper 2015; Agarwal and Wang 2009; Agarwal 
and Ben-David 2014). Others have used proprietary data from a single lender 
(Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisni 2010; Berg, Puri, and Rocholl 2013; Tzioumis and 
Gee 2013). The only large sample study that looks to move beyond the study of top 
executives is a recent paper by Acharya, Litov, and Sepe (2014) that introduces 
measures of non-executive incentives and shows that these played a role in promoting 
risk-taking by banks during the crisis. 
My paper provides direct evidence on the relationship between the characteristics 
of all of a bank’s employees and performance. By expanding the study of the firm 
beyond the C-suite and to the workforce as a whole, my study also contributes to the 
incipient literature on the role of corporate culture (Cohn, Fehr, and Maréchal 2014; Lo 
2015). Although past work in this arena has sought to quantify corporate culture using 
survey data (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2015), my paper proposes an alternative lens 
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through which one can infer a bank’s corporate culture—namely, by examining the 
personal characteristics of its employees.28 
Finally, I build on the literature that has sought to understand bank performance 
and risk-taking during the crisis. My results are consistent with Fahlenbrach et al. 
(2012); Ellul and Yerramilli (2013); Rajan (2010); and Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman 
(2015)—all of whom document a relationship between risk-taking and crisis 
performance. I contribute to this literature by demonstrating that examining the 
workforce composition of banks sheds light on risk-taking behavior and provides a 
powerful predictor for how banks will fare in an epoch of crisis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the 
data sources and variables. Section 3.3 establishes the baseline effect relating workforce 
characteristics and bank performance. Section 3.4 develops potential hypotheses to 
explain the baseline result; they are evaluated in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 explores how 
workforce characteristics and exposure to the housing bubble affect forms of risk-taking. 
Section 3.7 considers how local labor markets are related to my results. Section 3.8 uses 
textual job descriptions to ascertain that the results are driven by employees that 
impact risk-taking. Section 3.9 extends the analysis to the 1998 crisis. Section 3.10 
concludes. 
3.2 Data 
I examine employee-level data in banks and document a relationship between 
workforce characteristics and firm performance. In order to study this relationship, I 
merge data from different sources: 1) individual resume data from a major professional 
                                                     
28 See Zingales (2015) for a discussion of papers on corporate culture contributing to the incipient 
“cultural revolution” in finance. 
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networking website; 2) bank-level data from CRSP, Call Reports, and the FDIC’s 
Summary of Deposits as well as the risk management index (RMI) from Ellul and 
Yerramilli (2013);29 and 3) data on home prices from Zillow, an online real estate 
database that tracks real estate valuations throughout the United States. 
3.2.1 Bank-level data 
My initial bank sample includes all bank holding companies for which Call 
Reports have balance sheet information over the pre-crisis period, from 2004–2006. I 
further restrict my sample to those BHCs with stock price returns available on CRSP 
over the financial crisis period of 2007–2008.30 
The FDIC’s Summary of Deposits contains the by-branch distribution of a bank’s 
deposits. I supplement it with Zillow home prices data to estimate the exposure of each 
bank to the housing bubble. I do so by constructing a measure of deposit-weighted home 
price growth for all states where a bank has branches.31 
I also use the RMI of Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) which measures the importance 
each BHC attaches to the risk management function. This index reflects the 
organizational structure of risk management as detailed in banks’ 10-K statements, 
proxy statements, and annual reports. 
In my analysis, I use stock returns between July 2007 and December 2008 as 
measures of crisis performance, as well as bank failure and fractions of loans charged-
                                                     
29 I thank Andrew Ellul and Vijay Yerramilli for sharing their RMI data. 
30 I use CRSP-FRB Link file by Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2014) to match BHCs from Call 
Reports to CRSP. 
31 In the analysis in this paper, I use bank branches as of 2006. My results are robust to the use of branch 
information from earlier years. 
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off.32 I follow Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) in choosing control variables for the performance 
regressions. In particular, I use the book-to-market ratio, equity beta, and leverage. My 
sample consists of both large and small banks—I control for size using fixed effects for 
quintiles of banks’ total assets.33 
3.2.2 Data on individuals 
My individual-level human capital data was obtained from a major professional 
networking site in 2015. First, I matched bank holding companies in the sample to their 
subsidiary commercial banks—I used the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits as of 2006 for 
this purpose. Second, I identified individuals that list the names of banks on their 
resumes.34 Since I observe the start and end dates of jobs, I can infer the composition of 
the workforce of each BHC as of any date by looking at employees that were hired by 
that BHC—or one of its commercial bank subsidiaries—before that date and either left 
that job after that date or are still employed at that bank. I end up with just over 
250,000 people employed in at least one of the 224 bank holding companies in my 
sample at some point between 1997 and 2006.35 For each individual, I observe career 
trajectory and educational background. 
                                                     
32 In focusing on this time period, I follow Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) who stop calculating buy-and-hold 
returns in December 2008 in their analysis because, even though the crisis definitively did not end in 
2008, losses in 2009 were at least partly affected by banks’ probabilities of being nationalized. My results 
hold when I instead calculate returns through 2009. 
33 Using fixed effects for quintiles of banks’ assets size is a more restrictive way to control for size, as it is 
agnostic with respect to the functional form. 
34 In situations when two or more bank holding companies have commercial banks with similar names, it 
is challenging to determine the institution where an individual is actually employed. To minimize 
measurement error, cases like these are dropped from the sample. 
35 The professional networking platform I study in this paper did not exist in 1997. As such, I rely on 
information that individuals retroactively filled out when they created their pages. 
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Individuals utilize this professional platform in order to network with potential 
employers and collaborators. As of 2015, there are over 300 million members worldwide 
and over 100 million members in the United States alone. While the membership of this 
networking website does not constitute a nationally representative sample, it is fairly 
complete for professionals and the size of the platform makes its users and their 
characteristics ripe for empirical investigation. In particular, the use of professional 
networking platforms is especially common in fields like finance, lending additional 
credence to my working with this individual-level data in this context. 
My paper makes use of individual resume-data on a large scale. Past studies that 
considered professional networking data on individual resumes (e.g., Cheng et al. 2014; 
Gompers et al. 2015) used it to supplement their analyses with the backgrounds of 
specific executives. In another application, Brown and Matsa (2016) examine the 
resume-data of job applicants to financial firms in times of distress. In contrast to the 
prior literature, I look at the entire universe of firm employees and do not solely focus 
on the characteristics of a few specific individuals at particular moments in time.  
I focus on four individual characteristics derived from the resume data I collect: 
1) having an MBA degree; 2) having a degree from a top 50 university;36 3) having a 
propensity to change jobs more frequently than a median employee with similar career 
length; and 4) job turnover, defined as the negative of current job tenure. For my 
                                                     
36 I use the U.S. News & World Report’s rankings of universities. 
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analysis, I aggregate these variables to the bank level. Then, I adjust those bank level 
averages for banks’ size and standardize them.37 
My variables are chosen to satisfy two objectives. First, they must be relevant for 
my question and thus contain information that could plausibly be related to individual 
employees’ contributions to bank performance. Thus, they must bear some relation to 
individual skills or bank technology or strategy. Second, the workforce characteristic 
variables must be well defined for as many people in my sample as possible. The power 
of my dataset of individual resumes lies in its size—over 250,000 unique person-level 
observations. As one would expect, there is of course a tradeoff between making the 
workforce variables relevant to the question at hand and being able to specify them for 
as many individuals in my sample as possible. For example, one potential variable of 
interest is college major.38 Particularly, I would have liked to focus on those employees 
who did undergraduate coursework in finance, mathematics, and economics, as they 
exhibited both interest in and exposure to areas of science that could be useful, 
especially in non-traditional banking. However, in my sample less than 50% of 
individuals list their majors. I would thus not be able to utilize half of my person-level 
observations in such analysis. There would also be substantial noise in this variable, as 
focusing on those individuals who list themselves as having a financially relevant 
undergraduate major may drastically underreport the number of individuals in my 
sample who have this characteristic. Thus, I encounter a challenge in honing in on 
                                                     
37 The size-adjusted characteristic is a residual from the regression of raw bank-level averages on the fixed 
effects for quintiles of banks’ assets. Unless otherwise specified, when I refer to my workforce 
characteristic measures, I have in mind the size-adjusted standardized variables. 
38 I could classify the employees in my sample into categories based on the coursework they were most 
exposed to in their collegiate years—by science major (e.g., math, physics, computer science), economics 
major (e.g., business, management, finance), or humanities (e.g., literature, philosophy, history). 
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variables that will both be informative and somewhat reliably self-reported on this 
professional networking site. 
I focus on the workforce variables MBA, top school degree, job jumper, and job 
turnover because I believe they best manage the aforementioned tradeoff. Particularly, 
they are both relevant to the question of how individual characteristics can be 
informative on bank performance and likely to be correctly reported by a large 
proportion of the individuals in my sample. I discuss the merits of these variables in 
turn below. 
3.2.2.1 MBA 
First, my MBA variable meets both the criteria outlined above. Previous research 
has considered the importance of MBAs in the finance industry. MBAs have 
traditionally been considered to have the financial expertise necessary to undertake 
complicated bank strategies.39 Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that top executives 
with MBA degrees tend to follow aggressive strategies. Malmendier and Tate (2005) 
find that CEOs with financial education tend to exhibit lower investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. In a different but still relevant context, Grimm and Smith (1991) find that 
having a senior management team with a higher proportion of MBAs made railroads 
more likely to change strategy in the wake of the deregulation of the railroad industry. 
Anecdotally, there is also a sense that MBA programs teach sophisticated 
financial techniques that will be relevant to employees’ ability to contribute to firm 
performance. This is why students are willing to bear the burden of both the financial 
                                                     
39 The fraction of MBAs is traditionally high in financial firms with businesses demanding a high level of 
financial sophistication. For example, the fraction of partner level executives with an MBA is 57% in the 
sample of 79 private equity firms in Gompers et al. (2015). 
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and opportunity cost necessary to expend two years in these professional degree 
programs. 
MBA degree is also the least noisy of the education variables that I am able to 
measure. Individuals typically get MBA degrees in order to help transition careers and 
gain skills relevant to their future employment, and thus it is natural to disclose 
information about these degrees on their resumes. 
Within MBAs, I specifically assign a value of “1” to those individuals who report 
receiving an MBA. For an average bank in my sample, 16.3% of bank employees report 
having an MBA degree. 
3.2.2.2 Top school 
There are two possible avenues through which holding a degree from a top 
academic institution may be related to firm performance. Theoretically, employers are 
drawn to employees based on some (hopefully observable) indicator of their ability. One 
possibility is that individuals with elite degrees have acquired human capital through 
their selective education that will be relevant to how the firms that employ them 
perform. Alternatively, following Spence (1974), employees may be sending a signal to 
employers of their potential by acquiring impressive educational credentials. I am unable 
to tease out which mechanism is at play. 
Although virtually no work has been done on understanding the elite education 
of the workforce as a whole and its impact on firm performance, some limited work has 
been done in narrow contexts and it motivates our reliance on this measure. First, Palia 
(2000) provides support for the notion that the executive labor market slots managers 
with higher education quality into jobs where their human capital will have higher 
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returns, explaining why CEOs with lower quality education tend to be employed in 
highly regulated industries with little room for them to creatively maneuver and make 
use of their educational background. Additionally, Perez-Gonzalez (2006) finds that 
when a family-owned firm is managed by a CEO without top education credentials, this 
firm performs poorly relative to a family-owned firm managed by a well-educated CEO; 
providing evidence against nepotism and in favor of an executive’s education as 
predictive of her firm’s performance. In a slightly different context, Cohen et al. (2010) 
find evidence that sell-side analysts’ educational background is relevant to the 
performance of their predictions. And Gompers et al. (2016) show that venture 
capitalists with top school degrees have a higher fraction of successful exits. 
Like my MBA variable, the top school variable is valuable because it allows me 
to build on past literature that has considered the role of educational backgrounds in 
firm performance. Although past work has been able to consider the education of top 
executives, my dataset affords me the opportunity to create snapshots of the educational 
background of the workforce as a whole and determine how these measures can provide 
information about a firm. 
For the top school variable, I specifically assign a value of “1” to those 
individuals who report receiving a degree from a top 50 academic institution.40 For an 
average bank in my sample, 10.2% of bank employees report having a degree from a top 
school. 
  
                                                     
40 Top school in my sample refers to the top 50 schools in the U.S. News and World Report ranking. This 
is a rather arbitrary cutoff, and I could have looked at a smaller (i.e. top-25) or larger (i.e. top-100) 
group, and my results would have been substantively the same. 
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3.2.2.3 Job jumper 
My third resume variable is a measure of the propensity of employees to change 
jobs. An individual is classified as a job jumper if she has had more jobs than a median 
person with the same career duration.41  
This measure can be interpreted in multiple ways. One plausible story is that 
stable workplaces (few job jumping employees) have a culture of promoting internally, 
and those with significant job jumping tend to hire outside talent—thus, this job 
jumping variable is a proxy for workforce culture, with banks with many job jumpers 
being less likely to nurture talent internally. Another feasible interpretation is that the 
propensity to job jump is an inherent characteristic of a particular worker, who tends to 
move jobs and values what she perceives as short term-gains over stability. 
My job jumper variable captures the job mobility of individuals, which has been 
long discussed in the labor economics literature in the context of human capital 
functions and the returns to seniority for workers.42 In the finance literature, such 
variables have rarely been utilized because of data limitations. However, because my 
resume-level data allows me to see reported current and past employment, I am able to 
capture the job mobility of individuals. There are two channels through which job 
jumping could conceivably be relevant to firm performance. In the first extreme case, 
                                                     
41 I assign individuals into 5-year experience cohorts based on the duration of their career (since college 
graduation or since the first job when college graduation year is unavailable). Then I calculate the median 
number of past jobs for each cohort. Individuals who have had more jobs than the median of their 
experience cohort are classified as job jumpers. 
42 E.g., Topel and Ward (1992) study the job mobility of young men and find that job changing is critical 
to workers’ movement toward stable employment; Farber (1999) finds that worker heterogeneity and firm 
specific capital are significant factors in accounting for differential worker mobility patterns; Altonji and 
Shakotko (1987) discuss the effects of firm tenure on earnings; Altonji and Williams (2005) reassess 
whether wages rise with seniority; Jovanovic (1979) models firm-specific capital and its impact on worker 
turnover; and Buchinsky et al. (2010) model the joint decisions of participation and job mobility to 
ascertain the return to seniority in the United States. 
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where all the individuals who make use of this professional networking platform report 
all employment, irrespective of its length, job jumper captures those individuals who 
have the greatest tendency to move between jobs. In this case, job jumping is relevant 
because it captures individuals’ tendency to take on personal risk, or perhaps the 
tendency of certain banks to be willing to hire individuals who are less likely to display 
strong attachment to their firm. In the second extreme, where everyone has roughly the 
same number of jobs, but some have a predisposition to report all employment, no 
matter its length, and others are more reticent in reporting their experiences; job 
jumping is capturing a proclivity to report. In this second case, the mechanism through 
which job jumping will be related to firm performance is less clear. It is possible that 
this second channel simply adds noise to the job jumping variable and if anything 
contributes measurement error that will make it harder to find significance on this 
variable.  
3.2.2.3 Job turnover  
My fourth workforce measure is job turnover, which is defined as the negative of 
current job tenure. Average job tenure for employees working at the banks in my 
sample is 4.7 years. There are a variety of reasons that may explain why banks have 
workforces who have spent less time working at that institution. It could be that the 
strategy of the bank requires more on extensive hiring of “foot soldiers” because bank-
specific knowledge that employees acquire during longer job tenures is less relevant for 
business.43 It could also be that banks tend to hire new employees from outside the firm 
                                                     
43 Boot and Thakor (2000) think about a bank’s business as a combination of relationship banking (based 
on long-term relationships with borrowers) and transaction banking involving arm’s length transactions 
rather than relationships. Traditional banks are focused relatively more on the former type on lending and 
benefit from longer employee tenures. 
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rather than promoting from within. While we are not able to identify the exact reason 
banks’ differ in the tenure of their employees, we can hypothesize (and do observe) a 
relationship between this measure and firm performance. 
My focus on turnover is related to past literature on the role of experience and 
firm performance. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) track the relationship between CEO 
tenure and profitability, finding that it does not affect profitability at low levels of 
tenure, but for those on the job for 15 years or more, each additional year tends to 
reduce profitability, likely because of agency or firm entrenchment. Berger, Kick, and 
Schaeck (2014) find that less experienced executive teams tend to be riskier and that 
board changes may increase portfolio risk. Chernenko, Hanson, and Sunderam (2015) 
find that experience predicted crisis performance, as inexperienced managers had almost 
twice the subprime exposure of their seasoned counterparts. Greenwood and Nagel 
(2009) rely on mutual fund manager data to conclude that young managers, but not old 
managers, exhibited trend chasing in their technology stock investments and were more 
heavily invested in tech stocks than their older colleagues. This is consistent with 
experimental literature (i.e. Smith et al. 1988 and Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair 2007) 
who find that inexperienced subjects extrapolate recent price movements. While 
Chernenko, Hanson, and Sunderam (2015) and Greenwood and Nagel (2009) use age as 
a proxy for experience, in my analysis I rely on the bank-specific experience and focus 
on the question of whether the average worker tenure at a particular firm is related to 
how that firm will perform in crisis. 
I also construct a cumulative measure, the W-index—the standardized sum of the 
four aforementioned variables, each of which is adjusted by bank size and standardized. 
Summary statistics on variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable N Mean St. Dev. 25th Perc. Median 75th Perc. 
Performance 
      
Stock return (6/7–12/8) 222 -0.338 0.390 -0.654 -0.404 -0.027 
Failed 224 0.219 0.414 
   
Fraction of loans charged-off in 
2007-2009 223 0.011 0.010 0.003 0.008 0.015 
       
Employee characteristics 
      
Fraction of MBA degree holders 224 0.163 0.077 0.103 0.168 0.211 
Fraction of top school degree 
holders 224 0.102 0.086 0.044 0.079 0.128 
Average job tenure 224 4.724 1.297 3.797 4.628 5.564 
Fraction of job jumpers 224 0.428 0.087 0.372 0.429 0.484 
       
Year-end 2006 
      
Book-to-market 224 0.537 0.257 0.421 0.489 0.615 
Beta 224 1.006 0.095 0.944 1.016 1.079 
Leverage 224 6.521 3.065 5.027 5.972 7.240 
Assets ($B) 224 42.247 194.249 1.347 2.840 9.871 
Net interest margin 224 0.041 0.012 0.034 0.039 0.047 
       
2003-2006 
      
Highly rated securitization 
tranche holdings to total assets 224 0.013 0.037 0.000 0.002 0.016 
Private MBS holdings to total 
assets 224 0.014 0.032 0.000 0.001 0.013 
Interest income on loans to total 
loans 224 0.075 0.017 0.067 0.073 0.080 
Volatility 224 0.016 0.004 0.013 0.016 0.019 
Tail risk 224 0.035 0.009 0.028 0.035 0.040 
Risk management index 85 0.629 0.297 0.380 0.557 0.871 
Securitization activity indicator 224 0.192 0.395 
   
Securitization Ln( $ ) 224 2.835 6.064 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Housing bubble exposure 221 0.258 0.162 0.121 0.239 0.402 
Assets growth 216 1.488 0.519 1.171 1.341 1.620 
Number of employees growth 216 1.249 0.370 1.058 1.147 1.347 
Assets per employee growth 216 1.204 0.263 1.052 1.167 1.284 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics (Continued) 
 
Variable N Mean St. Dev. 25th Perc. Median 75th Perc. 
1998 Crisis       
1998 crisis return 179 -0.244 0.114 -0.293 -0.241 -0.184 
Volatility 1H 1998 174 0.020 0.006 0.017 0.019 0.023 
Volatility 2H 1998 179 0.030 0.010 0.024 0.028 0.036 
 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for my sample of bank holding companies (BHCs) in 2006. 
The sample consists of BHCs that have data available in CRSP and Call Reports and have employee 
resumes listed on a major professional networking website. MBA equals one if an employee has an MBA 
degree. Top School equals one if an employee has a degree from a top 50 university. Job Jumper equals 
one for employees that have switched more jobs than a median employee with similar career duration. Job 
Tenure measures employment duration at the current job; Turnover is defined as the negative of Job 
Tenure. These workforce measures are aggregated to the bank level, adjusted by bank size, and 
standardized. The W-index is the standardized sum of four size-adjusted workforce characteristics (MBA, 
Top School, Turnover, and Job Jumper). 
 
 
3.3 Baseline 
The baseline result relating workforce characteristics and different measures of 
bank performance in crisis is presented in different panels of Table 3.2. I start by 
examining stock returns in Panel A of Table 3.2. The dependent variable is measured as 
a buy-and-hold stock return between July 2007 and December 2008. A similar time 
period is used by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2012). The 
reason why the return estimation period is capped at the end of 2008 is because “the 
losses in 2009 were at least partly affected by uncertainty about whether banks would 
be nationalized” (Fahlenbrach et al. 2012).44 Over the course of my analysis, I control 
for standard variables used in the literature, including book-to-market value, beta, 
leverage, and total assets.45 Year-end 2006 data is used for my bank control measures as 
                                                     
44 I confirm that the results I document are qualitatively unchanged if stock returns are estimated 
between July 2007 and December 2009. 
45 I control for size conservatively using fixed effects for quintiles of assets. My results are robust to 
instead using as a control a continuous variable like log of assets or log of market value of equity. 
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well as for my workforce characteristics. Equity betas are estimated with daily returns 
data from January 2004 to December 2006 using a three-month T-bill rate as the risk-
free rate and the value-weighted CRSP index as the market portfolio. Accordingly, there 
is no forward looking information on the right-hand side of the regressions, and thus 
they can be interpreted as predictive. 
Table 3.2: Bank performance and workforce characteristics 
 
Panel A: Stock returns 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
MBA -0.045* 
    
 
[0.023] 
    Top school 
 
-0.094*** 
   
  
[0.022] 
   Turnover 
  
-0.135*** 
  
   
[0.021] 
  Job jumper 
   
-0.122*** 
 
    
[0.023] 
 W-index 
    
-0.145*** 
     
[0.020] 
Book-to-market -0.321* -0.316* -0.228 -0.387** -0.343* 
 
[0.186] [0.172] [0.178] [0.172] [0.175] 
Beta 1.310*** 1.444*** 1.433*** 1.161*** 1.254*** 
 
[0.413] [0.386] [0.392] [0.420] [0.385] 
Leverage 0.012 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.012 
 
[0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.016] 
Assets quintile FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 222 222 222 222 222 
R-squared 0.170 0.215 0.275 0.252 0.296 
 
Panel B: Bank failure (univariate) 
 
 
N Mean St. Dev. 25th. Perc. Median 75th. Perc. 
Failed 49 0.347 0.829 -0.112 0.373 0.748 
Survived 175 -0.097 1.024 -0.781 -0.177 0.535 
Failed–Survived 
 
-0.444  
 
 
 
  
***  
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Table 3.2: Bank performance and workforce characteristics (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Bank failure (multivariate probit, marginal effects reported) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
MBA 0.046* 
    
 
[0.028] 
    Top school 
 
0.005 
   
  
[0.026] 
   Turnover 
  
0.066** 
  
   
[0.028] 
  Job jumper 
   
0.095*** 
 
    
[0.028] 
 W-index 
    
0.077*** 
     
[0.026] 
Book-to-market 0.115 0.089 0.046 0.194 0.121 
 
[0.228] [0.227] [0.218] [0.229] [0.225] 
Beta -0.217 -0.303 -0.343 -0.12 -0.239 
 
[0.456] [0.460] [0.457] [0.455] [0.446] 
Leverage -0.019 -0.015 -0.013 -0.021 -0.017 
 
[0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.018] [0.018] 
Assets quintile FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 224 224 224 224 224 
 
Panel D: Fraction of loans charged-off 
 
  Total Charge-offs by category 
 
charge-offs Real estate C&I Consumer Agriculture Leases 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
W-index 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001 0.007 0.169 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.007] [0.157] 
Net interest margin 0.297*** 0.202** 0.089 0.12 0.073 -0.271 
 
[0.058] [0.093] [0.087] [0.180] [0.141] [1.434] 
Assets quintile FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 222 221 222 208 159 116 
R-squared 0.149 0.065 0.026 0.14 0.01 0.003 
 
Notes: This table reports results of cross-sectional OLS regressions relating bank performance to workforce 
characteristics. Panel A uses buy-and-hold stock returns from June 2007 to December 2008 as a measure 
of performance. Panel B and Panel C use bank failure, and Panel D used the fraction of loans charged-off 
in 2007–2009. Bank equity beta is measured during 2004–2006. Book-to-market, leverage, assets, and net 
interest margin are measured at the end of fiscal year 2006. All specifications include fixed effects for 
assets quintiles. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Asterisks denote statistical significance 
at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
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In Columns 1–4, the explanatory variables of interest are 1) fraction of employees 
with an MBA; 2) fraction of employees with a top school degree; 3) job turnover; and 4) 
fraction of job jumpers. I document a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between bank performance and each of my workforce measures. In other words, a bank 
with a higher fraction of MBAs, a higher fraction of top school degree holders, more job 
jumpers and workers with shorter tenures in its workforce as of 2006 was more likely to 
do poorly during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. The results are economically significant 
as well. A one-standard deviation increase in the fraction of MBAs lowers crisis 
performance by 4.5 percentage points. Similarly, a one-standard deviation increase in 
the fraction of top school employees, job jumpers, and worker turnover lowers 
performance by 9.4, 13.5, and 12.2 percentage points respectively. Unsurprisingly, the 
results are similar if we report them for the aggregated W-index as in Column 5. 
The coefficients on the other controls included in these baseline regressions have 
the expected sign, except for the coefficient beta. I get positive point estimates, meaning 
that banks with higher systematic risk did better in crisis. Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) find 
the same relationship between crisis returns and betas; they reconcile this with Acharya 
et al. (2010) who find the opposite relationship between the same variables, albeit in a 
sample of larger financial institutions.46 
Not all banks survived the crisis period. The financial crisis was an epoch of 
disarray for the banking industry and it precipitated the failure of a large number of 
banks. The FDIC closed upwards of 500 banks in 2007–2014. In contrast, from 2000 to 
                                                     
46 Banks in my sample are larger than banks in the sample of Fahlenbrach et al. (2012)—total assets as of 
year end 2006 of a median bank are about $2.8B and $2.0B, respectively. The reason my sample is shifted 
towards larger financial institutions is because employment data is more sparse for smaller banks. 
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2006, only 24 banks in the United States failed.47 In my sample, 49/224 banks (roughly 
20%) failed during the Great Recession. Thus, there is some concern that the results 
that I document for stock returns in Table 3.2 are driven by the fact that I am 
examining banks over different periods—as failed banks have returns for shorter 
horizons.48 To account for this, I also consider differences in employee characteristics in 
banks that failed versus banks that survived. The results are reported in Panels B and 
C of Table 3.2 and are qualitatively the same as those for stock returns. 
Particularly, I find that the W-index is substantially lower for an average bank 
that survived compared to an average bank that failed (Panel B of Table 3.2). In a 
multivariate setting in Panel C, I run a probit regression of bank failure on workforce 
measures and bank controls. Consistent with the stock performance results, each of the 
standalone workforce measures is negatively related to bank survival—and positively 
related to bank failure. The aggregate W-index is both statistically and economically 
significant and positively related to a bank’s likelihood of failure. A one standard 
deviation increase in the W-index is associated with a 7.7 percentage point increase in 
the bank’s probability of failure. Going forward, keeping statistical power and brevity 
considerations in mind, I report the results of the analysis using the W-index only. I 
have verified that the results hold for the standalone workforce variables as well. 
During the financial crisis, banks were forced to recognize large losses through 
charging off their loans. These loans were written off because banks realized that they 
                                                     
47 One can see the full list of bank failures on the FDIC website, by consulting 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html.  
48 Similar to Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), if a bank delists or fails before December 2008, I put proceeds in a 
cash account until December 2008. 
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had extended credit to individuals and institutions that would be unable to repay in the 
future. As an additional performance metric, I look to the fraction of loans charged-off 
in Panel D of Table 3.2. While stock returns serve as an overall indicator of bank 
performance, and bank failure is a categorical variable singling out those banks that 
fared the worst, charge-offs are a useful performance supplement as they provide unique 
information about the nature of loan origination in the pre-crisis period and the 
relationship between my workforce characteristics and strategy choices banks made 
about credit extension. 
Panel D of Table 3.2 explores the relationship between the W-index and the 
fraction of loans charged off during the crisis period of 2007–2009. The results are 
consistent with those for stock returns and bank failures in Panel A, B, and C.49 
In Columns 2–6, I report the same result for different categories of loans—real 
estate, commercial and industrial, consumer, agricultural, and leases. It is unsurprising 
that the baseline association I observe between total charge-offs and the W-index is 
driven by the categories of loans that exhibited the most expansion before the crisis: real 
estate, and commercial and industrial loans. 
In Figure 3.1, I provide evidence consistent with the notion that the W-index is 
not a proxy for observable bank measures commonly studied. Particularly, I separate 
banks into quintiles based on: loans to assets, assets per employee, fraction of non-
interest income in total income, core deposits to assets, tier-1 capital ratio, beta, book-
to-market, share of real estate loans in total loans, share of commercial and industrial  
                                                     
49 In the analysis of fraction of loans charged-off in financial crisis, I control for the net interest margin set 
equal to the fraction of net interest income in a year to total earning assets in a previous year. 
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of W-index in banks with different characteristics 
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of W-index in banks with different characteristics (Continued) 
 
Notes: This figure summarizes the relationships between the W-index and various observable bank 
characteristics. These characteristics are: 1) ratio of loans to assets; 2) assets per employee; 3) fraction of 
non-interest income; 4) Herfindahl loan index; 5) ratio of core deposits to assets; 6) tier-1 capital ratio; 7) 
beta; 8) book-to-market ratio; 9) fraction of real estate loans; 10) fraction of commercial and industrial 
loans; 11) fraction of consumer loans; 12) fraction of agricultural loans. Banks are sorted by quintile for 
each measure in the title of the individual charts below. The bars represent the average W-index of banks 
in that quintile; the 95% confidence interval is reported as well. 
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loans in total loans, share of consumer loans in total loans, share of agricultural loans in 
total loans, and the Herfindahl index for loan categories.50 Figure 3.1 reports, by 
quintile, the average W-index for each of these measures as well as the 95% confidence 
interval. It does not appear that the W-index is strongly related to any of these 
observable measures in a way that can meaningfully explain the baseline results 
documented above. As such, the W-index can be thought of as an almost orthogonal 
measure to the more commonly used bank controls. 
There are a few interesting relationships worth mentioning from Figure 3.1. First, 
we see that banks with high fractions of loans to assets tend to have high values on the 
W-index. Second, banks with high assets per employee also have high W-index values; 
these banks potentially pursue business models which endow employees with more 
impact. The fraction of non-interest income has an interesting U-shaped relationship 
with the W-index. Banks with higher fractions of consumer loans and, especially, 
agricultural loans tend to have lower W-index values. Finally, there is a negative 
relationship between the ratio of core deposits to assets and the W-index. This is 
consistent with the notion that banks engaging in less-risky activities (specifically, those 
with high proportions of agricultural loans and those with a higher fraction of assets 
financed by core deposits) have lower values of the W-index. 
  
                                                     
50 The Herfindhal index is the sum of the squares of the shares in total loans of each category of loans—
real estate loans, C&I loans, consumer loans, agricultural loans, and other loans. 
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In Table 3.3, I run a sequence of horse races between the W-index and other 
potential predictors of bank’s crisis performance. Specifically, I replicate Model 5 from 
Table 3.2 (Panel A) by adding additional control variables one at a time.51 I find that in 
each of these additional regressions, adding controls has literally no impact on the W-
index.52 
Overall, it seems unlikely that the relationship between the W-index and bank 
performance is attributable to the W-index being a proxy for observable bank 
characteristics. The findings presented so far are consistent with the W-index being a 
novel measure related to bank performance in crisis. 
The following section examines hypotheses to explain my baseline result. 
3.4 Hypotheses development 
I next develop and test hypotheses to explain my baseline result—that workforce 
characteristics of banks before the crisis are related to how well banks performed during 
the financial crisis and whether they survived at all. 
In the three decades preceding the crisis, the financial sector experienced 
tremendous growth as measured in assets, employment, and wages (Greenwood and 
Scharfstein 2013; Philippon 2014). The growth was particularly strong from the early 
                                                     
51 I control sequentially for volatility of stock returns in 2003-2006; tier-1 capital ratio; the ratio of core 
deposits to assets; housing bubble exposure; securitization activity in 2003-2006; growth (in assets, 
assets/employee, and employees) from 2003-2006; ratio of loans to assets; fraction of non-interest income; 
log assets per employee; residual compensation; loan composition (fractions of real estate loans, 
commercial and industrial loans, consumer loans, agricultural loans, and the Herfindahl index of loan 
categories). 
52 Only 75 banks in my sample were successfully matched to the Execucomp dataset that Cheng, Hong, 
and Scheinkman (2015) use for executive compensation (A) in the construction of residual compensation. 
Hence, the number of observations in that horse race is low. I also construct an alternative measure of 
residual compensation (B) equal to the residual from the regression of total compensation per employee 
(defined for all banks, as this measure does not require Execucomp matching), and run a horse race 
between the W-index and this alternative. 
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2000s—following a short recession associated with the dot-com bubble bursting—until 
the financial crisis. It is possible that to accommodate this growth, banks recruited in 
this pre-Great Recession period a variety of employees with workforce characteristics 
different from those of the employees that had previously been hired. 
Banks with the most aggressive pre-crisis growth were also those who performed 
the most poorly during the crisis. Thus, one possible explanation for the relationship 
between the W-index and bank performance during the crisis is that in the pre-crisis 
period, demand for bank employees outstripped supply. Banks who grew especially fast 
in the pre-crisis period to take advantage of the boom hired extensively, mechanically 
decreasing the average job tenure of their workforces. It is also possible that the people 
who they hired were more likely to be job jumpers (and thus unable or unwilling to 
retain stable employment). In the absence of candidates with relevant experience, banks 
could also have based their hiring decisions on (imperfect) signals of ability such as 
having an MBA degree or having a degree from a top school. 
My first hypothesis focuses on the role that hiring during the pre-crisis expansion 
could play in explaining the baseline result. 
Hypothesis 1: W-index and pre-crisis hiring. The W-index is related to 
crisis performance because of the people hired during the pre-crisis 
expansion period by the most aggressively expanding—and most affected 
in crisis—banks. 
My second hypothesis explores the possibility that the W-index is a proxy for a 
bank’s quality. If this is the case, then some banks always perform poorly—in good and 
bad times—and some banks always perform well. The baseline effect could then be 
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explained by the assignment of high W-index workforces to bad banks. A high W-index 
workforce could be viewed as subpar for the reasons mentioned in the discussion of the 
first hypothesis above. 
Hypothesis 2: W-index and persistent underperformance. The W-index is 
an indicator of underlying bank quality, sorting banks into persistent 
winners or losers in periods of crisis and no crisis alike. 
My third hypothesis builds off the work of Beltratti and Stulz (2012) who 
show that banks that performed the worst in the financial crisis had above-
average returns before the crisis began.53 Their findings are consistent with the 
view that risk-taking before the crisis (through non-traditional banking) created 
short term gains for shareholders but left them “exposed to risks that manifested 
themselves during the crisis and had an adverse impact on banks” (Beltratti and 
Stulz 2012). 
Accordingly, my third and final hypothesis investigates the relationship 
between the W-index and banks’ risk-taking before the crisis. It is possible that 
high W-index banks took on more risk in the pre-crisis period, which led to 
adverse consequences in subsequent bad times. There are two channels through 
which high W-index workforces—with higher fractions of MBAs and top school 
degree-holders, workers with shorter tenures, and more job jumpers—could be 
                                                     
53 Beltratti and Stulz (2012) seek to understand the significant variation in the cross-section of stock 
returns globally during the financial crisis. They document that the best-performing banks in crisis had 
significantly lower leverage at the end of 2006, had more traditional business models, and had higher 
deposits-to-assets ratios. They suggest that to the extent regulation served to augment crisis performance, 
it was because these regulations curbed newer or less traditional bank activities that turned out poorly 
during the crisis. Like Beltratti and Stulz (2012), I postulate and document a relationship between risky 
behavior and bank performance during the Great Recession. 
157 
 
associated with more aggressive banking in the pre-crisis period. On the one 
hand, people with these characteristics could have been matched to banks 
pursuing risky strategies to begin with. These banks needed employees with 
MBAs and top school graduates to execute complex transactions requiring a high 
level of financial expertise. And these banks were comfortable recruiting job 
jumpers—people without a track record of being loyal to their employers—since 
the nature of their business is distinct from traditional banking, which relies on 
bank-specific knowledge and benefits from long-term relationships with 
borrowers. For the same reason, these banks were comfortable sourcing talent 
externally as opposed to nurturing it internally and thus had higher turnover and 
lower average job tenures. 
On the other hand, employees possessing these characteristics could also 
conceivably, within their discretion, have made decisions that on the margin 
resulted in higher risk-taking.54 
Hypothesis 3: W-index and pre-crisis risk-taking. The W-index is 
positively related to risk-taking by banks before the crisis, which increased 
their vulnerability to crisis. 
3.5 Hypotheses evaluation 
3.5.1 W-index and pre-crisis hiring 
I start by laying the groundwork for testing my first hypothesis. First, it is true 
that the 2003–2006 period was accompanied by a substantial increase in the number of 
                                                     
54 For example, these employees could conceivably originate subprime loans, purchase private mortgage-
backed securities, or apply less scrutiny in the risk management process – taking on greater risk for their 
firm and reducing banks’ stability in the lead-up to the crisis. 
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full-time equivalent employees in banks. An average bank in my sample experienced a 
26% increase in the size of its workforce during the pre-crisis period. In Table 3.4, I 
show that the banks that grew the most rapidly also performed worst during the crisis. I 
capture the effect of bank growth using different variables (particularly: assets growth, 
employee growth overall, and assets/employee growth) and show that growth is in fact 
related to crisis underperformance. It is thus conceivable that who was hired during this 
pre-crisis period is related to crisis performance; that is, the workforce characteristics of 
recent hires could potentially explain the negative relationship between the W-index and 
crisis performance. 
Table 3.4: Pre-crisis growth and crisis performance 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Assets growth -0.250*** 
   
 
[0.045] 
   Number of employees growth 
 
-0.261*** 
 
-0.304*** 
  
[0.070] 
 
[0.065] 
Assets per employee growth 
  
-0.314*** -0.380*** 
   
[0.092] [0.089] 
Book-to-market -0.195 -0.245 -0.3 -0.185 
 
[0.197] [0.204] [0.192] [0.199] 
Beta 1.160*** 1.279*** 1.326*** 1.146*** 
 
[0.412] [0.427] [0.414] [0.404] 
Leverage -0.003 0 0.013 0.001 
 
[0.018] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] 
Assets quintile FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 215 215 215 215 
R-squared 0.256 0.209 0.194 0.270 
 
Notes: This table relates crisis performance of banks to their growth in the pre-crisis period. Bank 
performance is measured by stock returns from June 2007 to December 2008. Models 1-3 use standalone 
measures of growth for (1) assets growth; (2) employees growth; and (3) assets per employee growth. 
These variables are computed for the pre-crisis period. Bank equity beta is measured during 2004–2006. 
Book-to-market, leverage, and assets are measured at the end of fiscal year 2006. All specifications include 
fixed effects for assets quintiles. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level.  
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Table 3.5: Persistence 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 
W-index -0.089*** -0.094*** -0.091*** -0.082*** -0.053* -0.072** 
 
[0.024] [0.025] [0.026] [0.028] [0.029] [0.029] 
Assets growth -0.215*** -0.225*** -0.215*** -0.255*** -0.261*** -0.274*** 
 
[0.047] [0.057] [0.061] [0.065] [0.065] [0.065] 
Book-to-market -0.326 -0.303 -0.379* -0.312 -0.334 -0.424* 
 
[0.211] [0.197] [0.199] [0.210] [0.241] [0.242] 
Beta 1.307*** 0.977** 0.807** 1.251** 1.187*** 1.375*** 
 
[0.400] [0.408] [0.403] [0.483] [0.441] [0.403] 
Leverage 0.013 0.008 0.011 -0.003 -0.011 -0.019 
 
[0.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.018] [0.020] [0.019] 
Assets quintile FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 206 189 175 159 146 135 
R-squared 0.313 0.342 0.357 0.371 0.365 0.383 
 
Notes: This table reports results of cross-sectional OLS regressions relating bank performance to workforce 
characteristics. Bank performance is measured by stock returns from June 2007 to December 2008. The 
workforce characteristics are (a) having an MBA degree, (b) having a degree from a top 50 university, (c) 
job turnover, defined as the negative of current job tenure and (d) job jumper, defined as changing jobs 
more frequently than a median employee with similar career length. These workforce measures are 
aggregated to the bank level, adjusted by bank size, and standardized. The W-index is the standardized 
sum of four size-adjusted workforce characteristics (MBA, Top School, Turnover, and Job Jumper). 
Models 1–6 measure the W-index in different years—from 2005 to 2000—as indicated in the header of the 
table. Book-to-market, leverage, and assets are measured at the end of fiscal year 2006. All specifications 
include fixed effects for assets quintiles. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 
 
Table 3.5 presents direct evidence against this hypothesis. I establish a persistent 
relationship between performance and the W-index, controlling for assets growth in the 
pre-crisis period. Importantly, instead of focusing on those employees who worked at the 
firm in 2006, I compute the W-index for the workforce in earlier years. In particular, I 
go back one year at a time all the way back to 2000 and sequentially recalculate the W-
index for the bank’s workforce at the end of each year. Even though many of the 
individuals comprising the workforce in the earlier years leave the firm long before the 
onset of the crisis, the W-indices as of every year from 2000 to 2005 remain significant 
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predictors of bank underperformance in crisis. This is noteworthy given that there are 
over 6 years between the time when the workforce measure is estimated at the end of 
2000 (Model 6) and July 2007 when I start computing buy-and-hold returns to assess 
crisis performance.55 This finding rejects the hypothesis that the relationship between 
the W-index and performance is somehow driven by hiring practices in the lead-up to 
the crisis. On the contrary, the workforce composition of banks beginning in 2000, 
several years before the crisis, is a significant predictor of crisis performance. This result 
argues against the first hypothesis and drives me to consider additional explanations for 
the documented relationship between workforce characteristics and bank performance. 
3.5.2 W-index and persistent underperformance. 
As demonstrated in Table 3.5, the W-index remains predictive of crisis 
performance even when rolled back several years. In other words, the characteristics of 
banks’ workforces as far back as 2000 are statistically and economically significant in 
predicting performance during the crisis. A new hypothesis to explain the baseline effect 
emerges from this set of results. It is possible that the W-index is in fact an indicator of 
bank quality—some banks always perform poorly, and others always perform well. I 
next test this hypothesis by looking at how the W-index relates to bank performance in 
the pre-crisis period.  
If the W-index is indeed a proxy for a bank’s underlying quality, then there 
should be a negative relationship between the W-index and bank performance not only 
                                                     
55 As I demonstrate later in the paper (Table 3.12), even the W-index calculated as far back as 1997 is 
significant in predicting firm performance during the Great Recession. So, I am able to roll back these 
workforce measures at least a decade and still observe them having a strong and significant relationship 
with crisis performance. 
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in bad times, but in good times as well. In particular, high W-index banks should have 
lower stock returns in the pre-crisis period also. This is not what I observe. 
Table 3.6: Pre-crisis dynamics 
 
 
Stock return 
in 2003–2006 
Compensation per employee 
in 2003–2006 
Assets per employee 
growth in 2003–2006 
  (1) (2) (3) 
W-index 0.119** 11.076*** 0.046* 
 
[0.054] [1.872] [0.026] 
Book-to-market 0.218 6.457 0.215 
 
[0.476] [11.496] [0.268] 
Beta 0.38 27.876* -0.393*** 
 
[0.355] [15.760] [0.138] 
Leverage 0.038 0.015 -0.016 
 
[0.036] [0.959] [0.022] 
Assets quintile FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 154 154 152 
R-squared 0.192 0.457 0.063 
 
Notes: This table reports results of cross-sectional OLS regressions relating bank performance, 
compensation per employee, and assets per employee growth to workforce characteristics. Bank 
performance in Model 1 is measured as buy-and-hold stock returns from January 2003 to December 2006. 
The dependent variable in Model 2 is the average ratio of total salaries and employee benefits to the total 
number of employees from 2003 to 2006. The dependent variable in Model 3 is the growth in the ratio of 
total assets per employee from 2003 to 2006. The workforce characteristics are (a) having an MBA degree, 
(b) having a degree from a top 50 university, (c) job turnover, defined as the negative of current job 
tenure and (d) job jumper, defined as changing jobs more frequently than a median employee with similar 
career length. These workforce measures are aggregated to the bank level, adjusted by bank size, and 
standardized. The W-index is the standardized sum of four size-adjusted workforce characteristics (MBA, 
Top School, Turnover, and Job Jumper). Bank equity beta is measured during 2000–2002. Book-to-
market, leverage, assets, and workforce characteristics are measured at the end of fiscal year 2002. All 
specifications include fixed effects for assets quintiles. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 
Column 1 of Table 3.6 illustrates that the W-index is positively related to bank 
performance in the pre-crisis period. The explanatory variable is buy-and-hold returns 
from January 2003 to December 2006. To ensure that my regressions have a predictive 
interpretation, I use the W-index as of 2002—and not the 2006 measure that I use in 
the baseline analysis.56 I find that banks with high W-indexes did better in the lead-up 
                                                     
56 It has been established in Table 3.5 that the 2002 W-index is also predictive of crisis performance. 
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to the crisis. This result is consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012) who show that the 
best pre-crisis performers became the worst performers in crisis. In Column 2, I show 
that these same high-W banks had significantly higher compensation per employee and 
assets per employee growth (Column 3) in the lead-up to the crisis. 
My findings provide evidence against the hypothesis that the W-index is picking 
up latent underlying quality features of banks that sort them into persistent winners or 
losers. In fact, high W-index banks performed well before the crisis but fared poorly in 
the crisis itself. The fact that those banks that performed well for their stockholders in 
the pre-crisis period also paid their employees more and exhibited higher assets per 
employee growth suggests that there may be fundamental differences in the business 
models of these banks as compared to their low W-index counterparts.57 
3.5.3 W-index and pre-crisis risk-taking 
Having established that high W-index banks fared well in the pre-crisis period, 
but collapsed during the crisis, I proceed to my next hypothesis—that perhaps the W-
index is capturing risk-taking in the pre-crisis period of boom. I build up support for 
this hypothesis by connecting my W-index with a variety of measures of bank risk-
taking, risk realization, and risk management. 
Table 3.7 reports the relationship between the W-index and a variety of risk 
measures. Column 1 considers the fraction of assets held in highly rated tranches of 
securitization (following Erel, Nadauld, and Stulz 2014).58 This measure captures the 
                                                     
57 Brickley et al. (2012) show that bankers’ banks, for example, have higher assets per employee than a 
typical bank precisely because of the nature of their business—they supply no retail banking services. 
58 Erel, Nadauld, and Stulz (2014) define the highly rated residual as the value of securities assigned an 
AA or AAA risk weight that are not government or agency-affiliated (i.e., subprime residual mortgages 
and collateralized debt obligations). 
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proportion of a bank’s assets that were devoted to those synthetic securities that were 
deemed to not carry much risk in the lead-up to the crisis but ended up losing a 
significant amount of value during the crisis. Erel, Nadauld, and Stulz (2014) find that 
banks with higher holdings of highly rated residuals performed worse in the crisis. As 
expected, we find a statistically and economically significant relationship between the 
W-index and the ratio of highly rated residual to assets. 
Table 3.7: Pre-crisis risk-taking 
 
  
Highly rated 
residual 
Private 
MBS 
Interest 
on loans Volatility Tail risk 
Risk mana- 
gement index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
W-index 0.008*** 0.005** 0.003*** 0.001** 0.001** -0.087** 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.037] 
Book-to-market -0.044 -0.039 0.009 0.001 0.002 0.120 
 
[0.031] [0.026] [0.016] [0.002] [0.005] [0.258] 
Beta 0.032 0.016 -0.003 0.002 0.000 0.359 
 
[0.021] [0.017] [0.009] [0.002] [0.005] [0.396] 
Leverage 0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.019 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.022] 
Assets quintile FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 154 154 175 154 154 74 
R-squared 0.244 0.185 0.117 0.432 0.368 0.290 
 
Notes: This table reports results of cross-sectional OLS regressions relating pre-crisis risk-taking to 
workforce characteristics. Model 1 uses the fraction of assets held in highly rated tranches of 
securitization, on average, between 2003 and 2006. Model 2 uses the fraction of assets held in private 
MBS, on average, between 2003 and 2006. The dependent variable in Model 3 is the ratio of interest 
income on loans to total loans as of the previous year, on average, between 2003 and 2006. Volatility of 
daily stock returns from January 2003 to December 2006 is used as a dependent variable in Model 4. Tail 
risk in Model 5 is calculated as the negative of the stock’s average return over its 5% worst trading days. 
The Risk Management Index in Model 6 measures the strength of bank risk management. The workforce 
characteristics are (a) having an MBA degree, (b) having a degree from a top 50 university, (c) job 
turnover, defined as the negative of current job tenure and (d) job jumper, defined as changing jobs more 
frequently than a median employee with similar career length. These workforce measures are aggregated 
to the bank level, adjusted by bank size, and standardized. The W-index is the standardized sum of four 
size-adjusted workforce characteristics (MBA, Top School, Turnover, and Job Jumper). Bank equity beta 
is measured during 2000–2002. Book-to-market, leverage, and assets are measured at the end of fiscal year 
2002. All specifications include fixed effects for assets quintiles. Robust standard errors are reported in 
brackets. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
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In Column 2, I use as a measure of risk the fraction of private mortgage-backed 
securities to assets. Consistent with the risk-taking hypothesis, I find that having a 
higher proportion of private MBS to assets is associated with a higher W-index. Column 
3 shows that having higher interest on loans—in other words, having an ex-ante riskier 
loan portfolio—is also related to higher W-indices. 
Researchers can infer ex-ante risk-taking from the realized volatility of stock 
returns. I do this in Column 4 of Table 3.7. It turns out that higher values of the W-
index are, in fact, related to higher realized stock return volatility in 2003–2006. This is 
consistent with the proposition that high-W index banks engaged in more risk-taking 
before the crisis.59 
In Column 5, I also use a measure of risk based on the expected shortfall 
measure, capturing expected loss conditional on returns falling below some percentile-
based threshold (see, e.g., Acharya et al. 2010). Following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), I 
refer to this measure as Tail Risk and use the 5% worst return days for each stock in 
my calculation. In particular, Tail Risk is set equal to the negative of the stock’s 
average return over its 5% worst trading days.60 Column 5 of Table 3.7 shows that tail 
risk realized before the crisis is in fact positively related to the W-index of banks as of 
                                                     
59 Highly rated securitization tranches were naturally perceived as safe in the pre-crisis period and did not 
add volatility to banks’ stock returns. High W-index banks had higher volatility before the crisis because 
they presumably took on more risk through other channels. As such, this result is a testament to the 
multi-dimensional nature of banks’ risk taking, discussed previously in this paper. 
60 Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) explore the effect of risk management functions on tail risk. They view tail 
risk as the extent to which banks “enhance performance in the short run” before risk “materializes [and 
causes] significant damage to the institution.” Put differently, banks with high (low) tail risk are likely 
pursuing aggressive (conservative) business models. In this paper, I think about tail risk in a similar 
fashion. 
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the year-end 2002. Note, however, that neither my volatility nor my tail risk results 
demonstrate how exactly the risk was taken. 
In Column 6, I use the risk management index (RMI) of Ellul and Yerramilli 
(2013). RMI measures the strength of risk management at bank holding companies. To 
construct a measure of a bank’s ability to mitigate large losses, Ellul and Yerramilli 
(2013) rely on information on the organizational structure of banks from their 10-K 
statements, proxy statements, and annual reports. I find that there is a strong negative 
relationship between risk management and the W-index at the BHCs in my sample. 
This suggests that banks with the weakest risk management practices also had high 
values of the W-index.61 
I have shown my workforce characteristics are negatively related to banks’ 
performance in the financial crisis and positively related to their performance before the 
crisis. High W-index banks had a higher fraction of assets held in highly rated 
securitization tranches, a higher fraction of private MBS to assets, and also had riskier 
loans. They also experienced more volatility, had higher tail risk, and had less stringent 
risk management. These findings are consistent with the notion that high-W index 
banks engaged in more risk-taking before the crisis that possibly led to better 
performance during the boom and increased their vulnerability to the bust. 
In the subsequent section I explore whether the form of risk-taking was different 
in high-W index banks depending on the growth of house prices—central to the financial 
crisis—in areas where they were located. 
  
                                                     
61 This result does not imply in any way that RMI determines the W-index or the other way round. It is 
in fact plausible that both are related to an unobserved variable associated with banks’ risk appetite. 
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3.6 Exposure to the housing bubble 
Given the pivotal role that the mid-2000s real estate boom played in the financial 
crisis, it is natural to add it into consideration when thinking about the relationship 
between banks’ performance in crisis and workforce characteristics. To do so, I need a 
measure of banks’ exposure to the housing bubble. My measure is constructed from two 
datasets. State-level growth in median home prices from 2003 to 2006 is obtained from 
Zillow. From the 2006 Summary of Deposits, I get the by-state distribution of banks’ 
deposits. I then construct each bank’s exposure to the housing bubble as a deposit-
weighted average of home price growth rates in the states where a bank has branches.62 
To give a specific example, banks with branches located in states like Nevada—with 
booming house prices in the lead-up to the crisis—score high on the housing bubble 
exposure measure, whereas banks located in states like Iowa—with sluggish home price 
growth—score low. I next explore how crisis performance and the form of pre-crisis risk-
taking in high W-index banks is related to the growth of home prices in banks’ 
locations. 
First, I confirm in Table 3.8 that high W-index banks performed worse in the 
recent financial crisis—in terms of buy-and-hold stock returns—irrespectively of whether 
they were located in areas with booming or sluggish house prices. Columns 1–3 report 
the analysis for the full sample and control for housing bubble exposure in different 
ways. I use the continuous variable of bubble exposure in Column 1 and fixed effects for 
quintiles and deciles of that continuous measure in Columns 2 and 3, respectively.  
                                                     
62 The results are robust to instead restricting the sample of banks for this analysis to those whose 
deposits are located in only one state. 
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Table 3.8: Housing bubble 
 
(Sub)sample: Full Full Full 
Low bubble 
location 
High bubble 
location 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
W-index -0.129*** -0.127*** -0.120*** -0.153*** -0.111*** 
 
[0.021] [0.022] [0.022] [0.038] [0.024] 
Housing bubble -0.386** 
  
-0.416 -0.846*** 
 
[0.165] 
  
[0.646] [0.293] 
Book-to-market -0.344* -0.371** -0.322* 0.024 -0.612** 
 
[0.176] [0.175] [0.182] [0.223] [0.280] 
Beta 1.156*** 1.159*** 1.131*** 0.41 1.818*** 
 
[0.412] [0.413] [0.432] [0.547] [0.522] 
Leverage 0.011 0.013 0.011 -0.029 0.046** 
 
[0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.020] [0.022] 
Fixed Effects 
   
  
Housing bubble 
   
  
Quintile No Yes No No No 
Decile No No Yes No No 
Assets quintile Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 219 219 219 109 110 
R-squared 0.317 0.334 0.372 0.315 0.4 
 
Notes: This table reports results of cross-sectional OLS regressions relating bank performance to workforce 
characteristics. Bank performance is measured as buy-and-hold stock returns from June 2007 to December 
2008. Housing Bubble is the growth of home prices in a bank’s locations. It is measured as a deposit-
weighted average of the increase in 2003–2006 of median home prices in states where a bank had branches 
in 2006. Models 1–3 report the results for the full sample. Models 4–5 report the results separately for 
banks located in areas with low (below median) and with high (above median) home price growth, 
respectively. The workforce characteristics are (a) having an MBA degree, (b) having a degree from a top 
50 university, (c) job turnover, defined as the negative of current job tenure and (d) job jumper, defined 
as changing jobs more frequently than a median employee with similar career length. These workforce 
measures are aggregated to the bank level, adjusted by bank size, and standardized. The W-index is the 
standardized sum of four size-adjusted workforce characteristics (MBA, Top School, Turnover, and Job 
Jumper). Bank equity beta is measured during 2004–2006. Book-to-market, leverage, and assets are 
measured at the end of fiscal year 2006. All specifications include fixed effects for assets quintiles. Robust 
standard errors are reported in brackets. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 
or 10% (*) level. 
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Columns 4–5 report the results separately for banks located in areas with low (below 
median) and with high (above median) home price growth. In each of the specifications, 
my baseline result remains intact, and the W-index is still a significant negative 
predictor of bank performance during crisis. Econometrically, this suggests that my 
results are not driven by differences in the W-index in areas with high exposure to the 
real estate bubble relative to areas with low exposure to the bubble. Particularly, the 
W-index turns out to be an important predictor of crisis performance for banks within 
the same level of housing bubble exposure. In other words, high W-index banks in states 
like Nevada fare worse in crisis compared to low-W index banks in states like Nevada; 
and the same is true for banks located in states like Iowa. Taken together with the 
earlier results, it is plausible that high W-index banks took more risk in the pre-crisis 
years—irrespectively of whether they were located in areas with booming or sluggish 
house prices—and were more vulnerable to the crisis for that reason. I next explore 
whether the form of pre-crisis risk-taking varies depending on the dynamics of home 
prices. 
Panels A and B of Table 3.9 examine two different forms of housing-related risk-
taking—securitization activity and holding of real estate derivatives, respectively. For 
securitization, I calculate the average outstanding principle balance of assets sold and 
securitized with servicing retained or with recourse or other seller-provided credit 
enhancements between 2003 and 2006. I use both the continuous variable and an 
indicator variable for it being greater than zero (evidence of some securitization 
activity) as dependent variables in Panel A.63 I also use as an ex-ante measure of loans’ 
                                                     
63 I follow Erel, Nadauld, and Stulz (2014) in defining variables to capture banks’ securitization activities. 
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Table 3.9: Housing bubble and risk-taking 
 
Panel A: Risky loans and securitization 
 
Subsample: Low housing bubble location High housing bubble location 
 
Interest on 
loans 
Securitization in 
2003–2006 
Interest on 
loans 
Securitization in 
2003–2006 
  
> 0 Ln( $ ) 
 
> 0 Ln( $ ) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
W-index 0.001 -0.013 -0.016 0.003** 0.056** 0.690** 
 
[0.002] [0.043] [0.636] [0.001] [0.026] [0.313] 
Share of real estate loans 0.024 -0.455* -7.396* 0.016 -0.584** -9.862* 
 
[0.022] [0.265] [4.118] [0.023] [0.281] [5.076] 
Share of C&I Loans -0.005 -0.486 -8.192 -0.001 -0.697* -12.021* 
 
[0.020] [0.424] [5.861] [0.025] [0.358] [6.101] 
Net interest margin 0.145 -1.607 -39.063 0.533*** -1.788 -24.405 
 
[0.547] [4.760] [77.465] [0.120] [1.424] [25.713] 
Assets quintile FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 110 110 110 110 110 110 
R-squared 0.16 0.32 0.358 0.389 0.461 0.519 
 
Panel B: Holdings of risky assets and risk management 
 
 Highly rated residual Private MBS 
Risk management 
index 
Housing bubble 
subsample: Low High Low High Low High 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
W-index 0.016** 0.003* 0.011* 0.002 -0.085* -0.026 
 
[0.007] [0.002] [0.006] [0.001] [0.049] [0.028] 
Book-to-market 0.013 -0.047 0.047 -0.044 -0.100 -0.168 
 
[0.031] [0.030] [0.037] [0.030] [0.337] [0.317] 
Beta -0.02 -0.019 -0.002 0.002 -0.662 -2.785*** 
 
[0.041] [0.029] [0.032] [0.029] [0.918] [1.000] 
Leverage -0.002 0.002 -0.005 0.002 0.005 0.02 
 
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.029] [0.028] 
Assets quintile FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 110 111 110 111 42 41 
R-squared 0.223 0.251 0.202 0.206 0.299 0.44 
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Table 3.9: Housing bubble and risk-taking (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Fraction of loans charged-off in crisis 
 
(Sub)sample: Full Full Full Low bubble 
location 
High bubble 
location 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
W-index 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.000 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Housing bubble 0.007   0.002 0.029*** 
 
[0.005]   [0.014] [0.008] 
Net interest margin 0.263*** 0.249*** 0.252*** 0.395*** 0.245*** 
 
[0.063] [0.063] [0.065] [0.110] [0.081] 
Fixed Effects 
   
  
Housing bubble 
   
  
Quintile No Yes No No No 
Decile No No Yes No No 
Assets quintile Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 220 220 220 110 110 
R-squared 0.191 0.204 0.260 0.204 0.305 
 
Notes: This table reports results of cross-sectional OLS regressions relating bank risk-taking before the 
financial crisis to workforce characteristics. Highly Rated Residual is the fraction of assets held in highly 
rated tranches of securitization, on average, between 2003 and 2006. Private MBS is the fraction of assets 
held in private MBS, on average, between 2003 and 2006. The Risk Management Index measures the 
strength of bank risk management. Interest on Loans is the ratio of interest income on loans to total loans 
as of the previous year, on average, between 2003 and 2006. The dollar amount of securitization is set 
equal to the average outstanding principle balance of assets sold and securitized with servicing retained or 
with recourse or other seller-provided credit enhancements between 2003 and 2006. Housing Bubble is the 
growth of home prices in a bank’s locations. It is measured as a weighted average of the increase in 2003–
2006 of median home prices in states where a bank had branches in 2006. This measure is weighted by the 
amount of a bank’s deposits in each of these states. Results are reported separately for banks located in 
areas with low (below median) and with high (above median) house prices growth, as indicated in the 
header of each column. The workforce characteristics are (a) having an MBA degree, (b) having a degree 
from a top 50 university, (c) job turnover, defined as the negative of current job tenure and (d) job 
jumper, defined as changing jobs more frequently than a median employee with similar career length. 
These workforce measures are aggregated to the bank level, adjusted by bank size, and standardized. The 
W-index is the standardized sum of four size-adjusted workforce characteristics (MBA, Top School, 
Turnover, and Job Jumper). Bank equity beta is measured during 2000–2002. Book-to-market, leverage, 
assets, share of real estate loans in total loans, share of C&I loans in total loans, and net interest margin 
are measured at the end of fiscal year 2002. All specifications include fixed effects for assets quintiles. 
Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 
5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
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riskiness the interest on loans, introduced in Table 3.7. For the real estate derivatives, I 
use the same measures I introduced in Table 3.7—fractions of assets held in highly rated 
tranches of securitization and fraction of assets held in private mortgage-backed 
securities. 
It turns out that there is a separating equilibrium in the form of banks’ risk-
taking that depends on the dynamics of home prices in banks’ locations. High W-index 
banks based in states like Iowa—with low bubble exposure—do not have as much of an 
opportunity to extend and securitize risky loans secured by real estate. They can and 
do, however, choose to be exposed to the housing bubble by holding synthetic assets 
backed by real estate on their balance sheets.64 On the contrary, high W-index banks 
based in states like Nevada are active in originating risky loans (with high interest 
rates) and securitizing them, but not in holding real estate derivatives on their books. 
Panel A of Table 3.9 shows that the relationship between interest on loans and 
securitization activity in 2003–2006 is related to the W-index only in the subsample of 
banks with above-median exposure to the housing bubble. Panel B of Table 3.9 
illustrates that the relationship between holdings of real estate-linked securities is 
stronger for banks with below-median exposure the housing bubble. Interestingly, the 
quality of bank’s risk management is negatively correlated with the W-index for banks 
in areas with sluggish growth of house prices. In other words, high W-index banks in 
states like Iowa had poor risk management practices. This may help explain why these 
banks had higher holdings of securities deemed toxic as the crisis unraveled.65 
                                                     
64 Particularly, they hold highly rated securitization tranches and private mortgage-backed securities. 
65 This result should be taken with caution because RMI—the risk management index—is defined for less 
than half of the banks in my sample. 
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This set of results warrants an interesting interpretation. What I observe could 
be a consequence of risk transfer between banks. High W-index banks in states with 
booming real estate prices originated high-yield loans, securitized them, and sold real 
estate-linked derivatives to high W-index banks located in states with sluggish growth 
in home prices. It is precisely the opportunity to securitize risky loans that made this 
risk transfer possible and enabled high W-index banks in states like Iowa—to their 
detriment—to gain exposure to the housing bubble through holdings of private MBS 
and highly-rated securitization tranches. To a certain extent, this risk transfer mitigated 
the losses that high W-index banks in states like Nevada experienced in crisis, because 
some of the loans that they would have charged-off in crisis were already off their 
balance sheets through securitization. This is confirmed in Panel C of Table 3.9 which 
shows that the relationship between the fraction of loans charged-off in crisis and the 
W-index is weaker for banks located in areas with high home price growth pre-crisis. 
3.7 Local Labor Markets and the W-Index  
It is possible that the relationship between the W-index and bank performance 
reflects local labor market conditions. For example, it may be the case that MBA or top 
school degree holders are concentrated—and thus available for employment—in only 
certain areas. Banks sourcing their labor force from these locations will hire from a pool 
of employees stacked in favor MBAs and top school graduates. In case employees with 
such characteristics are mostly available in regions with a highly pronounced boom-bust 
cycle, the relationship I document may just reflect local hiring. I rule out this possibility 
in Table 3.10. 
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Table 3.10: Location- and bank-specific effects 
 
  
Highly 
rated 
residual 
Private 
MBS 
Interest 
on loans Volatility Tail risk 
Crisis 
stock 
returns 
% of 
charge-Offs 
in crisis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Local W-index 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.001** 0.001** -0.071*** 0.001 
 
[0.004] [0.003] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.027] [0.001] 
Bank W-index 0.006** 0.005** 0.003*** 0.000* 0.001* -0.122*** 0.002* 
 
[0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.031] [0.001] 
Book-to-market -0.045 -0.042 0.01 0.002 0.004 -0.05 
 
 
[0.030] [0.027] [0.016] [0.002] [0.004] [0.250] 
 Beta 0.032 0.015 -0.003 0.002 0.000 0.382** 
 
 
[0.021] [0.018] [0.009] [0.002] [0.005] [0.168] 
 Leverage 0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 
 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.019] 
 Net interest margin 
      
0.280*** 
       
[0.095] 
Assets quintile FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 149 149 169 149 149 148 148 
R-squared 0.251 0.193 0.115 0.426 0.36 0.241 0.111 
 
Notes: This table reports results of cross-sectional OLS regressions relating banks’ pre-crisis risk-taking 
(Model 1–5) and crisis performance (Models 6–7) to workforce characteristics. Highly Rated Residual is 
the fraction of assets held in highly rated tranches of securitization, on average, between 2003 and 2006. 
Private MBS is the fraction of assets held in private MBS, on average, between 2003 and 2006. Interest 
on Loans is the ratio of interest income on loans to total loans as of the previous year, on average, 
between 2003 and 2006. Volatility of daily stock returns is measured between 2003 and 2006. Tail Risk is 
the negative of the average return on the 5% of the worst trading days of a stock in 2003–2006. Bank 
performance is measured as buy-and-hold stock returns from June 2007 to December 2008 and fraction of 
loans charged-off in 2007–2009. The workforce characteristics are (a) having an MBA degree, (b) having a 
degree from a top 50 university, (c) job turnover, defined as the negative of current job tenure and (d) job 
jumper, defined as changing jobs more frequently than a median employee with similar career length. 
These workforce measures are aggregated to the bank level, adjusted by bank size, and standardized. The 
W-index is the standardized sum of four size-adjusted workforce characteristics (MBA, Top School, 
Turnover, and Job Jumper). Local W-index is set equal to the average W-index of other banks located in 
the same state as the bank under consideration. Bank W-index is the difference between W-index and 
Local W-index. Bank equity beta is measured during 2000–2002. Book-to-market, leverage, assets, and net 
interest margin are measured at the end of fiscal year 2002. All specifications include fixed effects for 
assets quintiles. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Asterisks denote statistical significance 
at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 
174 
 
I start by constructing, for each bank, an average W-index of other banks located 
in the same state with the bank under consideration. I call this the Local W-index.66 I 
also introduce a Bank W-index which I obtain by subtracting Local W-index from the 
basic W-index measure. Put differently, I decompose the W-index of each bank into its 
local component and into its bank-specific component. I then use both the location and 
bank-specific W-indices in a series of regressions to understand banks’ pre-crisis risk 
taking (Columns 1–5) and bank performance (Columns 6–7). I find that for ex-ante risk-
taking measures (holdings of highly rated securitization tranches, private MBS, and 
riskiness of loans in Columns 1–3), it is only the bank-specific W-index that is relevant. 
For ex-post market-based realized risk measures (i.e., volatility in Column 4 and tail 
risk in Column 5) it appears that both the Local and Bank W-indices matter. The same 
is true for stock performance in crisis (Column 6), though for loan charge-offs only a 
bank’s own workforce characteristics are important. 
Taken together, these results suggest that while the workforce characteristics of 
the locality may be informative on bank volatility, the balance sheet ex-ante measures 
of risk-taking are entirely driven by banks’ own workforce characteristics and not by 
those of the locality as a whole. These results are consistent with the fact that workforce 
characteristics are not simply picking up the location effects but rather are reflective of 
a bank’s strategy or its predisposition to take on risk. 
3.8 Job Relevance and the W-Index 
To utilize the full power of my individual-level dataset, I can use job titles and 
job descriptions to classify people into different groups depending on their function in a 
                                                     
66 My Local W-index measure is—by its nature—defined only for banks in states that have more than one 
bank in my sample. 
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bank. If, as I hypothesize above, the relationship between the W-index and bank 
performance stems from bank risk-taking, then I expect that this relationship will be 
more pronounced if the analysis is performed on those employees who work in areas of 
the bank where they have impact on risk-taking (e.g., loan origination) rather than less 
relevant occupations (e.g., support roles). 
Table 3.11 provides a brief snapshot of the job descriptions I observe in my 
dataset. I start by stemming words in each job description. Then I discard the words 
from the list of common stop words (such as “and”, “the”, “a”, etc.). Panel A reports 
the 50 stemmed words most frequently used in job descriptions of bank employees in my 
sample. The list contains stems that are related to banking in general (e.g.,  
manag, busi, bank, etc.) as well as words that provide information about an employee’s 
job function (e.g., loan, sale, risk, etc.). 
I then use a latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA)67 model of topic discovery to see if 
individual job descriptions group together in a meaningful way. LDA is a machine 
learning method that examines the relative frequencies of words in different documents 
and posits that each document is a combination of a small number of topics—collections 
of words—from which the words used in the document are drawn.68 The top 5 words for 
each topic identified by an LDA model with 9 topics are reported in Panel B of Table 
3.11. These are the words most representative of a specific topic. The topics are 
reported by the algorithm in no particular order. In this particular case, I have sorted 
                                                     
67 LDA is a popular model for collections of discrete data, such as texts, introduced by Blei et al. (2003). 
68 In terms of applications of topic models, Blei and Lafferty (2006) use dynamic topic models to analyze 
archives of the journal Science from 1880 through 2000 and can infer the rise and fall of a specific topic’s 
(e.g., atomic physics) popularity over time. More recently, Jelveh et al. (2015) extend methods introduced 
by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) and apply LDA to economists’ academic papers to identify their 
political ideology and eventually its impact on research results. 
176 
 
them in a way that allows for intuitive interpretation of the first four topics. Topic 1, 
for example, features the keywords loan, mortgag, account, process, and review and is 
likely describing employees whose job functions are related to loans. Topic 2—with the 
keywords risk, finance, invest, manag, bank—potentially identifies risk management-
related roles. Topic 3 has the keywords custom, manag, sale, service, busi and is thus 
likely associated with customer- or sales-related job functions. Finally, Topic 4 contains 
the keywords system, applic, support, data, test and plausibly points to employees that 
work in IT roles. The remaining topics are hard to interpret. 
The LDA results reported in Panel B of Table 3.11—and particularly the 
possibility of identifying reasonable topics—speaks to the meaningfulness of the textual 
job descriptions in my dataset. I can use these job descriptions to classify employees 
into two groups—employees with impact on risk-taking and other employees. Employees 
are labeled as having impact if their job descriptions contain one of the following 
stemmed words: loan, mortgag, credit, risk, or sale. I then calculate my W-index for 
both subsets of employees—those with impact and the others. I show in Panel C of 
Table 3.11 that the W-index is related to my performance measures of stock return in 
crisis and percentage of charge-offs in crisis only for those employees with impact. Also, 
as expected, I find that volatility is positively related to the W-index of the impactful 
employees, but not the others. 
The fact that the relationship between my workforce measures and performance 
is driven by employees with impact and not by other employees adds credence to the 
hypothesis that the relationship between human capital and crisis performance is not 
due to some proxy for risk-taking unrelated to workforce characteristics. 
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Table 3.11: Job descriptions and employees with impact 
 
Panel A: Most frequently used words in job descriptions 
 
Word Freq. 
(%)  
Word Freq. 
(%)  
Word Freq. 
(%)  
Word Freq. 
(%)  
Word Freq. 
(%) 
manag 46.2 
 
respons 13.2 
 
assist 10.9 
 
risk 9.0 
 
branch 7.4 
busi 22.3 
 
process 13.0 
 
support 10.6 
 
perform 8.7 
 
mortgag 7.4 
bank 20.4 
 
client 12.9 
 
offic 10.6 
 
provid 8.0 
 
train 7.3 
servic 19.0 
 
financi 12.8 
 
relationship 10.5 
 
execut 8.0 
 
amp 7.1 
presid 17.4 
 
custom 12.6 
 
project 10.4 
 
system 8.0 
 
intern 7.0 
vice 16.8 
 
loan 12.3 
 
market 10.0 
 
ensur 7.8 
 
invest 6.8 
develop 16.6 
 
oper 12.2 
 
account 9.9 
 
implement 7.7 
 
review 6.8 
team 15.1 
 
analyst 12.0 
 
work 9.9 
 
consult 7.6 
 
commerci 6.6 
product 13.6 
 
includ 11.8 
 
report 9.6 
 
lead 7.6 
 
program 6.6 
senior 13.3 
 
sale 11.4 
 
credit 9.2 
 
plan 7.5 
 
complianc 6.6 
 
 
Panel B: Top five keywords in LDA topics 
 
Keywords identified by LDA 
Topic 1 loan, mortgag, account, process, review 
Topic 2 risk, financi, invest, manag, bank,  
Topic 3 custom, manag, sale, servic, busi 
Topic 4 system, applic, support, data, test 
Topic 5 student, assist, program, design, research 
Topic 6 director, real, estat, commerci, manag 
Topic 7 manag, project, develop, busi, team 
Topic 8 event, recruit, medium, work, commun 
Topic 9 presid, manag, vice, senior, consult 
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Table 3.11: Job descriptions and employees with impact (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Crisis performance and employees with impact 
 
  
Stock return in 
crisis 
% of charge-offs 
in Crisis 
Volatility in 
2003–2006 
  (1) (2) (3) 
W-index: employees with impact -0.097*** 0.002* 0.001** 
 
[0.035] [0.001] [0.000] 
W-index: other employees -0.051 0.000 0.000 
 
[0.033] [0.001] [0.000] 
Book-to-market -0.334* 
 
0.000 
 
[0.182] 
 
[0.002] 
Beta 1.222*** 
 
0.028*** 
 
[0.411] 
 
[0.003] 
Leverage 0.01 
 
0.000** 
 
[0.017] 
 
[0.000] 
Net interest margin 
 
0.296*** 
 
  
[0.063] 
 Assets quintile FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 200 201 202 
R-squared 0.267 0.163 0.61 
 
Notes: Panel A reports the stems of words used most frequently in job descriptions of bank employees in 
my sample. The stems are sorted by the fraction of job descriptions in which they are used. Panel B 
reports the top five keywords for topics identified by Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model of topic 
discovery. Panel C reports results of cross-sectional OLS regressions relating bank crisis performance and 
pre-crisis volatility to workforce characteristics. Bank performance is measured as buy-and-hold stock 
returns from June 2007 to December 2008 and fraction of loans charged-off in 2007–2009. The workforce 
characteristics are (a) having an MBA degree, (b) having a degree from a top 50 university, (c) job 
turnover, defined as the negative of current job tenure and (d) job jumper, defined as changing jobs more 
frequently than a median employee with similar career length. These workforce measures are aggregated 
to the bank level, adjusted by bank size, and standardized. The W-index is the standardized sum of four 
size-adjusted workforce characteristics (MBA, Top School, Turnover, and Job Jumper). The W-index is 
measured separately for “employees with impact” and other employees. Employees are classified as having 
impact if their job descriptions contain word stems: loan, mortgag, credit, risk, or sale. Bank equity beta 
is measured during 2004–2006. Book-to-market, leverage, assets, net interest margin are measured at the 
end of fiscal year 2006. All specifications include fixed effects for assets quintiles. Robust standard errors 
are reported in brackets. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) 
level.
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3.9 Performance in the 1998 Crisis 
My baseline result and subsequent analysis suggest that workforce characteristics 
can be used as an indicator of a bank’s propensity to take on risk and its vulnerability 
to crisis. Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) show that banks’ vulnerability to crisis is persistent 
in its own right. In particular, they document that a bank’s stock return in the 1998 
crisis is a strong predictor of its performance in the recent financial crisis. They suggest 
that this relationship demonstrates the persistence of banks’ risk culture or some aspects 
of their business models. Since there is some support for the W-index capturing 
vulnerability to crisis through the same channel, I next use both the 1998 crisis return 
and the W-index as of year-end 1997 to predict bank performance in the recent crisis.69 
Column 1 of Table 3.12 successfully replicates the baseline effect of Fahlenbrach 
et al. (2012) in the subsample of banks for which I have workforce composition data in 
1997. The 1998 crisis return is set equal to the buy-and-hold return from August 3, 1998 
to the date when a stock achieves its lowest value in 1998. Column 2 of Table 3.12 
illustrates that the W-index as of as early as 1997 is still negatively related to the 
performance in the recent financial crisis. The two measures are controlled for 
simultaneously in Column 3. The magnitudes of both are reduced, and the statistical 
significance of the 1998 crisis returns decreases relatively more—to the 10% level. This 
is consistent with the notion that the W-index in fact captures a persistent component 
of a bank’s risk culture that has an effect on performance, even a decade removed. 
 
 
 
                                                     
69 As noted previously, since the professional networking platform did not exist in 1997, I rely on 
information that individuals retroactively filled out when they created their pages. 
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Table 3.12: The persistence of banks’ vulnerability to crisis 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1998 crisis return 0.821*** 
 
0.584* 0.451 
 
[0.291] 
 
[0.331] [0.305] 
W-index as of 1997 
 
-0.100*** -0.076** -0.144*** 
  
[0.032] [0.035] [0.042] 
∆ W-index from 1997 to 2006 
   
-0.131*** 
    
[0.049] 
Book-to-market -0.594** -0.728** -0.659** -0.731** 
 
[0.277] [0.309] [0.299] [0.321] 
Beta 1.544** 1.964*** 1.793** 1.610** 
 
[0.764] [0.672] [0.709] [0.705] 
Leverage -0.021 -0.015 -0.019 -0.01 
 
[0.033] [0.034] [0.032] [0.032] 
Assets quintile FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 95 95 95 95 
R-squared 0.323 0.33 0.355 0.404 
 
Notes: This table reports results of cross-sectional OLS regressions relating bank performance during the 
crisis of 1998 and workforce characteristics to performance in the recent financial crisis. 1998 Crisis 
Return is the bank’s stock return from August 3, 1998 until the day in 1998 on which the stock price 
attained its lowest value. The workforce characteristics are (a) having an MBA degree, (b) having a 
degree from a top 50 university, (c) job turnover, defined as the negative of current job tenure and (d) job 
jumper, defined as changing jobs more frequently than a median employee with similar career length. 
These workforce measures are aggregated to the bank level, adjusted by bank size, and standardized. The 
W-index is the standardized sum of four size-adjusted workforce characteristics (MBA, Top School, 
Turnover, and Job Jumper). W-index is measured as of year-end 1997. Model 3 includes both the 1998 
crisis return and the W-index as independent variables. Model 4 includes an additional variable, the 
change in bank workforce characteristics between the two crisis periods. The change in the W-index is 
computed as the difference in the W-index between year-end 1997 and year-end 2006. Bank equity beta is 
measured from 2004 to 2006. Book-to-market, leverage, and assets are measured at the end of fiscal year 
2006. All specifications include fixed effects for assets quintiles. Robust standard errors are reported in 
brackets. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 
 
I also explore the time series variation of the W-index in Column 4 of Table 3.12. 
In particular, I include a control variable equal to the difference between the W-index in 
2006 and the W-index in 1997 for the same bank. The point estimate on that variable is 
negative and significant. This result suggests that not only does the level of the W-index 
in 1997 matter for the recent financial crisis performance, but also the change of the W-
index in the intervening period between the two crises is relevant. Interestingly, the 
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significance of the 1998 crisis disappears once we include this change in W-index as an 
added control. 
Table 3.13: Bank performance in the 1998 crisis 
 
  1998 Crisis Volatility 
 
Stock Return 1H 1998 2H 1998 
  (1) (2) (3) 
W-index -0.036*** 0.000 0.003* 
 
[0.013] [0.001] [0.002] 
Book-to-market 0.176** -0.005 -0.007 
 
[0.086] [0.003] [0.008] 
Beta -0.079* 0.001 0.006** 
 
[0.045] [0.002] [0.003] 
Leverage -0.029*** 0.001 0.001 
 
[0.009] [0.000] [0.001] 
Assets quintile FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 97 97 97 
R-squared 0.362 0.267 0.353 
 
Notes: This table reports results of cross-sectional OLS regressions relating bank performance during the 
crisis of 1998 to workforce characteristics. 1998 Crisis Return (Model 1) is the bank’s stock return from 
August 3, 1998 until the day in 1998 on which the stock price attained its lowest value. Volatility of daily 
stock returns in the first and second halves of 1998 is studied in Models 2 and 3, respectively. The 
workforce characteristics are (a) having an MBA degree, (b) having a degree from a top 50 university, (c) 
job turnover, defined as the negative of current job tenure and (d) job jumper, defined as changing jobs 
more frequently than a median employee with similar career length. These workforce measures are 
aggregated to the bank level, adjusted by bank size, and standardized. The W-index is the standardized 
sum of four size-adjusted workforce characteristics (MBA, Top School, Turnover, and Job Jumper). Bank 
equity beta is measured during 1995–1997. Book-to-market, leverage, assets, and workforce characteristics 
are measured at the end of fiscal year 1997. All specifications include fixed effects for assets quintiles. 
Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 
5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 
 
Table 3.13 relates the 1997 W-index to the 1998 crisis return. If the W-index is in 
fact a measure of a bank’s risk appetite, it should be indicative of a bank’s vulnerability 
not only to the recent financial crisis, but also to the 1998 crisis—even though the two 
differed in their fundamental causes. My results are consistent with this hypothesis. 
Column 1 shows that the 1997 W-index is a statistically significant predictor of the 1998 
crisis return. Columns 2 and 3 confirm that this relationship is attributable to the crisis 
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event. In particular, I show that only in the second half of 1998—and not in the first 
half—does volatility of stock returns have a statistically significant relationship with the 
W-index. 
3.10 Conclusion 
I find that banks with a higher proportion of employees with certain 
characteristics—MBA and top school degrees, tendency to shift jobs and shorter job 
tenures—perform worse during periods of crisis. A one standard deviation increase in 
the fraction of MBAs lowers stock returns between July 2007 and December 2008 by 4.5 
percentage points. Similar statistics for top degree holders, workers with short tenures, 
and job jumpers are 9.4 percentage points, 13.5 percentage points, and 12.2 percentage 
points, respectively. A one standard deviation increase in the W-index—the 
standardized sum of the other four measures—is related to a 14.5 percentage point 
decrease in stock returns during the recent financial crisis. The results are similar for 
bank failures and for the fraction of loans charged-off in crisis.70 
My results are not explained by the fact that banks grew tremendously in the 
pre-crisis period and tended to hire individuals with the aforementioned characteristics. 
I find a strong relationship between crisis performance and the W-index even if I 
calculate the latter using the workforces of banks at the turn of the century. This 
suggests that there are persistent qualities of banks’ workforces that are predictive of 
their vulnerability to crisis. My results are not, however, capturing a difference between 
“good banks” with strong performance in times of boom and bust alike, and “bad 
                                                     
70 The relationship I document between bank performance and workforce characteristics cannot be 
attributed to my workforce measures proxying for observable bank characteristics like assets growth, loan 
portfolio composition, and residual compensation, among others. 
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banks” that consistently underperform. Rather, banks that score highly on my 
workforce measures tend to be above-average performers in the pre-crisis period, but 
perform poorly after crisis onset. 
I show that high W-index banks had a predisposition to take on risk in the pre-
crisis period as measured by the ratio of highly rated securitization tranches to assets, 
the ratio of private mortgage-backed securities to assets, and the interest rates on loans. 
They also had higher volatility and tail risk, relatively poor risk management, and 
engaged in more securitization. These results support the hypothesis that workforce 
characteristics are capturing aspects of banks’ risk appetites.  
When extrapolating my results to the 1998 crisis, I find that the same workforce 
measures that are able to predict which firms will perform well in the Great Recession 
also predict outcomes in the earlier crisis, despite its fundamentally different nature. I 
find evidence consistent with the notion that the persistence of banks’ vulnerability to 
crisis can be explained by the stickiness of their workforce characteristics, which in turn 
may capture components of their underlying risk cultures. 
My findings demonstrate that looking to workforce measures can be a powerful 
indicator of banks’ vulnerability to crisis. These measures are especially valuable in an 
industry like finance, where banks are easily able to obscure their financial capital in 
order to obfuscate any problematic signals from their investors and the public at large. 
Human capital, on the other hand, is much harder to disguise, and this paper manifests 
its importance in demonstrating which firms will succeed—and which will fail—in times 
of tumult. One natural question that merits further consideration is whether this 
184 
 
relationship has especially strong predictive power in firms where obscurity is at its 
most extreme.71 
Taken together, the results in this paper suggest that workforce composition 
sheds light on the elusive “quantifiable information about a bank’s risk culture or 
business model that could be used to measure its sensitivity to crises” that Fahlenbrach 
et al. (2012) remain in search of at the end of their analysis.72 
 
                                                     
71 Measures of firms’ obscurity are tantamount to, for example, the disagreement among analysts about 
expected earnings (Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina 2002) or information processing complexity (Cohen 
and Lou 2012). 
72 The last paragraph in the conclusion of Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) reads as follows: “In the absence of 
quantifiable information about a bank’s risk culture or business model that could be used to measure its 
sensitivity to crises, our evidence shows that there is strong persistence in crisis exposure for crises that 
are 10 years apart so that a bank’s performance in one crisis is an important measure of its inherent 
riskiness and exposure to crises.” 
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